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ITERATING TOWARD PERFECTION, WHEN PERFECTION IS 
UNATTAINABLE 
 
Charles E. MacLean* 
 
 
We look back now with haughty disdain and self-
righteous indignation at the law of capital punishment as it 
existed in America just a very short time ago: regularly 
executing convicts who were mentally ill1 or retarded,2 under 
the age of eighteen,3 or found guilty of non-homicide 
offenses.4 Not long ago in America, all-White juries and White 
judges, after hearing racially charged arguments from White 
prosecutors, took mere minutes to convict minority 
defendants who had been represented by patently ineffective 
                                                 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. Professor 
MacLean was an Assistant Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial 
University-Duncan School of Law until May 2013. He was one of the 
Faculty Advisors to the LMU Law Review and taught a Death 
Penalty Seminar in the spring of 2013 at LMU. 
1 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
3 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
4 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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counsel.5 To many, this sounds horrific, and we may ask 
ourselves, “How could it have been like that in America?”  
That was the reality just a few short years ago. The 
broken American capital punishment system of several 
decades ago began to change only after courageous legal 
researchers and scholars spoke up and confronted the hidden 
and tragic realities on America’s death rows. In this volume, a 
new group of young scholars and researchers pick up the 
mantle from those who came before and stand on their 
shoulders to confront the injustice and inequality played out 
still in today’s American capital punishment system. 
Tomorrow’s scholars will stand on the shoulders of the 
scholars whose vision and creativity is captured on these 
pages in the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.   
When a society chooses, through its criminal justice 
system, to execute certain criminals who have violated the 
law, that society must ensure that the system by which death 
is imposed is just, accurate, race-neutral, and defensible. If a 
society chooses to allow capital punishment to continue, the 
system must ensure that only the “worst of the worst”6 are 
executed, and that procedures are in place to compel the 
system’s decision-makers – prosecutors, judges, jurors – to 
                                                 
5 E.g., Missouri v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996). The White 
presiding judge in Kinder, while campaigning for his seat during 
pendency of the trial, had issued a press release stating in pertinent 
part, “The [other] party places far too much emphasis on 
representing minorities . . . people who dont’ [sic] want to work, and 
people with a skin that’s any color but white.” Missouri v. Kinder, 
Appellant’s Brief, No. 75082 (Mo. 1996) (excerpted at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-black-and-white-
who-lives-who-dies-who-decides#7). See also Peek v. Florida, 488 So. 
2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986) (wherein the White presiding judge, as the 
penalty phase was set to begin, stated in court, “Since the nigger 
mom and dad are here anyway, why don’t we go ahead and do the 
penalty phase today instead of having to subpoena them back at cost 
to the state”). See generally David Baldus, et al., Comparative Review of 
Death Sentences: An Empirical study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1983). 
6 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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elevate law and reason over emotion and revenge. Of course, 
as humans, we are incapable of creating a perfect and error-
free capital punishment system. One might then ask, if we 
cannot create a perfect capital system, then why have one at 
all? Conversely, since we cannot create a perfect capital 
punishment system, how much injustice and error should 
society accept before capital punishment becomes 
fundamentally unjust? These questions tear at the fabric of the 
death penalty system in America. They also, however, raise 
more questions.   
Why do we ask such searching questions only of our 
capital punishment system? When a person is put to death by 
a constitutionally infirm and discriminatory system, most of 
us can perceive the need for change, and many of us call for 
change, but injustice permeates more than just the capital 
punishment system. Blacks are imprisoned today at twice the 
rate of Whites in every FBI crime category except driving 
under the influence of alcohol and other alcohol-related 
offenses.7 In a 2007 study, seven states reported an 
incarceration rate for Blacks that was ten times higher than 
that for Whites.8 Thus, we should be intolerant of 
discrimination no matter where it arises in the criminal justice 
system, and not just in capital cases. Arguably, there is only 
marginally less injustice when an unjustly convicted person is 
sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. Perhaps the 
next steps to be taken by some of the researchers in this 
volume will be to address unjust convictions with a depth and 
breadth that spans the entire criminal justice system.   
When society became uneasy with public executions, 
we moved them indoors. When society confronted the fact 
that execution by hanging, electrocution, or the firing squad 
                                                 
7 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012, 
table 43A (2013). 
8 Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF 
INCARCERATION BY RACE & ETHNICITY, table 6 (The Sentencing Project 
July 2007). 
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was unnecessarily painful and cruel, we substituted death by 
lethal injection. When a three-drug protocol occasionally led 
the condemned to suffer extreme pain and suffering, some 
states moved to a one-drug protocol. But these purported 
solutions are proverbial pats on the head, because the flaws 
and injustices reside at the core of the death penalty system. 
Thus, we must ask whether our society, like so many across 
the globe, should abolish the death penalty altogether. 
Capital punishment as a research focus is a glum 
endeavor. Tragedy abounds on all sides of death penalty 
cases, and many would rather that the practice remain hidden 
from plain view, “off our radar” in execution chambers, and in 
the bowels of correctional facilities. This is precisely why the 
courageous young researchers who penned the student notes 
in this volume in conjunction with a 2013 Death Penalty 
Seminar at Lincoln Memorial University’s Duncan School of 
Law have contributed to the American capital punishment 
debate in extraordinary ways. Their efforts give life to the late 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concept that since “death is 
different,”9 our procedures and the quantum of due process 
must be of the highest order. Simply put, the research 
presented here is of the highest order. 
Sheena Foster probes the special challenges and 
evidentiary dilemmas facing capital defendants suffering from 
Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome and their variants. Foster 
wisely concludes that evidence and expert testimony 
regarding a defendant’s disabilities must be admissible 
because otherwise, capital jurors may misinterpret visible 
symptoms of these mental illnesses as evidence of disinterest, 
lack of remorse, lack of empathy for the victim, or worse. 
Foster calls for broader admissibility to ensure these special 
defendants can truly have their cases heard by fully informed 
jurors. 
Paige Coleman argues that America is perilously close 
to losing international credibility because we are so out-of-step 
                                                 
9 Ford, 477 U.S. at 411. 
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with the rest of the industrialized world on how we approach 
capital punishment. Most recently, America was the only 
remaining death penalty nation, other than Somalia, that 
continued to allow executions of criminals whose crimes were 
committed when they were juveniles. As Coleman notes, it is 
appropriate for us to consider other nations’ approaches to the 
death penalty as we reconsider our own approaches. 
Nick Davenport’s thought-provoking note illuminates 
the links between Natural Law, the Declaration of 
Independence, and the American death penalty system. He 
posits, as Natural Law adherents explain, that by voluntarily 
continuing to live in America, we at least impliedly adopt and 
accept the criminal justice system’s strictures, including the 
principle that the death penalty is an accepted penalty for the 
“worst of the worst.” As Davenport argues, part of the price of 
living in and benefiting from this ordered society is that each 
of us tacitly accepts the risk that serious violations of criminal 
law can yield very serious consequences.   
Ivy Gardner’s thoughtful note demonstrates that cost-
benefit arguments, although they may play a reasonable role 
in grander discussions of the capital punishment system as a 
whole, have no rightful place in individual capital cases and 
therefore should be suppressed. The issues in the penalty 
phase of a capital case are properly about the nature of the 
offense and the nature of the offender. There is no room in the 
sentencing equation for an argument that the decision maker 
should rule for or against execution because it is cheaper or 
more expensive than life imprisonment. As Gardner notes, 
such economic arguments, where a defendant’s life is at stake, 
are at best unseemly, and at worst, unconstitutional. 
Kendall Inglish’s note focuses on the Atkins v. Virginia 
decision and the constitutionality of executing capital 
defendants who suffer from developmental disabilities or 
mental retardation. As Inglish concludes, the Atkins case has 
left the door open for states to set their own standards for 
determining which defendants are too mentally retarded to be 
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constitutionally executed, and in so doing, the Court has 
utterly failed to give the states any guidance on specific 
standards that might pass constitutional muster. 
Randall Noe, a career Tennessee law enforcement 
officer, who has lost coworkers and friends through violent 
crimes, presents a moving and insightful history of 
Tennessee’s experience (some may call it Tennessee’s 
experiments) with capital punishment. Noe’s insights into and 
connections with the topic were not merely the product of 
research at arm’s length. Rather, they were earned the old-
fashioned way – up close and personal. 
The Supreme Court’s struggle with capital 
punishment, at least since 1976, has not been easy or always in 
the same direction. In one case, all nine Supreme Court justices 
issued separate written opinions.10 Nor has the Court’s 
struggle been solely or even predominantly about 
constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, the Court has engaged in 
a practice that appears more like an exercise of judicial will 
than a principled jurisprudential quest. At times, it seems like 
the Court has arrived at a pre-ordained outcome while 
struggling to find a constitutional hook to support its decision. 
Shouldn’t it be the other way around? That is certainly not the 
kind of constitutional analysis the Court should typically 
perform.   
In a very real sense, “death is different.” Perhaps it is 
not enough to be an originalist and adhere only to the text and 
intent of the Framers. Perhaps it is not enough to be a “living 
Constitution” devotee and explain with a wave of the hand 
that the Framers intended these concepts to be malleable and 
adaptable over time as circumstances change. That makes the 
Supreme Court—not the people—in charge of telling us what 
the Constitution means now—and forever—in the death 
penalty area. 
Ultimately, one’s take on capital punishment is an 
individualized and complex equation that incorporates 
                                                 
10 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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religious, ethical, and moral concepts within a legal context. It 
is a personal matter, indeed.  Perhaps there is no one right 
answer, and perhaps our approach to terrestrial justice on 
Earth is doomed, as a product of humans who err, to be 
imperfect. But that does not moot the quest for perfection.  
Perhaps the “safest” religious, ethical, moral, and even legal 
path is to admit perfection is unattainable and simply abolish 
capital punishment as an option. But once a society has 
fervently decided to exact the most final retribution on its 
“worst of the worst” offenders that society must just as firmly 
bind itself to engage in that quest toward perfection, because 
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AUTISM IS NOT A TRAGEDY… IGNORANCE IS: 
SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME AND 
HIGH-FUNCTIONING AUTISM IN CAPITAL TRIALS 
PREJUDICES DEFENDANTS FOR A DEATH SENTENCE 
 
Sheena Foster* 
A jury is an unpredictable group. Each of the twelve 
jurors on a case could have a different and separate reason for 
reaching a verdict. The jury in each criminal case is asked to 
determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and in some 
cases that guilty verdict could lead to a death sentence for the 
accused. With a person’s life at stake, the criminal justice 
system should take every possible precaution to make sure the 
jury is properly informed (while not misled) to make this 
decision. If a defendant suffers from mental deficiency or 
diminished capacity, relevant evidence in that regard must be 
presented to the jury for the twelve jurors to reach a properly 
informed decision. Evidence of mental deficiency or disability 
can be relevant to defendant’s mental culpability – mens rea – 
for the crime, but these defects or disorders also explain a 
                                                 
* Sheena Foster, B.A.-History (University of Tennessee), J.D. (Lincoln 
Memorial University, Duncan School of Law). This article was 
originally presented to Death Penalty Seminar Professor Charles 
MacLean at Lincoln Memorial University, Duncan School of Law, 
spring semester 2013. 
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defendant’s mannerisms and responses, both outside of court, 
and in full view of the judge and jury. For this reason, jurors 
should always be allowed to view or hear evidence that relates 
to a defendant’s mental defect, disorder, or disability. 
Particularly in cases involving social disorders such as 
Asperger’s Syndrome (“AS”) and High-Functioning Autism 
(“HFA”), introducing the diagnosis to the jury could explain 
why the Defendant had particular reactions to other witnesses 
or victims before, during, or after the crime and why the 
defendant seems to lack remorse or normal social functioning 
in the courtroom. Without knowing and understanding a 
defendant’s mental disorder, the jurors could misinterpret the 
defendant’s social actions or lack of remorse as evidence of 
guilt.  
I. MENTAL/SOCIAL DISORDERS 
A number of mental/social disorders are closely 
related to and are parts of autistic spectrum disorders, 
including autism, HFA, AS, Deficits in Attention Motor 
Control and Perception (“DAMP”) syndrome, and other 
disorders that are based purely on observable behaviors.1 
These disorders are complex and new research regarding 
these disorders is surfacing constantly. Many of these 
disorders are related; one disorder could be mistaken for 
another, or an individual could be suffering from more than 
one of these or related disorders at the same time.2  
Asperger’s Syndrome and HFA have been 
characterized as milder forms of autism, but each disorder 
varies widely in degree.3 Characteristics of AS include social 
isolation, oddness, obsessive special interests, eccentric or 
pedantic use of language, physical clumsiness, and sensory 
                                                 
1 Maria Rhode, Asperger’s Syndrome: A Mixed Picture, 31 
PSYCHOANALYTIC INQUIRY 288, 288 (2011); Lotta Dellve, Lars 
Cernerud, and Lillemor R.-M. Hallberg, Harmonizing Dilemmas: 
Siblings of Children with DAMP and Asperger Syndrome’s Experiences of 
Coping with Their Life Situations, 14 SCAND J CARING SCI 172, 172 
(2000). 
2 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288. 
3 Id. 
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hypersensitivity.4 For example, a coin collector who lives for 
his hobby, has no close friends, feels overwhelmed by bright 
lights and loud noises, has difficulties communicating with 
people, and is bewildered by social cues would fit the typical 
profile of a person suffering from AS or HFA.5 
A problem arises in the court system when dealing 
with defendants who suffer from AS. First, the disorder is 
widely misunderstood by the general population and by most 
jury members. The disorder also varies in degree from person 
to person and there is no way to objectively measure such 
degrees as this disorder is based purely on observable 
behaviors.6 While low-functioning Autism will almost 
undoubtedly qualify a defendant as intellectually disabled and 
incompetent to stand trial, AS and HFA likely will not.7  The 
overlap between autism and mental retardation seems 
obvious, but courts in capital punishment states routinely hold 
there is no such correlation.8 The Supreme Court of Florida has 
held that while a diagnosis of AS serves purposes for 
mitigation, AS is considered a mere “mental illness [and] does 
not serve as a bar to execution.”9 The court’s decision was 
rendered in a case involving a defendant with AS, who was 
only eighteen years old and had the developmental and 
emotional age of twelve to thirteen.10 Louisiana has even 
included in its state law that a diagnosis of autism is not 
equivalent to a finding of mental retardation.11 With courts 
making blanket decisions about AS and whether or not it rises 
to the level of mentally retarded, the need increases for the 
                                                 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 859, 896-97 (2009) (citing Eric Fombonne, Epidemiology of Autistic 
disorder and Other Pervasive Developmental Disorders, 66 J. CLIN. 
PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 10) (2005)) (Almost 70% of persons suffering 
from a disorder under the autistic spectrum meet the diagnostic 
medical criteria to be classified as mentally retarded, and 30% do 
not.). 
8 Farahany, supra note 7, at 898.  
9 Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 563 (Fla. 2010). 
10 Id. at 543-44. 
11 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(2)(a) (2008). 
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public, especially jurors, to be aware of AS, its symptoms, and 
how it affects behaviors and thoughts. 
 
II. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Many courts have excluded evidence of psychiatric 
experts involving AS and HFA claiming any probative value 
would be substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing 
the jury causing members of the jury to speculate on how the 
disorder affected the defendant.12 However, when the jury 
does not have this information, the jurors are left to assume 
the defendant has a normal brain which is socially functional. 
This situation actually creates a higher danger of juror 
confusion, because many social mannerisms exhibited by a 
person suffering from AS or HFA are very similar to reactions 
associated with a guilty mind.  
If a defendant looks down at the table during the entire 
trial, jurors could interpret it to mean the defendant is 
ashamed and cannot bear to face the victims, witnesses, 
attorneys, or judge. In reality, looking down at the table may 
be something very common for persons with AS or HFA 
because isolation is a characteristic of both disorders.13 A jury 
lacking knowledge of the defendant’s mental conditions is 
very dangerous for the accused, who could be unfairly viewed 
in a different light just because of the mannerisms that are 
symptoms of these mental conditions. There is no existing 
danger, as prosecutors argue, in equipping the jury with 
relevant facts about the defendant’s mental conditions. The 
danger of prejudice lies with not introducing the evidence. 
Reports have found persons suffering from AS or HFA 
have a greater history of violent behaviors14 and a greater 
tendency toward violent crime, including murder.15 Several 
different hypotheses have been suggested to explain the 
association of AS with violent crime, including “lack of 
                                                 
12 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. 2010). 
13 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288. 
14 M. R. Woodbury-Smith, High functioning autism spectrum disorders, 
offending and other law-breaking: findings from a community sample, 17 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 108 (2006). 
15 D. M. Schwartz-Watts, Asperger’s disorder and murder, 33 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 390, 390 (2005). 
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empathy, social naiveté, excessive interests getting out of 
control,” and sexual preoccupations.16 However, this evidence 
does not prove having AS or HFA equates to a lack of intent. 
Expert psychiatric evidence would give the jury better insight 
into how the individual’s mind operates on a daily basis. The 
jury would still be free to determine, using the evidence 
presented, whether the defendant acted with the requisite 
intent. No expert can testify as to whether a person is guilty of 
a crime. This determination has always been and will be left to 
the jury.  
Most states require the prosecution to prove intent to 
kill as an element of a murder conviction, and the jury must 
consider the defendant’s subjective state of mind to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt whether that requisite intent 
existed at the time of the crime.17 In states that do not 
recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity, the jurors are 
left to speculate as to the mental state and brain functioning of 
a defendant whose mental state falls just shy of qualifying for 
an insanity defense. Minnesota courts, in particular, have held 
that psychiatric testimony cannot be used to disprove a 
defendant’s subjective state of mind – at the time of the crime 
– during the guilt phase of trial.18 “Without the doctrine of 
diminished capacity, an offender is either wholly sane or 
wholly insane, and criminal liability cannot be based on the 
degree of sanity an offender possesses.”19 However, as most 
psychiatrists would agree, mental health is not a black or 
white issue, but operates along a continuum,20 yet this black or 
white/sane or insane decision is left up to a lay jury as it tries 
                                                 
16 Stewart S. Newman & Mohammad Ghaziuddin, Violent Crime in 
Asperger Syndrome: The Role of Psychiatric Comorbidity, 38 J. AUTISM & 
DEV. DISORDERS 1848, 1849 (Nov. 2008) (citing Y. Kohn, et. al., 
Aggression and sexual offense in Asperger’s syndrome, 35 ISRAEL J 
PSYCHIATRY 293 (1998)). 
17 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 140-41 (1997). 
18 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010) (citing 
Minnesota v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821-22 (Minn. 2009); 
Minnesota v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 677-678 (Minn. 2007); State 
Minnesota v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 104 (Minn. 1992); Minnesota v. 
Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 763-64 (Minn. 1990); Minnesota v. Jackman, 
396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. 1986). 
19 Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at  237.  
20 Minnesota v.Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982). 
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to decide the mental state of a defendant without proper 
expert evidence on the issue. Determining the subjective 
mental state of the defendant without the aid of an expert 
seems challenging at best. Add on the fact that the defendant 
might be exhibiting unexplained, odd, and guilty-looking 
mannerisms, and the task approaches impossibility.  
 
III. THE M’NAGHTEN TEST FOR INSANITY 
Most jurisdictions use some variation of the 
M’Naghten test to determine whether a defendant is insane for 
purposes of trial. This test comes from an English case in 1843 
in which the House of Lords held that the defendant would be 
able to assert an insanity defense if, “at the time of committing 
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, [he] 
did not know he was doing what was wrong.”21 Therefore, if 
the defendant failed to know that what he was doing was 
either wrong or illegal or did not know the nature and quality 
of his act, he should receive a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. This M’Naghten Rule addresses awareness, an 
essential component of mens rea or intent, but awareness alone 
cannot suffice to fully explain a defendant’s mental state. The 
human mind is a complex system of many mechanisms a lay 
jury could not be expected to comprehend. What if the 
mechanism that separates the knowing from the acting, the 
feedback loop, is the mechanism impaired?22 Assessing a 
defendant’s awareness is not enough to understand his mental 
state.23  
“For defendants whose mental illness manifests itself 
by an inability to self-govern, it is unjust that their knowledge 
of the act’s guilty nature denies them reprieve.”24 Schwarz 
describes how intent formation, having the express purpose of 
committing the crime, and awareness of the illegality of the 
                                                 
21 ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 512 (citing M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718, 722 (1843)).  
22 Charlotte Schwarz, Irreconcilable Differences: Mens Rea and Mental 
Illness, 20 WRITING IN & ABOUT MED. 41, 44 (Spring 2009). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
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crime, work in a feedback loop, but each is neurologically 
distinct.25 This creates a fundamental asymmetry between law 
and medicine, as the law seeks to analyze guilt.26 Situations 
that are more grey than black and white must be explained by 
an expert before any layperson on a jury can begin to 
understand the concepts at issue.  
The underpinnings of such neurological and 
psychiatric diagnoses as AS and HFA are complex neural 
systems which remain at odds with M’Naghten’s one-
dimensional constraint to deliver an unequivocal verdict, and 
the gradients of mental illness are overlooked, resulting in a 
forced conformity.27 In a society where death is still a viable 
punishment for crime, every level of mental illness must be 
examined during trial. The jury can still weigh the facts before 
them, but justice requires that the jury have all of the facts 
relevant to guilt. State prosecutors will argue that introducing 
evidence of mental illnesses that do not rise to the level of 
insanity might cause the jury to associate the mental illness 
with a lack of intent, but the jurors are left to weigh those facts. 
If our justice system leaves any room for error, that error 
should be on the side of life. 
 
IV. IN MINNESOTA V. ANDERSON, A MINNESOTA COURT 
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME 
In Minnesota v. Anderson, Minnesota courts denied 
expert testimony which would have established that the 
defendant was suffering from AS and suppression of this 
testimony stripped Anderson of a fair trial.28 Minnesota state 
courts have held that introduction of probative psychiatric 
testimony is overshadowed by the risk of confusing juries as 
to the legal elements of intent and premeditation, and that 
legal definitions of each are outside of a psychiatrist’s 
practice.29 However, in Anderson’s case, and likely many 




28 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 2010). 
29 Brittany E. Bachman, CRIMINAL LAW: SUBJECTIVE INQUIRY INTO A 
DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND: SHOULD PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT 
TESTIMONY BE ALLOWED TO DISPROVE MENS REA?-- MINNESOTA V. 
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other similar cases, defense attorneys sought to introduce 
evidence of AS to help the jury understand how the disorder 
affected many parts of Anderson’s life.30  
The suppressed expert testimony would have 
explained that AS impairs an individual’s ability to socialize, 
communicate, empathize, or understand and respond 
properly to social cues,31 and persons with AS lack an 
understanding of what is socially acceptable.32 The court in 
Anderson believed that this was lay evidence, and that the jury 
could determine this type of general information without the 
help of an expert.33 Both AS and HFA are rare, complex, and 
misunderstood disorders. Expert testimony would be 
absolutely necessary to avoid juror confusion, yet the state’s 
attorney argued the evidence would lead to exactly that. As 
the jurors viewed Anderson’s demeanor and facial 
expressions, they had no way of knowing these reactions were 
a result of his disorder. The judge even said to Anderson: 
“You have shown no remorse, no empathy, and I have no 
sympathy for you.”34 The jurors would have surely perceived 
Anderson differently if they had known of his inability to 
empathize and respond to social cues. Suppressing such 
evidence was clear error and unfairly prejudiced Anderson 
during his trial. 
Persons affected by AS or HFA have an odd, pedantic 
manner of speaking35 and poor nonverbal communication.36 
As Anderson’s attorneys argued, although it fell upon deaf 
ears, these symptom-driven actions and mannerisms, both in 
the courtroom and in his behavior toward witnesses around 
the time of the event, can and will look negatively upon the 
defendant. Anderson’s appearance was described as odd and 
                                                                                                       
ANDERSON, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
491, 503 (2011). 
30 Anderson, at 227. 
31 Id. at 235. 
32 Id. at 233. 
33 Id. at 233-34. 
34 Bachman, supra note 30, at 510-11. 
35 A. Klin, D. Pauls, R. Shultz & F. Volkmar, Three diagnostic 
approaches to Asperger’s syndrome: Implications for research, 35 J. AUTISM 
& DEV. DISORDERS 221, 223 (2005). 
36 See L. Wing, Asperger’s Syndrome: A clinical account, 11 Psychol. 
Med. 115 (1981). 
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scary, and this was unfairly prejudicial against him all because 
of his mental and social disorder. The expert testimony, if it 
had been admitted, would have allowed the jury to 
understand his appearance and actions.  
 
V. A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANT IS STILL AT RISK WHEN 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS SUPPRESSED 
The argument for introduction of expert testimony 
remains even if the defendant does not take the witness stand 
to testify. The defendant sits at counsel table and is visible to 
the jury throughout the entire trial. Especially in cases where a 
death sentence could be imposed, juries are likely to observe 
the defendant closely in an attempt to find some type of 
justification in his behavior for the verdict they will render. 
Accordingly, first impressions are extremely important.  
Just as a job applicant wants to put the best foot 
forward in the initial interview, a defendant needs to be free 
from a tainted first impression. The influences shaping a 
juror’s thoughts and feelings about a particular case begin 
long before trial.37 Indeed, “the decision-making process for a 
juror in any particular case begins as soon as the juror enters 
the courtroom and starts making assessments of the people 
and information that are presented.”38 Therefore, the 
defendant is being judged as soon as the jury members are 
walking through the door. This assessment will occur whether 
or not the defendant testifies. 
Once the guilt phase of trial is completed, most states 
have much more lenient evidence rules with regard to 
mitigating factors. There is a lower burden of proof for 
mitigating factors, and relevance, as a hurdle to admissibility, 
in a capital case is lower in the sentencing phase than at any 
other time or any other type of trial. However, even when 
evidence of AS or related disorders is admitted during the 
sentencing phase of trial for mitigation purposes, the attempt 
to explain behavior is too little, too late. By the sentencing 
phase of trial, the jurors have already sat through many hours 
                                                 
37 Richard C. Waites, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of 
Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 29 (2005) (citing Richard 
C. Waites, COURTROOM PSYCHOL. & TRIAL ADVOC. 535-37 (2003)). 
38 Id. 
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of trial, and they have already made up their minds as to the 
defendant’s guilt. The picture of the defendant is firmly 
situated inside the jurors’ minds, and any alternative 
explanation for the defendants’ behavior is likely futile.  
Another scholar of jury decision making conducted a 
study of capital trial jurors and premature decision making. 
What he found was quite telling. “One half of the capital 
jurors take a stand on the defendant's punishment before they 
even see the full inventory of evidence, of arguments, and of 
instructions for making the punishment decision.”39 
Furthermore, those jurors who do take an early stand “are 
absolutely convinced of their early stands and stick with them 
consistently thereafter.”40 The same scholar also noted that 
even during the penalty phase deliberations, “the same 
inability, or unwillingness, to keep the decisions separate 
appears to allow jurors to justify a death sentence simply by 
pointing to the evidence of the defendant's guilt.”41 Therefore, 
not only is it too late by the sentencing phase to change jurors’ 
minds, but the jurors will also point back to the fact that he 
was guilty in order to justify their sentencing decisions. Thus, 
the defendant’s uphill battle only steepens as the trial 
progresses. Opponents might argue juries are specifically told 
not to decide on punishment before the sentencing phase and 
are asked if they will keep an open mind throughout the trial, 
but studies show that regardless of how the jurors answer that 
question, one half have already made up their mind and will 
stick with that conclusion until the end. 
 Danger also exists in the defense looking like they are 
grasping at straws and trying to find any and every little thing 
to excuse the defendant’s behavior. A juror might wonder 
why mental condition is even being raised, because if it was an 
important fact, then it would have been raised earlier during 
                                                 
39 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed 
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial 
Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 
1529 (1998). 
40 Id. at 1529. 
41 Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: 
Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is 
No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2001). 
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the guilt phase. They may assume, therefore, mental condition 
is unimportant. 
 
VI. IN EDWARDS V. ROPER, THE DEFENDANT WAS 
DIAGNOSED WITH ASPERGER’S SYNDROME ONLY AFTER 
HIS TRIAL 
 For some, the diagnosis of AS or other developmental 
disorders comes too late. That was the case for Kimber 
Edwards, who is currently sitting on “death row.”42 Edwards 
was convicted of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife, and 
the trial court entered a death sentence in accordance with the 
jury’s recommendation.43 Prior to trial, Edwards was 
evaluated by three medical experts to determine whether he 
was competent to stand trial, and whether he had a mental 
disease or defect that could provide a defense or significant 
mitigating evidence.44  
All three experts determined Edwards was competent 
to stand trial; however, one of the experts, Dr. Cross, alerted 
the defense team that Edwards had a 25-point difference 
between his verbal and performance IQ scales which was 
indicative of a developmental disability.45 Another expert, Dr. 
Stacy, diagnosed Edwards with a pervasive developmental 
disorder (not otherwise specified).46 Yet, all three experts 
reached the same conclusion; the defendant was competent to 
stand trial and free from any mental disease or defect that 
could provide a defense or mitigation evidence. The findings 
of the experts and their conclusions seem to be at odds. No 
complete social history was formed, nor was a specific 
diagnosis given prior to trial.47 Edwards’ case continued with 
no evidence introduced of AS in either the guilt or penalty 
phase. He was convicted and received a sentence of death.48 
                                                 
42 Missouri v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. 2003). 
43 Id. at 520. 
44 Edwards v. Roper, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2009 WL 3164112, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 28, 2009). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at *1-3. 
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 The post-conviction team began investigations and 
again three medical experts were retained. Dr. Cross had been 
on the team of three that had examined Edwards prior to trial. 
The team was finally able to compile a complete social history 
of the defendant and diagnose him with AS.49 Dr. Logan, an 
on-board expert, opined that evidence of AS could have been 
offered to explain Edward’s abnormal demeanor and his 
inability to reach an amicable agreement with his ex-wife 
regarding child support and custody issues,50 yet this evidence 
was not even offered during the penalty phase for purposes of 
mitigation.  
The defense attorneys for Edwards’ trial even noted 
abnormal behaviors during their representation. The entire 
defense team found it extremely difficult to communicate with 
the defendant, and he demanded that his lawyers pursue 
irrelevant, time-wasting inquiries.51 Edwards also threatened 
to withhold exculpatory information from his attorneys unless 
they satisfied his demands.52 His attorneys had to spend many 
hours wasting time and going through boxes of irrelevant 
material just to try to regain the defendant’s cooperation.53 
Edwards even asked the court to remove his lawyers at 
various times through his trial.54 These behaviors are similar to 
characteristics of AS. Edwards’s special interest became the 
trial, and he obsessed and needed to control it. This obsession 
prejudiced his opportunity to receive a fair trial, and the jury 
heard no mention of any mental or social disorder.  
 The need for introduction of AS evidence was clear in 
Edwards’s case, but the appellate court was left with little 
discretion to do anything about it. Edwards’s post-conviction 
team tried to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, but to win 
on such an argument they were required to prove the 
attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and Edwards was prejudiced because of the 
failure.55 To get past the first prong of this test the post-
                                                 
49 Id. at *4. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at *4 n.6. 
54 Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 at *4. 
55 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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conviction team would have to “show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”56 This is a high 
burden, and the post-conviction team’s argument for 
ineffective assistance of counsel was unsuccessful.57  
The defense team did a reasonable job with the facts 
they were given and the medical records at hand, and it is 
almost impossible to speculate how a diagnosis of AS would 
have affected the outcome of the case. There are very few 
capital punishment cases nationwide involving similar issues 
and the medical studies surrounding AS are relatively new. 
Thus it is of utmost importance juries be properly informed as 
to the defendant’s medical condition so as to give an informed 
and unprejudiced decision regarding the defendant’s guilt and 
corresponding sentence. 
 
VII. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS CAN CHOOSE NOT TO INTRODUCE 
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE AND THIS WILL BE DEEMED 
PROPER TRIAL STRATEGY 
 With the growing complexity of scientific data to be 
introduced during a capital trial, the need for expert 
psychiatric testimony increases. However, some defense 
attorneys have chosen either not to elicit an expert diagnosis 
and analysis or completely leave out expert psychiatric 
testimony altogether. The following cases illustrate how the 
decision by the attorney can negatively affect the case, but the 
courts are unwilling to classify such an attorney’s conduct as 




                                                 
56 Id. at 694. 
57 Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 , at *12-13. 
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A. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES 
 
A potentially autistic North Carolina man was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1995.58 In 
preparation for trial, the government issued written notice to 
the defense that the government would only seek to introduce 
mental health experts in rebuttal to those introduced by the 
defense team.59 Upon review of the government’s potential 
rebuttal evidence, the defense team decided to withdraw its 
notice of intent to introduce mental health experts.60 The 
defense team also failed to elicit any further mental health 
evaluations concerning Jackson’s childhood and 
development.61 This trial strategy was deemed proper and in 
no way rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.62 
In other words, if a defendant does not receive the proper 
mental evaluations before trial, he is probably just out of 
luck.63 
However, denying expert testimony has not been the 
only problem for defendants and their assistance of counsel.64 
In some cases, the defense team introduces very damaging 
expert testimony, and this is still proper trial strategy. 
 
B. MORTON V. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 
 
In a Florida case, Alvin Morton received a sentence of 
death for two 1992 murders.65 Upon appeal, Morton received a 
new sentencing hearing.66 During his first trial, Morton had a 
                                                 
58 Jackson v. United States, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2010 WL 2775402, at *1 
(W.D.N.C. July 13, 2010). 
59 Id. at 6. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Jackson v. United States, 638 F.Supp.2d 514, 599-600 (W.D.N.C. 
2009). 
63 See id. 
64 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (discussing 
counsel’s lack of criminal trial experience, “Every experienced 
criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case[,]. . . but it 
does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. . . .”). 
65 Morton v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th 
Cir. 2012).  
66 Id. at 1164. 
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psychiatric expert testify for mitigation purposes.67 This expert 
testified that Morton had a mixed personality disorder with 
emotional instability.68 After giving the diagnosis, the expert 
seemed to totally undermine Morton’s plea for mercy.69 The 
expert said Morton’s “ability to develop into a more fully 
functioning individual was extremely limited,”70 and that 
“given the state of the art and what we know, I would have a 
difficult time saying we could cure [Morton’s] disorder.”71  
The expert went on to compare Morton’s situation with 
that of a serial killer, which only made Morton look even 
worse to the jury.72 During the new sentencing hearing, 
Morton’s attorney decided that even though the expert 
testimony did more harm than good, they would have the 
expert testify again at the second sentencing hearing.73 Morton 
was again sentenced to die.74 The appellate courts 
subsequently held that offering damaging expert testimony as 
to Morton’s mental condition was proper trial strategy.75 
Again, these cases illustrate the importance of a correct 
diagnosis and helpful expert testimony.76 Without these two 
things, a defense attorney’s case is at a great disadvantage.77  
 
VIII. IN PEOPLE V. MACKLEM, PROSECUTORS REBUTTED 
EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME WITH 
IRRELEVANT BUT PERSUASIVE NEUROLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 In People v. Macklem, the State of California originally 
sought the death penalty, but subsequently dropped the 
                                                 
67 Id. at 1163. 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 1164. 
75 Id. at 1163.  
76 See Morton v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr, 684 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 
2012); Jackson v. United States, 2010 WL 2775402, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 
2010). 
77 Id. 
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pursuit for a death sentence in the joinder motion to 
consolidate the murder of Macklem’s ex-girlfriend and the 
assault upon his prison cellmate.78 Macklem was diagnosed 
with AS as a juvenile.79  
At the age of 18, Macklem killed his ex-girlfriend, 
Sarah Beagle.80 While awaiting trial, Macklem also attacked his 
cellmate with a PVC pipe.81 Luckily for Macklem, the trial 
court allowed expert testimony about AS in front of the jury.82 
The expert was allowed to testify about Macklem’s mental 
state and how AS affected a person’s thinking and behaviors.83 
Unfortunately for Macklem, the prosecutors came up with a 
way to rebut this evidence and convince the jury that the AS 
evidence was, in essence, “hogwash.”84 The state offered 
psychological evidence that there were no neurological, 
structural, or functional abnormalities that would explain or 
affect the defendant’s behavior.85   Yet AS and similar 
disorders in the autistic spectrum are characterized and 
diagnosed purely by observable behaviors.86 An absence of 
visible deformities or damage to the brain does not equate to 
the lack of mental disorder.  
 Medical scholar Charlotte Schwarz published an article 
in 2009 attempting to explain how jurors respond to different 
types of expert psychiatric testimony.87 She noted that use of 
neuro-scientific data in courts is becoming more routine as 
psychiatry has shifted toward biological models.88 New 
medical technology has produced functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), an increasingly accessible scanning 
technique that measures changes in brain blood-oxygen levels 
                                                 
78 California v. Macklem, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 243 (2007). 
79 Id. at 680. 
80 Id. at 679-81. 
81 Id. at 681. 
82 Id. at 684. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 685. 
85 Id.  
86 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288. 
87 Schwarz, supra note 22. 
88 Id. at 42. 
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to indirectly chart thought and behavior.89 Despite these 
advances, Schwarz cautions, “the admissibility and 
immediacy of this data create a misleading aura of scientific 
infallibility,”90 because “there is not and will never be a brain 
correlate for responsibility.”91 Schwarz’s article points out 
what most people already know: a jury is an unpredictable 
group who will make decision based on whatever they wish, 
regardless of law or science. 
Included in Schwarz’s article was Jessica Gurley and 
David Marcus’s examination of 396 mock jurors and how they 
responded to various categories of psychiatric and 
psychological evidence.92 The subjects studied were 
significantly more likely to declare a defendant not guilty by 
reason of insanity when the mock attorneys presented neuro-
images or brain injury testimony to the jury.93 The fMRI scans 
give the jury a visual connection to testimony about brain 
functions, but the scans are too variable from person to person 
to serve as a means for identifying culpability; what one 
would classify as normal brain features have yet to be 
determined.94  
There are certain brain deficiencies and mental 
illnesses such as mood disorders caused by disease of the 
basal ganglia that have detectable physiological traits; 
however, they are the exception, not the rule.95 Observable 
defects from neural images do not directly correspond to 
severity of a condition, but their vividness has a 
disproportionate effect on jurors who tend to discount less 
tangible chemical imbalances.96 The mock jurors were four 
                                                 
89 Id. at 42 (citing Seiji Ogawa, Oxygenation-sensitive Contrast in 
Magnetic Resonance Image of Rodent Brain at High Magnetic Fields, 14.1 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE MED. 68-78 (1990). 
90 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42. 
91 Id. at 42 (citing Eyal Aharoni, Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts 
Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 
1124.1 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 145-160, 145 
(2008)). 
92 Jessica Gurley & David Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and 
Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26.1 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 85-97 (2008). 
93 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42. 
94 Gurley & Marcus, supra note 92, at 86. 
95 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42. 
96 Id. 
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times more likely to convict a psychopath than a defendant 
with visible damage from head trauma.97 There is no rational 
explanation for this result. A psychopath’s condition could 
render him or her insane, and the person with visible damage 
from head trauma could reasonably have little or no mental 
effect from the damage. It seems unjust that the lack of visible 
damage or visible charting of blood-oxygen levels could keep 
some defendants from receiving a fair trial. 
The inherent problems of mixing the medical and legal 
fields as described by Schwarz seem to be a big part of 
Macklem’s problems. Even though the defense was able to 
introduce the evidence of AS, the prosecution had no problem 
rebutting the evidence by pointing out no neurological or 
structural abnormalities existed.98 Macklem had a number of 
circumstances working against him. He had no visible 
damages or defects for the expert to show, his mental 
condition exists purely through observable behaviors, and 
there already exists a certain stigma around disorders in the 
autistic spectrum. Autism and its milder forms are highly 
complex and greatly misunderstood by most of society. 
Hollywood movies feature characters with autism, and some 
of these characters are extremely smart.99 Many people assume 
that someone with AS or HFA is highly intelligent, has an 
excellent memory, and is good with numbers. It is quite 
difficult to fit this stereotype with any lesser form of 
culpability. In general, people believe that intelligent persons 
should be held responsible for their actions.  
Macklem was found to have an average IQ even 
though he tested below average in areas of memory, thought 
processing, and academic skills.100 Luckily for him, the trial 
judge allowed expert testimony of how AS affects persons 
with the disorder. The expert was able to testify that AS is 
demonstrated by “impaired social interaction, attention 
problems, rigid behaviors, and fantasy thoughts.”101 The 
expert also explained that persons with AS generally have few 
                                                 
97 Gurley & Marcus, supra note 92, at 93. 
98 Macklem, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 at 245. 
99 See e.g., RAIN MAN (MGM 1988); TEMPLE GRANDIN (HBO Films 
2010). 
100 Id. at 684. 
101 Id. 
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friends, struggle with romantic relationships, go into rages 
and act out, and cannot explain or understand their 
behavior.102 He also noted that persons with AS are capable of 
manipulating situations to get what they want and generally 
do not care about how their behavior impacts or affects 
others.103  
This information was helpful considering that 
Macklem, before the crime, had conversations with his ex-
girlfriend where she asked him to kill her to put her out of her 
misery.104 Macklem often fantasized about killing her because 
he thought he would be helping her.105 Sarah was also 
depressed about the death of a family member, and Macklem 
thought that by killing Sarah, she would be with that family 
member again.106 The expert testimony likely helped connect 
the dots and explain part of Macklem’s thought process and 
also why Macklem would have lacked remorse or sympathy 
for Sarah or her family.  
Surely, the expert testimony did not fall upon deaf ears 
because Macklem only received a sentence of 25 years to life. 
He was eligible for the death penalty, and the state of 
California is not shy about pursuing it, but after discovery had 
begun, the prosecutors chose not to pursue it. The record does 
not reflect the state’s reason for dropping pursuit of a death 
sentence, but if prosecutors knew what the expert testimony 
was going to entail, then it was a smart move on their part. 
Macklem’s case stands for the proposition that evidence of AS 
should be introduced in every criminal trial, especially when 
death is a possible sentence. Competent psychiatric 




 Being diagnosed with a disorder in the autism 
spectrum does not equate to a lack of intent to commit a crime, 
but it does have a direct effect on a person’s mind and how the 
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104 Id. at 679. 
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mind perceives things. Not all persons with AS are 
automatically incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Evidence of AS is needed merely to help 
the jury make an informed decision. Suppressing such 
evidence denies the jury of highly relevant and crucial 
information. By hearing/viewing evidence of how AS affects 
persons, the jury is able to connect all the dots and properly 
decide whether the defendant had the subjective intent to 
commit the crime. Persons with AS do not deserve a “get out 
of jail free card,” but they deserve to offer before the jury all 
evidence relevant to culpability and mitigation.
 
 








WHEN ONE LIVES IN A GLASS HOUSE, ONE 
SHOULD NOT THROW STONES:  
HOW CONTINUING TO ALLOW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
WHILE TRYING TO FOSTER HUMANITARIANISM ON A 





The use of capital punishment has been a part of 
America’s criminal justice system since the seventeenth 
century when colonists brought the practice from Europe 
where it was generally morally acceptable.1  Similarly, when 
drafting the United States Constitution, specifically the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishment,”2our discerning forefathers intimated that the 
death penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment, because 
the punishment, at least at the time, was neither cruel nor 
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unusual.3  Ever consistent with our country’s long-standing 
tradition of borrowing both law and policy from other nations, 
it was not seen as a public policy issue or an illegality to 
prescribe death for a host of crimes including, but not limited 
to the following: adultery, witchcraft, sodomy, and, of course, 
murder.4  Nevertheless, the United States of America has 
evolved and what may not have been seen as cruel or unusual 
in the eighteenth century very well may be in the twenty-first.   
Abolition of capital punishment has subsequently 
become a vogue issue and a popular debate topic.5  This 
changing tide notwithstanding, the United States has failed to 
wholeheartedly embrace an abolishment of the death penalty 
and the Supreme Court has yet to completely rule against the 
death penalty within the context of the Eighth Amendment.6  
Because of this, the United States has pitted itself against many 
international communities and, at least to some extent, this rift 
has given way to a renewed debate among the Supreme Court 
Justices concerning what impact, or lack thereof, international 
pressure or law or sentiment should have on future decisions 
relating to the death penalty.7 
In Roper v. Simmons, an eighteen-year-old defendant 
was convicted and sentenced to death for a murder he 
committed as a juvenile.8  After successfully petitioning for a 
writ of habeas corpus, the Missouri Supreme Court granted 
relief and the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately 
granted certiorari.9  The Court held that to execute a person 
who was a minor at the time of the crime’s commission does 
not fit within the parameters of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
                                                 
3 Koh, supra note 1, at 1091-92. 
4 Id. at 1092. 
5 Id. at 1093. 
6 Franklin E. Zimring, Postscript: The Peculiar Present of American 
Capital Punishment in, Beyond Repair?, AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 
212, 213 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).   
7 William A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in, Beyond Repair? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 178, 210 
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).  
8 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005) (the defendant was only seventeen when he 
committed the murder). 
9 Id. at 559. 
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Amendments, and is, therefore, cruel, unusual, and 
unconstitutional.10   
The Roper opinion is noteworthy for many reasons, but 
within the context of this article, it signifies the Court’s 
willingness to consider the “overwhelming weight of 
international opinion” against use of the death penalty in 
some situations11.  Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion 
and stated that while international sentiment was certainly not 
controlling, it was a “respected and significant confirmation 
for the Court’s determination . . . .”12  This case, if nothing else, 
leaves the door open for future courts to not only consider 
domestic sentiment for or against capital punishment, but also 
to consider global sentiment when seeking to quantify 
standards of decency. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Not only does capital punishment fail in its 
justification, but no punishment could be invented with so 
many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way 
it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The defendant of 
wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the 
gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is 
theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is 
able to have his case presented with every favourable aspect, 
while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the 
court. Sometimes such assignment is considered part of 
political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no 
experience whatever in a capital case.13    
Debates regarding the death penalty are naturally 
predicated on both the content and the  meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and “[t]he basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.”14  The Eighth Amendment derives 
“its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 554. 
12 Id. 
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251 (1972) (quoting the Warden 
of Sing Sing, James E. Lawes). 
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
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mark the progress of a maturing society.”15 Much 
jurisprudence regarding the death penalty within the 
framework of an Eighth Amendment argument has been 
centered around the ever elusive evolving standards of 
decency concept.  For many, the argument is such that only 
the American evolving standards of decency are applicable. 
Others argue the net should be cast wider such that it would, 
at a minimum, consider evolving standards of decency for the 
human race at large.   
At least for the Supreme Court, evolving standards of 
decency have been solely those held by the United States with 
very little deference given to international law.  The opinion in 
Trop left little, if any, room for doubt on the subject holding 
that only the “American [notions] of decency . . . are 
dispositive and the sentencing practices of other countries are 
[not] relevant.” 16 The Supreme Court opinion went further by 
establishing that the practices of other democracies can be 
relevant to whether the American people would view the 
practice as tolerable.17 The definitiveness in Trop 
notwithstanding, subsequent Supreme Court holdings 
concerning the use of capital punishment have been less 
definitive.  This has at least left the door open, even if only 
slightly, for the counterargument that favors an international, 
human race based context when assessing the evolving 
standards of decency.  
For purposes of this article, I contend that the counter 
argument must prevail.  A global definition of these standards 
must be considered because the death penalty, within the 
context of the American system of justice, does not exist inside 
a vacuum.  To believe otherwise would be to disregard 
variables such as: an ever shrinking global community, 
international pressure, international treatises prohibiting use 
of the death penalty, and rulings from International Courts 
regarding the American death penalty.  It seems illogical to 
conclude that the United States, a country that profoundly 
embraces diversity and multiculturalism and readily embarks 
upon humanitarian missions in other countries when an 
injustice is being done to the citizenry of those countries, 
                                                 
15 Id. at 101. 
16 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 405 (1989). 
17 Id. 
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continues to endorse such a narrow-minded view of what 
embodies the evolving standards of decency.  Despite the 
apparent absurdity, this is indeed the case.  International law, 
policy, and procedure regarding the death penalty had 
traditionally been given only tangential reference within the 
American system of justice.   
This article will seek to establish that the United States 
cannot continue, without ever increasing difficulty, to both 
encourage democracy on a global scale and participate in the 
sanctioning of those countries that have, in the opinion of our 
nation’s leaders, committed crimes against humanity, while at 
the same time allowing capital punishment in its own 
backyard. This article will seek to establish the practices of 
encouraging democracy on a global scale and sanctioning 
those countries that have, in the opinion of our nation’s 
leaders, committed crimes against humanity. These practices 
whether via humanitarian aid or military force, cannot 
continue at all, or at least without immense difficulty, if the 
United States continues to allow capital punishment.  Then, 
once it has been established that capital punishment in the 
United States cannot continue, at least not while also seeking 
to further humanitarianism, this article will look towards 
justifying the abolishment of capital punishment via three 
separate premises:  One, borrowing that which is being done 
or has been done by other like-minded nations or democracies 
and appears successful, desirable, and achievable to the 
United States is not a novel idea and it is logical to do the same 
when assessing the evolving standards of decency.  Two, the 
death penalty cannot be sustained because it is 
unconstitutional for reasons that span well beyond the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Finally, from a textual standpoint, the mother of 
the United States Constitution, that is the Declaration of 
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II.  ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACY ON A GLOBAL SCALE AND 
SANCTIONING THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE COMMITTED 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY CANNOT CONTINUE 
WITHOUT IMMENSE DIFFICULTY, IF THE UNITED STATES 
CONTINUES TO ALLOW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. 
The United States is geographically and judicially 
isolated from the international opinion of the death penalty as 
a form of criminal punishment.  A March 2012 survey revealed 
that one hundred and forty-one countries (141) had 
completely banned the use of capital punishment in both law 
and practice, whereas only fifty-seven countries continued to 
allow use of the death penalty.18  In addition to those countries 
banning capital punishment outright, another thirty-six 
countries have done so in practice despite having no formal 
legislation renouncing their use of the death penalty.19  In sum, 
as of 2012, the number of countries that do not execute 
prisoners was nearly five times higher than the number of 
countries that practice capital punishment.20  Suffice it to say 
that the global trend has clearly been to extinguish capital 
punishment as a practice and the United States has not kept 
pace with the trend.21   
Europe has prohibited use of the death penalty due to 
pressure from the Council of Europe which requires 
abolishment of the death penalty for any country wishing to 
become or remain a member of the European Union.22  Asia 
and the Middle East, like the United States, still practice 
capital punishment.23  Specifically, in 2012, the United States, 
China, Iran, North Korea and Yemen ranked as the top five 
                                                 
18 VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 280-81 (4th Ed. 
2013).   
19 Id. at 281. 
20 Simon Rogers & Mona Chalabi, Death Penalty Statistics, Country by 
Country, THE GUARDIAN DATA BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/death-
penalty-countries-world# (citing statistics from Amnesty 
International). 
21 STREIB, supra note 18, at 280. 
22 Id. at 281. 
23 Id. 
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nations based on the number of executions performed.24  
Excluding China, because government secrecy precludes an 
accurate representation of the true number, at least six 
hundred and eighty (680) executions occurred in 2012.25  Of 
these, 314 occurred in Iran, 129 in Iraq, 79 in Saudi Arabia, and 
43 in the United States.26   
Two American idioms frame the issue at hand: those 
that live in glass houses ought naught throw stones and if one 
lies down with dogs, one is likely to get up with fleas. The 
threshold question is: How can the United States continue to 
police the world against what our nation collectively, 
legislatively, or judicially views as immoral or illegal activity 
(i.e., throw stones), subject the rest of the world to America’s 
evolving standards of decency, and then contradict this same 
practice (i.e., living in a glass house) in terms of the death 
penalty?  The second question is, if the United States continues 
to be one of the top countries executing prisoners (lie down 
with dogs), will we not, at some point, be viewed in the same 
light from a human rights perspective as the other members of 
the group (wake up with fleas)?   
In short, the United States cannot live in a glass house 
and then throw stones at all the evils in the world because 
doing so will destroy our own house.  The answer to the 
threshold question is quite simple; continuing with capital 
punishment in the United States cannot continue without 
substantial change because such blatant hypocrisy will 
continually lessen the credibility of our nation.  When seeking 
to further advance our values of freedom, democracy, and the 
veneration of human rights in spite of the obvious 
contradiction will only allow the reputation of the United 
States as a world leader to continue to fall from grace.  This is 
obviously not an acceptable answer, but neither is the 
converse, which is to continue our slumber with the dogs, 
resulting in a flea infestation rendering the United States as a 
nation to be avoided by those without fleas.  Accordingly, the 
only option available is to change the company we keep and 
become a nation fully supportive of the policies that we preach 
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by abolishing the use of capital punishment in the United 
States.  
 
III. BORROWING LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES USED BY 
OTHER COUNTRIES IS NOT A NEW PRACTICE, AND IT IS 
LOGICAL TO DO THE SAME WHEN ASSESSING STANDARDS 
OF DECENCY. 
The Court in Roper has proven to be very insightful as 
this argument too is best begun by again quoting from the 
opinion. “The [constitution] sets forth…innovative principles 
original to the American experience…These doctrines and 
guarantees…remain essential to our present-day self-
definition and national identity.”27 However, we do not honor 
the Constitution because “we know it to be our own.  It does 
not lessen our fidelity to [it] or our pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain 
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage freedom.”28 
 Both the Supreme Court and the Legislature have not 
only given due deference to the international consciousness, 
and even to the laws and policies of other nations when ruling 
or enacting laws because, quite frankly, our Nation was 
founded upon borrowed principles.  In fact, the first ten 
amendments to the United States Constitution came from the 
English Bill of Rights.29  The Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution is nearly identical to that of the English Bill 
of Rights which states, “excessive bail ought not to be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”30 The English Bill of Rights reflected 
the ideals surrounding the laws of Edward the Confessor who, 
in turn, was influenced by France as he spent most of his 
childhood in Normandy.31   
                                                 
27 Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-79. 
28 Id. 
29 Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).  
30 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 267 440, 441 (1689). 
31 Recent Cases, Constitutional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Provision of Eighth Amendment as Restriction Upon State Action Through 
the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135 (1950). 
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In short, the United States is, and always has been, a 
hodge-podge of different cultures spanning far beyond just 
that of our English origins, which include the often forgotten 
American Indian presence that was here long before the 
Colonists and the Spanish conquistadors. Lastly, our Nation is 
bordered by Canada and Mexico thereby making it a near 
impossibility not to at least purport to listen to the 
consciousness of those two countries specifically.  
Even with the United States’ longstanding tradition of 
borrowing jurisprudence from those countries that have 
undeniably influenced us, there remain staunch holdouts 
among the Supreme Court Justices that seem unwilling to give 
the tradition proper deference. Justices Thomas and Scalia 
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting view in the 
Atkins case where he said, “[w]hile it is true that some of our 
prior opinions have looked to the climate of international 
opinion to reinforce a conclusion regarding evolving 
standards of decency; we have since explicitly rejected the idea 
that the sentencing practices of other countries could serve to 
establish the Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice 
is accepted among our people.”32  Justice Thomas stood strong 
in this opinion, referencing it again in 2002 with a concurring 
opinion in support of the Supreme Court of Florida’s denial of 
a writ of certiorari.33  Similarly, in his dissenting view in a later 
case that, while not specifically dealing with the death penalty, 
did center around Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice 
Scalia again downplayed the weight of consideration, if any, 
that should be afforded to international law.  His dissent 
claimed that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring . . . 
into existence . . . because foreign nations decriminalize 
conduct” and [t]he Court's discussion of . . . foreign views . . . 
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, 
since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.’”34  Not surprisingly, Justices 
Rehnquist and Thomas both joined him in this dissenting view 
as well. 
                                                 
32 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (quoting Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) which emphasized that “American 
conceptions of decency ... are dispositive”). 
33 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002). 
34 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003). 
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Conversely, and more attuned to the rich tradition 
surrounding the practice, there are those that believe 
international law has an important place in the jurisprudence 
of the United States.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in an article 
that she co-wrote in 1999, said that “[e]xperience in one nation 
or region may inspire or inform other nations or regions . . . , 
as generally holds true for human rights initiatives.”35  She 
went further by explaining how such countries as India, 
Germany, and the European Court of Justice have all 
referenced or borrowed decisions made by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in one form or another.36 Yet, as Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out, the United States is not as willing to 
look “beyond one’s own shores.”37  In response to the mere 
notion that the United States Supreme Court should look 
further than our own shoreline, the Court said, “[w]e think 
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution.”38  
In Justice Ginsberg’s opinion, “comparative analysis 
emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting 
constitutions and enforcing human rights.39 We are the losers 
if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to 
eradicate bias . . . . For irrational prejudice and rank 
discrimination are infectious in our world. In this reality, as 
well as the determination to counter it, we all share.”40 
If abolishment of the death penalty in the United States 
is the bull’s eye, which I contend in this article that it should 
be, then recent Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the 
controversial topic is most certainly the dart, and the Court is 
beginning to narrow in on the target.  In fact, the Court’s 
degradation of capital punishment began almost immediately 
after reinstating the practice in 1976.  For example, in 1977, the 
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to impose the death 
sentence for the crime of rape where the victim was an adult 
                                                 
35 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: 
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and not killed during the commission of the crime.41  In 1982, 
the Court held that without proof that a killing occurred, or an 
attempt therein, regardless of whether the person intended to 
take a life, the death penalty cannot be sustained.42  In 1986, 
the Court disallowed further execution of any person declared 
to be insane;43 in 2002, death as a consequence for a mentally 
retarded individual was declared unconstitutional;44 and 
finally, in the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case, the Supreme Court 
held it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore 
unconstitutional, to execute a person who was, at the time the 
crime was committed, a juvenile.45   
In Roper, Justice Kennedy wrote that both a recent state 
trend toward abolition of capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders and an international trend toward the same goal 
played a role in the ultimate holding.46  Understanding how 
domestic and international trends affect the United States’ 
Government or Jurisprudence requires little more than an 
elementary level government or civics class; it is quite easy to 
see.  Additionally, paying attention to our Nation’s 
consciousness and ruling with it in mind, even slightly, is not 
a new notion for the Supreme Court; nor is it unusual for the 
Legislature to enact laws based on the pulse of our nation.  
One specific example, as it relates to the Eighth Amendment’s 
cruel and unusual punishment provision, was referenced 
earlier but is equally as applicable to the argument at hand 
particularly when the preceding words are included.  In Trop, 
writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren said, “[where] 
the words of the Amendment are not precise, and…their scope 
is not static[,] the Amendment must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”47 
                                                 
41 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“We have concluded 
that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive 
punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the 
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
42 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
43 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
44 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
45 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. 
46 Id. at 552-604.  
47 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01. 
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But how is one to establish that which is ever evolving?  
The opinion in Coker gives at least some insight into this 
question.  The Coker court held that evolving standards of 
decency must be measured, wherever possible, using 
“objective factors.48”  The factors elucidated by the opinion 
included:  public attitudes regarding a particular punishment, 
legislative attitudes, and jury trends as reflected in their 
sentencing decisions.49  Yet, nowhere in the opinion does it 
specifically say these criteria must be American notions or 
ideas.  Of course, jury trends would likely involve those trends 
occurring within our own justice system, but even major 
trends or shifts in other democratic societies with similar 
justice systems would be, at the very least, relevant to a 
discussion about the death penalty being within a human 
rights context.  Even if the jury trend argument is a stretch, 
and I do not believe that it is, the remaining two factors given 
by the Coker opinion, public attitudes and legislative attitudes 
are equally more important on a global scale than they would 
be if viewed only from the American perspective.   
 
IV. THE DEATH PENALTY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE 
IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR REASONS SPANNING WELL 
BEYOND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
According to the United States Constitution, it, along 
with “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”50  Further, redress 
is statutorily available, generally in the form of a habeas 
corpus petition, for any person “in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”51  Thus, 
                                                 
48 Coker, 499 U.S. at 592. 
49 Id. 
50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (capitalization intentionally left as it 
appears within the document). 
51 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West, WestlawNext current through P.L. 113-
49, 2013). 
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it is unconstitutional to execute any individual in violation of 
any treaty to which the United States is a party, and even for 
textualists such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, who believe 
that interpretation of the Constitution can be done only 
through an understanding of its original public meaning, this 
interpretation would be difficult to circumvent.   
Such treaties do exist although they are very often 
shrouded with administrative and interpretive hyperbole.  
Particularly applicable to a current day argument against use 
of the death penalty in violation of an international treaty is 
that the death penalty is discriminatory which violates the 
International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).52  The treaty, which called for 
all ratifying nations to review their laws and policies in an 
effort to identify any that have a discriminatory effect and 
then to take appropriate remedial action was ratified by the 
United States in 1994.53  In so doing, our nation was bound to 
the terms just as a citizen would be bound to a constitutional 
provision.  Although a thorough and exhaustive discussion of 
discrimination within the American death penalty scheme is 
not possible within the confines of this paper, suffice it to say 
that there is a great deal of evidence to support a finding that 
it is rampant and very likely unavoidable.  Allowing it to 
continue is in violation of the Constitution.   
Additionally, in 1948, battered from having recently 
endured two World Wars and with a renewed sentiment 
towards the globalization of human rights on their side, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.54  The Declaration, which was 
drafted by a committee of nine members, including former 
first-lady Eleanor Roosevelt as the committee’s chairperson, 
proved to be the springboard for what is modern day human 
rights jurisprudence. 55  One of the major objectives of the 
                                                 
52 See STREIB, supra note 18, at 287-88. 
53 Id. 
54 The United Nations, Website Regarding the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml 
(last visited March 12, 2013). 
55 Id. (listing the other drafters as:  Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), 
Alexandre Bogomolov (USSR), Dr. Peng-Chang (China), Rene Cassin 
(France), Charles Dukes (United Kingdom), William Hodgson 
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document was an initiative to globally abolish capital 
punishment.56  To this end, the drafters desired to 
unequivocally set forth the idea that every human being, 
regardless of nationality or race or gender, has a right to life 
and must not be forced to endure torture or inhumane 
treatment. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a 
tangible representation of “the universal recognition that basic 
rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human 
beings, inalienable and equally applicable to everyone, and 
that every one of us is born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”57  As a result of this document and our nation’s 
involvement in its development, it is not surprising that many 
of the laws affecting the use of capital punishment are 
generally derived from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”).   
Where the United States is concerned, the treaty was 
ratified but only with conditions that were clearly included to 
avoid any entanglement with the American death penalty.58  
Adding further fuel to the fire, President Clinton, in 1998, 
issued an executive order which stated that any treaty 
enforcing human rights would be fully recognized and 
implemented by the United States, including the larger treaty 
of which the UDHR is a part, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  To date, both have been 
little more than lip service, but the time may be ripe for a 
constitutional challenge in this area. 
 
V.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS SPECIFIC:  ALL 
MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL AND ALL MEN POSSESS 
CERTAIN UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT 
TO LIFE.  THIS RIGHT BELONGS TO ALL MEN, NOT ONLY 
AMERICAN MEN. 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
                                                                                                       




58 See STREIB, supra note 18, at 284. 
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and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men[.]”59 
Admittedly, the Declaration of Independence does not 
contain a provision regarding enforcement.  Nonetheless, as 
an important historical document, and the physical 
representation of the birth of the United States, it “set forth the 
constitutional obligation to protect life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness” as well as the requirement that these rights, 
applicable to all men, be protected on an equal basis.60  Simply 
stated, the Declaration of Independence elucidated that men 
form governments in an effort to “secure their coequal 
interests in ‘unalienable rights[.]”61  As such, the drafters of the 
document necessarily meant that the rights are “innate, rather 
than created by states or nations [and] the Declaration 
recognize[d] that some dignity interests precede the 
Constitution.”62 
Any argument suggesting that there is a dignity 
interest more important or deserving of protection than life is 
doomed to fail.  Without life, there is no reason to strive for 
anything else because, quite obviously, there is nothing left.  
The birth of the United States of America was predicated upon 
the notion that all men are equal and deserving equally of 
certain rights, one of which is life.  The Declaration did not 
specify that only Americans are created equally, that only 
American life should be protected, and only American rights 
protected.  Quite the opposite, the Declaration was specific in 
applying these rights, and the protection thereof, to all men.  
Consequently, when pontificating about whether or not to 
include international law in any dialogue about evolving 
standards of decency, the United States Supreme Court must 
remember that the mother of the Constitution, the Declaration 
of Independence, applies the rights and protection of them to 




                                                 
59 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2  (U.S. 1776). 
60 Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of 
Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 694-95 (2012). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 698. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As an adolescent, I could not fully appreciate that the 
choices one makes today are the seeds of a flower called 
consequence and, once planted, they bloom for one’s entire 
life.  As adults, we understand this because our seeds were 
long ago planted and we live with the bloom of consequence, 
be it good, bad, or indifferent, on a daily basis. Thus, 
collectively, we give adolescents a chance to act in a way that 
we would deem inappropriate, at least on certain issues, 
because they are still maturing and experiencing and growing 
and need the time to falter so that life’s lessons will be 
impressionable ones.  We offer advice, support, and even 
punishment in an effort to fully develop the gardening skills 
of our youth with the hope that, in the future, if allowed to 
bloom, their gardens will be brilliant.   
America is a young country and our garden is still growing.  
 We stand shoulder to shoulder with powerful, 
exemplary nations, but we do so in spite of the fact that they, 
as the adults, tolerate certain policies and practices from the 
United States, those which stand in opposition to their own, 
because we are still growing.  This tolerance, much like that 
which we give to the adolescent is short lived.  The United 
States must evolve and begin to act in a responsible and 
civilized manner before too many of the seeds we have 
planted in the past turn out to be bad consequences in the 
future and we find ourselves left only with the company that 
we did not mean to keep. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 “What gives a state the right to imprison a person?”2 
The simplest answer is that the person broke the law.3 
Justifying punishment, however, is not, and should not, be so 
simple. It is generally accepted that our government is allowed 
to punish persons who commit crimes.4 Professor John 
Bronsteen5 demands that a “developed theory”6 is needed to 
justify punishment by society. The purpose of this article is to 
                                                 
J.D. Candidate 2013 at Lincoln Memorial University, Duncan School 
of Law. 
1 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, AT 36 [1762] 
(G.D.H. Cole trans., Barnes and Noble 2005).   
2 John Bronsteen, Retribution's Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2009). 
3 Id.  
4 See id.; see also Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793 (2007). 
5 Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. J.D., 
Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard University.  
6 Bronsteen, supra note 2, at 1154-55 (suggesting theories such as neo-
Kantian, Rawlsian social contract theory, and fair play). 
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provide a justifying theory for capital punishment in the 
United States.   
Generally speaking, the death penalty debate focuses 
on whether it is right or wrong, and whether the United States 
should continue to punish by death. Some people advocate for 
the death penalty because of concepts like retribution and 
punishment. Others believe the death penalty serves no 
legitimate purpose and risks executing innocent people; for 
instance, one scholar states that 
 
[T]he death penalty is discriminatory in 
administration in a country rife with 
background racial discrimination, that it cannot 
be fairly and effectively administered when 
used as sparingly as it is usually used, that 
having a death penalty creates too great a gulf 
between the United States and other democratic 
nations, or that there is insufficient evidence 
that the death penalty has greater deterrent 
value than life in prison without parole.7 
 
The focus on capital punishment involves whether we should 
continue to have the death penalty. It is not surprising that 
debates regarding capital punishment are generally focused 
on whether the United States should continue to allow it as a 
practice; but the far better debate would focus on whether, and 
to what extent, there is a moral justification for the practice 
that goes beyond the notions of “retribution” and 
“punishment.”8 For instance, some death penalty advocates 
“may believe that the death penalty is what some murderers, 
i.e., the worst of the worst, deserve by dint of their 
wrongdoing.”9 However, the “he deserves it” approach is 
more difficult to justify; additionally, one must subscribe to a 
                                                 
7 Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death 
Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2006); see generally, Death 
Penalty Focus website, http://www.deathpenalty.org/index.php. 
8 See Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 1288 (analyzing the terms 
“deterrence” and “retribution” as applied to the death penalty). 
9 Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the 
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 422 (2005).  
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moral basis in order to support the fact that the person 
“deserves” death. 
 This article seeks to clarify America’s relationship with 
capital punishment through one of the country’s most 
important documents. This article will distinguish America’s 
philosophy on capital punishment from the rationales of other 
countries that also have the death penalty. Unlike in the movie 
“National Treasure,”10 the actual Declaration of Independence 
does not contain a treasure map, but it does contain evidence 
of a concept that reveals why America implements capital 
punishment. 
 
I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE “RIGHT TO 
LIFE,” AND ESTABLISHING AMERICAN MORALS. 
 
A. A RIGHT TO LIFE IS PROVIDED TO ALL AMERICANS. 
 The Declaration of Independence enshrines three basic 
rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.11 “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.”12  
“The right to life is the only fundamental right, from 
which all other rights are derived.”13 The Constitution, 
specifically the Bill of Rights, provides all other American 
rights. Why would the Founding Fathers not list the “right to 
life” in the Bill of Rights, but list the “right to life” in the 
Declaration?14  
The authority of the Declaration of Independence is not 
usually described as fundamental law; therefore, using the 
                                                 
10 NATIONAL TREASURE, Director Jon Turteltaub, Walt Disney 
Pictures, Jerry Bruckheimer Films, Junction Entertainment, Saturn 
Films (2004). 
11 Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, Principles of a Free Society 
website, Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights, 
http://principlesofafreesociety.com/life-liberty-pursuit-of-
happiness/ last accessed Mar. 14, 2013. 
12 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
13 Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit, supra note 11. 
14 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I- XXVII, with THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Declaration as a primary reference in legal argument rarely 
occurs. Some might argue that the Declaration is only an 
emancipation document that does not carry legal authority in 
the common use of the term “law;” however, there are those 
that disagree.  Professor John Eidsmoe, who is an attorney, an 
author, and a professor of constitutional law and legal history 
at Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones School of Law 
in Montgomery, Alabama, describes it as “fundamental law:” 
 
[t]he role of the Declaration of Independence in 
American law is often misconstrued. Some 
believe the Declaration is simply a statement of 
ideas that has no legal force whatsoever today. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
Declaration has been repeatedly cited by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as part of the fundamental 
law of the United States of America.15 
 
If fundamental law is characterized as a base law from which 
all other law extends, then the Declaration is perhaps 
“fundamental law.” However, it is more accurate to 
characterize the Declaration of Independence similar to the 
Utah Supreme Court’s opinion regarding its Declaration of 
Rights. Utah’s Supreme Court articulated that its Declaration 
of Rights16 “was never meant to establish a comprehensive or 
positive law but merely to reaffirm various natural rights that 
exist independent of any constitution.”17 Nonetheless, 
determining the role of the Declaration as it applies to capital 
punishment is rather unique. At first glance, it appears that 
capital punishment is in direct contradiction with a “right to 
life.”  To understand this dichotomy, one must analyze a 
                                                 
15 John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution: The Faith of Our 
Founding Fathers, pp. 360-361 (1995); Earl Taylor, Jr., The Declaration 
of Independence Part of American Law, Newsletter to National Center 
for Constitutional Studies, June 1998, 
http://www.nccs.net/newsletter/jun98nl.html. 
16 UTAH CONST. ART. 1 § 1 
17Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1283 (Utah 2006) 
(citing Utah v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 636 (Utah 1997). 
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concept that goes beyond fundamental law and into natural 
rights.18  
 
B. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS A DOCUMENT 
FROM WHICH AMERICAN MORALITY ORIGINATED. 
Since a “right to life” is provided in the Declaration 
and such right is a prerequisite to all other rights granted in 
the Bill of Rights,19 it is important for Americans to analyze the 
need and justifications for the death penalty with all American 
principles, especially the Declaration. “The Declaration 
matters, and it is important that we bring to it the same level 
of critical analysis that we apply to the Constitution and to 
other legal texts.”20 
The Declaration is a document that reflects the moral 
values of its authors, who were the founders of American 
government. Principles stated in the Declaration are now the 
roots of American moral code. “[T]he Declaration was an act 
of all the American people, creating an entity, the United 
States of America, which presented itself as one nation to the 
world.”21 The “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness”22 is a designation of morality. It is a moral 
standard set forth by America at its inception to dictate what is 
important. It is important to know that morality can be, and 
often is, just a standard set forth by society. Morals can, but 
need not be, universal concepts that are unchangeable. For 
instance, “defenders of the death penalty continue to refer to 
moral desert,” which is a condition in which one is deserving 
                                                 
18 One law review author does not agree with analyzing the 
Declaration of Independence solely through a natural law 
perspective. He states, “The importance of the Declaration of 
Independence to American law has been obscured by dubious 
associations with natural rights jurisprudence.” Carlton F.W. Larson, 
The Declaration of Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 
76 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2001). 
19 See U.S. CONST. amend.  I-XXVII.  
20 Larson, supra note 19, at 702. 
21 Id. at 723.  
22 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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of something, whether good or bad, “as…real, and not 
infinitely subject to public manipulation” 23 
The argument among Americans on whether the death 
penalty is right or wrong should be discussed based on 
perceived morals stated in the Declaration. However, how is 
moral generally defined? Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines 
“moral” as “of or relating to principles of right or wrong in 
behavior.”24 Morals, therefore, according to this definition, are 
merely a standard of action set by a group of people. 
Generally, morality is not just a single universal code; rather, 
there are several potential definitions of morality, for instance 
 
[w]hen a person simply claims that morality 
prohibits or requires a given action, then the 
term “morality” is genuinely ambiguous. It is 
not clear whether it refers to (1) a guide to 
behavior that is put forward by a society, either 
one's own or some other society; (2) a guide 
that is put forward by a group, either one to 
which the person belongs or another; or (3) a 
guide that a person, perhaps himself, regards as 
overriding and wants adopted by everyone in 
his group, or (4) is a universal guide that all 
rational persons would put forward for 
governing the behavior of all moral agents.25 
 
As Professor Gert noted, there are essentially two main types 
of morality: normative morality and descriptive morality.26 
Descriptive morality is a type of morality put forth by a 
society, a group, a church, or an individual for her own 
behavior.27 The set of people who subscribe to that moral code 
                                                 
23 R. George Wright, The Death Penalty and the Way We Think Now, 33 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 533, 537 (2000). 
24 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/moral, last accessed Jan. 20th 2012 at 
3:02p.m. 
25 Bernard Gert, The Definition of Morality, THE STANFORD 




27 Id.  
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live by it, and adhere to those morals. 28 Normative morality, 
on the other hand, is a universal concept.29 This type of 
morality is a code of conduct that would be put forward by 
any rational person under the same circumstances.30 An 
example of normative morality in terms of the death penalty is 
a statement that the death penalty is immoral because “the rest 
of the civilized world knows better.”31 “Indeed, it is possible 
that ‘morality’ in the normative sense has never been put 
forward by any particular society, by any group at all, or even 
by any individual who holds that moral rules should never be 
violated for non-moral reasons.”32 Gert states, “the only 
feature that the descriptive and normative senses of ‘morality’ 
have in common is that they refer to guides to behavior that 
involve, at least in part, avoiding and preventing harm to 
others.”33  
There are two additional moral approaches that are 
ancillary to Gert’s normative and descriptive classifications. 
First, Deontology is one approach to morality; this is the best 
approach, according to Professor Peter Brandon Bayer.34  
Professor Bayer contends that the Founding Fathers were 
deontologists.35 The Deontology theory asserts that 
government is legitimate only if it governs according to 
eternal moral precepts.36 Deontology requires a sacrifice to 
abide by morality no matter the circumstances.37 Interestingly, 
Professor Bayer offers that such a sacrifice is evident in the 
Declaration:38 
 
For the preservation of those moral principles, 
the Founders pledged their “Lives,” 
                                                 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 David McCord, Imagining A Retributivist Alternative to Capital 
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998). 
32 Gert, supra note 25, at § 2, sent. 2. 
33 Gert, The Definition of Morality, supra note 25. 
34 Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the 
Constitution is a Suicide Pact, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287 (2011). 
35 Id. at 288. 
36 Id. at 287. 
37 Id. at 292.  
38 Id.  
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“Fortunes,” and “sacred Honor,”39 meaning 
that it is the duty of all Americans-their “sacred 
Honor”-to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives and 
property to defend legitimate government.40 
 
  A second moral theory is Consequentialism, which is a 
moral philosophy that relies on the consequences of one’s 
actions for determining morality.41 Therefore, if the 
consequence for an act is a “good” result, then such an act is 
moral. However, while Consequentialism applies to capital 
punishment, its application does not offer in-depth insight.  
 
The referents of both labels [deontology and 
consequentialism] . . . are usually caricatures, 
used to oversimplify philosophical positions for 
the sake of convenience and less innocently to 
provide people with a plausible pretext for 
rejecting ideas they do not understand.42 
 
Theories like Consequentialism and Deontology are overly 
simplistic when justifying the death penalty and do not 
provide a complete understanding of an all-encompassing 
approach.43 As such, for the purposes of this article, a more 
encompassing and less restrictive philosophical approach is 
necessary to answer the capital punishment dilemma between 
the death penalty and the right to life. Natural rights 
embedded in the Declaration of Independence serve this 
purpose. 
  
II. AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW IS DICTATED BY MORAL 
BELIEFS. 
 
Morality in its various forms is so intertwined with law 
that it is nearly impossible to evaluate each concept 
                                                 
39 Id. at 292 (citing DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 
1776)). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 293.  
42 Id. at 293 (citing Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS at 259).  
43 Id.  
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independently.44 One well known theorist, Immanuel Kant, 
believed that laws lacking moral support are not law, rather 
only commands.45 Law is one method by which society 
demands certain action that corresponds with morality. 
“When we credibly attempt to punish an offender who knows, 
or reasonably should have known, that it was illegal to have 
stolen, raped, or murdered, we are trying to tell him that his 
actions matter to this community constituted by shared 
laws.”46 
Basically, American criminal law creates and enforces 
written law in order to avoid or prevent harm. Punishment for 
non-conformity in an attempt to prevent harm is generally 
summed into four categories: incapacitation, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.47 However, these four 
categories only penetrate so far when justifying punishment 
for the death penalty; morality is the underlying theory that 
provides authority for the notion that certain acts should 
result in deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
retribution.48 Since morality is the basis of the aforementioned 
punishments, the moral debate49 is often the subject of 
                                                 
44 Id. at 369 (explaining that “Like morality, concepts of law ‘cannot 
be understood in isolation from one another,’ although they can be 
described discretely.”). 
45Id. (citing Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS 108-09 (2008) (quoting 
Immanuel Kant, LECTURES ON ETHICS, in Cambridge Edition of the 
Writings of Immanuel Kant 27:273 (1992)). 
46 Markel, supra note 9, at 427-28.  
47 Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the 
Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1151, 1154 (2003). 
48 See, Markel, supra note 9, at 426. “In the past, retribution theorists 
asserted that “the fact that a person has committed a moral offence 
provides a sufficient reason for his being made to suffer.” Id.  This 
understanding of retribution as a purely interpersonal moral 
doctrine has waned over time.” Id.   
49 The moral debate extends in a multitude of directions. For 
example, two popular, but contrary, views for defining driving 
forces behind moral actions are utilitarianism and deontology. 
“Utilitarianism, holds that morality is defined by the consequences 
of one's actions or that increasing overall welfare generally equates 
to doing the right thing;” Bronsteen, supra note 2, at 1130. 
“[However,] deontology, [which] defines morality independent of 
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criminal law disputes, especially the death penalty, because it 
is the ultimate punishment in criminal law. If the death 
penalty changes, it will be due to a change in law, which, in 
turn, indicates a change in societal morals. 
Morality, when translated, becomes the law, which is 
then written and enforced by a sovereign power. However, the 
law operates by separation of powers through the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches. Morality’s ability to change 
law can often be a lengthy process. This long process is 
exemplified by the capital punishment debate through past 
attempts to abolish the death penalty. The law can be slow to 
evolve to meet social morals, especially in eradicating moral 
concepts that are based on founding concepts of the United 
States, like the “right to life.” 
When law is or becomes contrary to moral beliefs, 
social and political stability are undermined.50 It is important 
to keep laws updated in accordance with society’s progressing 
moral code lest instability ensue,51 otherwise the instability 
results in unjust punishment of citizenry. However, there is 
controversy as to what branch of government should adjust 
the law to conform to moral preference. For instance, one 
notion contends that the legislative branch should ensure that 
laws reflect morality: 
 
[t]raditional jurists contend that the positive 
law is itself systemically moral and that judges 
can and should decide all cases--including 
those that present controversial moral issues of 
liberty and equality--within the constraints of 
the standards, rules, and precedents in the 
positive law.52 
 
                                                                                                       
consequences and suggests that moral acts are done for their own 
sake rather than in order to achieve any particular end.” Id. 
50 Alice Ristroph, Third Wave of Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151 
(2010). 
51 Id.   
52 Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and 
Perfectionist Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 233, 233 (2008). 
 NATURAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  55 
 
 
However, there is an alternative argument that the judicial 
branch should ensure that laws reflect morality, which avers 
 
that judges should, therefore, read the 
Constitution ‘morally,’ i.e., they should 
construe the principles of liberty and equality 
in the Constitution in accordance with the 
community's best construction of the moral 
requirements of decency and fairness and 
should implement the true democratic 
conditions of liberty and equality.53 
 
Adjusting criminal law based on changes in society’s moral 
fabric generally occurs in one of two ways. First, the 
legislature can make or amend the positive law. This type of 
law-making process is said to be in accordance with public 
opinion because political representatives are elected to act for 
their constituents. Second, the judiciary may alter criminal law 
in some instances, especially those issues that involve 
interpretation of the law. For example, the Supreme Court has 
abolished some execution methods as violating the Eighth 
Amendment’s54 “cruel and unusual punishments” language.55 
The Court has held: “To constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment, an execution method must present a ‘substantial’ 
or ‘objectively intolerable’ risk of serious harm.”56 Of course, 
the previous statement is subject to broad interpretation. It 
could be assumed that the Supreme Court may one day 
abolish the death penalty based on changing morals. Perhaps 
the Court will use the “right to life” language in the 
Declaration to justify such an opinion; however, considering 
natural law theories from which this phrase originates, such a 
decision from the Supreme Court is unlikely.  
  
                                                 
53 Id. at 234. 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
55 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (declaring 
“disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning 
alive” are not allowed as execution techniques). 
56 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 35-6 (2008). 
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III. MURDER VIOLATES A PERSON’S “RIGHT TO LIFE,” BUT 
EXECUTION BY THE STATE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
MORAL “RIGHT TO LIFE” CONCEPT. 
 
 At common law, murder was defined as “the unlawful 
killing of another human being with ‘malice aforethought.’”57 
The intent to kill and the intent to commit a felony were sub-
categories of the single concept of “malice aforethought.”58 At 
its most basic description, murder is one person taking the life 
of another through some volitional act. This act violates the 
victim’s “right to life.” One West Virginia Supreme Court 
Justice, in dissent, has described murder as “an ordinary 
natural law crime.”59 
When a convicted murderer is put to death, there is no 
violation of the right to life.60 This dichotomy seems 
contradictory at first glance but, in fact, it is not contradictory 
to the right to life language in the Declaration. A person’s 
“right to life” under the Declaration is different from rights 
granted in the Constitution. The Declaration, as previously 
established, is not the same type of legal authority as the 
Constitution. The Constitution limits government action or 
conduct against citizens; it does not apply to non-state actor 
wrongs against other private citizens. Moreover, the 
Declaration was not intended to necessarily limit government; 
rather, it attempts to create a moral structure within which 
both society and its government will thrive.  
The Declaration is much broader than the Constitution 
and applies to capital punishment differently. It can be 
inferred that the Declaration imposes a duty not to kill on both 
                                                 
57 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991); see 3 J. STEPHEN, 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 21-22 (1883). 
58 Id.  
59 West Virginia v. Hobbs, 282 S.E.2d 258, 276 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, 
J., dissenting).  
60 Not everyone agrees that a violation of the right to life occurs 
when a convicted murder is sentenced to death: “Executions 
undermine the very respect for life they purport to foster.” David 
McCord, Imagining A Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 
FLA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). While Americans subscribe to natural nights 
by virtue of the Declaration of Independence, a person’s belief 
system allows him or her to oppose such theories internally, while 
society acts on an adjacent moral level.  
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government and citizenry. The Constitution imposes a duty 
only on the government not to kill unjustly -- unjustly 
meaning through either deprivation of due process or cruel 
and unusual methods of punishment.61  For example, a private 
citizen can murder another private citizen and not violate that 
particular victim’s constitutional rights; however, such a 
victim’s right under the Declaration’s “right to life” language 
is violated. Such a moral violation62 occurs under the 
Declaration because of the natural rights theory known as the 
social contract. From a natural law perspective, there is no 
violation when the state seeks retaliation because according to 
natural law that person’s right to life is voluntarily forfeited 
based on the act of killing.63 
Notwithstanding natural law, there are other theories 
that can justify punishment but that do not necessarily flow 
from the Declaration. First, Utilitarianism offers one such 
approach: 
 
[f]or utilitarians the good that can be done is 
preventing the criminal, by incapacitation, from 
committing future criminal acts, plus deterring 
other potential criminals, and minus the harm 
punishment does to the criminal; but what a 
criminal supposedly “deserves” is merely 
revenge and does no good.64 
 
A second approach is retribution theory, which focuses 
singularly on justice based on a theory of revenge. To put it in 
Latin, lex talionis65 or “an eye for an eye”66 is the principle of 
                                                 
61 See generally, U.S. CONST. amends. V & VIII.  
62 One commentator asserts that dignity is “the premier value 
underlying the last two centuries of moral and political thought, an 
essential ‘basis of human rights.” Leslie Meltzer Henry, The 
Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172 (2011). 
63 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1.  
64 Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 335 (2004). 
65 “The principle or law of retaliation that a punishment inflicted 
should correspond in degree and kind to the offense of the 
wrongdoer, as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; retributive 
justice.” Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/lex+talionis.  
58                                                 2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
retribution. Professor Oldenquist suggests that most people 
are not well-informed when subscribing to the retribution 
approach. “Most people's reasons for capital punishment are 
retributivist; they talk about deterrence because it seems a 
respectable kind of reason that relies on crime statistics and 
they don't know what to say when told retribution is 
revenge.”67 
 
IV. AMERICAN SOCIETY CAN PUNISH INDIVIDUALS BY 
DEATH, BECAUSE OF NATURAL LAW AND SOCIAL 
CONTRACT THEORY. 
 
 Justifying capital punishment is difficult and rightly so. 
One can use terms of art such as “retribution,” “deontology,” 
“consequentialism,” and “deterrence.” However, these terms 
are limited in application. They do not, for example, provide a 
solution as to why America is in the minority of the world, 
since most countries have abolished punishment by death.68 
Countries such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United 
States of America, Yemen, North Korea, Somalia, Taiwan, and 
several others still retain the death penalty.69 However, there is 
a distinguishing factor between the United States and the 
other countries listed above. Unlike the other countries, the 
United States still has the death penalty because of natural 
law, the philosophical concept that embodies various theories 
that are mostly encompassed in a general theory known as the 







                                                                                                       
66 The phrase “eye for an eye” is generally used when referencing 
Biblical scripture. See Exodus 22:24 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.).  
67 Oldenquist, supra note 65, at 337.  
68 Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-
penalty, last accessed Jan. 20th 2015 at 6:30 p.m. 
69 Id. 
70 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13.   
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A. PHILOSOPHERS WHO INFLUENCED THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ 
“RIGHT TO LIFE” LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION, 
NATURAL RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY THAT 
OFFERED THE BASIS FOR AMERICA’S FOUNDING. 
 
“[T]he Founders inspired and justified both the 
Revolution and ensuing fundamental principles of American 
law, especially due process, on the best applicable precepts of 
enduring morality they knew.”71 Moral influence on the 
Founding Fathers in large part likely came from theorists such 
as Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, whose works offer 
original and intelligent explanations into the American social 
and political structure as well as America’s moral fabric. These 
theorists believed in a concept known as natural law. “Natural 
law theory is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics, 
theories of politics, theories of civil law, and theories of 
religious morality.”72 One can look to the plain language of the 
Declaration to derive evidence to support natural law’s 
influence in the document.  
 
When, in the course of human events, it 
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them 
with another, and to assume, among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal 
station to which the laws of nature and of 
nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to 
the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to 
the separation.73 
 
This aforementioned language and the natural rights concept 
were successful in establishing a separation between America 
and Britain. However, its meaning and impact established 
more than just independence; it established a mindset, morals, 
and a society. In order to fully understand the justification that 
                                                 
71 Bayer, supra note 35, at 328. 
72 Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, (Sept. 23, 2002), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ (last 
substantive revision Sept. 27, 2011) (last accessed Mar. 23, 2012). 
73 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
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natural law provides for the death penalty, one must become 
further acquainted with the philosophical ideas from these 
natural law theorists whose voices resonated in the minds of 
the Founding Fathers.   
 
B. ROUSSEAU’S “THE SOCIAL CONTRACT,” LOCKE’S “TWO 
TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT,” MILL’S “ON LIBERTY,” AND 
HOBBES’ “LEVIATHAN,” OFFER CLARITY AND 
UNDERSTANDING ON NATURAL RIGHTS JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. 
 
 The social contract is exactly like it sounds – a 
contract. On one side of the contract is the individual; on the 
other side of the contract is a collective unit comprised of all 
individuals.74  In his work, “The Social Contract,”75 Jean 
Jacques Rousseau offered two basic concepts upon which he 
builds his well-known theory. First, each man seeks to 
preserve himself; man in his natural state has free will and acts 
to protect himself because no one else will protect him.76 
Rousseau’s second concept, the common good, offers a way 
for each man to alter his method of self-preservation by 
submitting through an exercise of free will to a civil body, but 
in return he receives rights, and with those rights comes 
protection.77 In essence, self-preservation becomes 
preservation of the civil state, and the civil state in return 
offers to help preserve each individual through rights and 
interests. “Each of us puts his person and all his power in 
common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, 
in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an 
indivisible part of the whole.”78  
The social contract takes man from a natural state of 
anarchy and free will and provides a structured system where 
free will impulses are tempered with human thought.79 The 
                                                 
74 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
75 Id.   
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 14 
79 Oldenquist, supra note 63 (suggesting that humans are innately 
social, as opposed to being social through adoption of societal 
conventions). 
 NATURAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  61 
 
 
social contract is mutually beneficial to all because the natural 
state of man exploited the weaknesses of all men.80 Under the 
social contract, weakness is counteracted by collective action 
and thought. Rousseau articulates that “only[] when the voice 
of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of 
appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, 
find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to 
conduct his reason before listening to his inclinations.”81 The 
obligation of each participant under the contract is to conform 
to the “civil state,” as compared to the natural state where 
man only conformed to his own free will. “As nature gives 
each man absolute power of his members, the social compact 
gives the body politic absolute power over all its members 
also[.]”82 
After man leaves his natural free state and enters the 
civil state, there are boundaries of action; however, each man 
still has liberties. But liberty to act is no longer unfettered as it 
was in the state of nature. Rousseau argues that punishment is 
required to preserve the civil state when man goes outside the 
boundaries set by the civil state (i.e., when man violates the 
collective morals).83 Rousseau addresses the concept of the 
death penalty directly in his work.  
The death penalty is justified because the wrongdoer 
has provided “consent” to be punished or perhaps die for his 
breach of the contract. “He who wishes to preserve his life at 
other’s expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to 
give it up for their sake.”84 As a result, if a person acts within 
                                                 
80 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1. 
81 Id. at 19. 
82 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 31. 
83 Other well-known theorist St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with 
Rousseau declaring that “[t]herefore if a man is dangerous and 
infectious to the [other members], on account of some sin, it is 
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to 
safeguard the common good, since a little leaven corrupted the 
whole lump.” Wright, supra note 24, at 554 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA THEOLOGICA II (Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
trans., 1929), reprinted in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, REFLECTION ON 
HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II q. 64, 240 
(John P. Doyle trans., 1997). 
84 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 36. 
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his former state of nature85 (self-preserving) to the detriment 
of another (for instance, through murder), then the civil state 
must punish him, because the person harmed, and the person 
harming had given up their right to act impulsively. The civil 
state can act86 because “by the social compact we have given 
the body politic existence and life; we have now by legislation 
to give it movement and will.”87 In short, the act of 
punishment is justified because the wrongdoer and victim 
both consented to the civil state’s social contract for protection 
and for punishment.88 
 
i. JOHN LOCKE 
 John Locke also shared Rousseau’s principles of 
justification for punishment in a civil society. In Two Treatises 
of Government, Locke explained: Punishment is permitted to 
correct transgressions not for oneself but for mutual security.89 
More relevantly, “[e]ach [t]ransgression may be punished to 
that degree, and with so much [s]everity as will suffice to make 
it an ill bargain to the [o]ffender, give him cause to repent, and 
terrifie others from doing the like.”90 The former statement is 
what is, in modern terms, called deterrence. Of course, 
deterrence91 is commonly used as justification for the death 
penalty.  
                                                 
85 There is another perspective that believes detrimental human 
action in the civil state is not a reversion to the previous state of 
nature, but rather only a skewed action under the civil state. For 
example, “To say that the defendant, at the time of the offense, was 
operating at a sub-human, animalistic level and yet engaged in 
premeditation and deliberation or malice aforethought is to indulge 
in patent self-contradiction.” Wright, supra note 24, at 555.  
86 Markel, supra note 9, at 432 (noting a more modern term for civil 
state action and punishment is known as “democratic self defense”). 
87 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 39. 
88 See id. 
89 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 312 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. 1960). 
90 Id. at 315. 
91 There are skeptics on whether the death penalty has deterrent 
value. See e.g., Walter Berns et al., The Death Penalty: A Philosophical 
and Theological Perspective, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 468 (1997) 
(stating “If we make the admittedly unlikely assumption that the 
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 Locke also addressed retribution, insinuating that in 
the state of nature, a type of vigilantism is necessary. 
However, the right to punish a transgressor in a structured 
civil state is turned over to the government. Locke explains the 
civil state’s collective protection scheme: “[e]xecution of the 
[l]aw of [n]ature is in that state, put into every [m]an’s hands, 
whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of 
that [l]aw to such a [d]egree, as may hinder its [v]iolation.”92 
The individual right of retribution that existed in the state of 
nature no longer exists and is replaced with a right to punish 
in the civil state. The right to punish becomes more complex in 
the civil state, as compared to the state of nature. In the state of 
nature, a wrongdoing was only an act against the person. In 
comparison, a wrongdoing in the civil state is a crime both 
against the person and the body politic, but the wrong can 
only be righted by the body politic, which seeks punishment 
on behalf of the victim and all others in society.93 
 
ii. JOHN STUART MILL 
In his work, On Liberty,94 John Stuart Mill also explored 
the body politic. For instance, does man give up all rights to 
the civil body to seek retribution? Mill articulated an answer 
this way:  
 
[e]veryone who receives the protection of 
society owes a return for the benefit, and the 
fact of living in society renders it indispensable 
that each should be bound to observe a certain 
line of conduct toward the rest. The conduct 
consists, first, in not injuring the interest of 
another; or rather certain interests, which either 
by express legal provision or by tacit 
                                                                                                       
number of murderers is equal to the number of murders, this means 
that 99.9 percent of the murderers are not, or have not been, 
executed, which is not much of a ‘message.’”). 
92 LOCKE, supra note 90, at 312. 
93 Id. 
94 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY [1859] (Charles W. Elliot ed., 2004). 
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understanding, ought to be considered as 
rights.95 
 
It appears that Mill agrees with Locke’s perspective that action 
by individuals who injure others is not allowed; further, it 
appears that Mill agrees with Locke’s perspective that the 
benefit for exercising restraint of personal vigilante retribution 
is “protection by society.”96   
Mill avers that society will attempt to control human 
action by either, or both, a written moral code (law) or a tacit 
understanding.97  The most interesting aspect of Mill’s “tacit 
understanding” language is that no collective body can judge 
tacit understanding, but rather it is determined within each 
individual with the expectation of consensus among all. 
Unlike law, which is interpreted and enforced by the civil 
state, tacit understanding is in each individual’s mind. 
Therefore, two sets of moral code exist: one that is prescribed 
by society, and another which is a moral code of the 
individual. These sets of moral codes are similar to Bernard 
Gertz’s descriptive and normative morality, discussed above.  
If one, globally-adopted moral code (“macro morality”) 
could govern all human action, then no crime would exist, 
because all human action would follow the predetermined 
morality, i.e., no one would breach the social contract. Man 
cannot give up all of his state of nature impulses; such 
impulses will often result in breaking the law, or in other 
words, violating the civil body’s code of conduct. Therefore, in 
regard to Mill’s issue, how much free will does man submit to 
the sovereign?   The answer is not enough to prevent breaches 
of civil code (morals). Man’s state of nature still exists, and 
reverting to the previous state of nature often violates the 
social contract and must result in punishment. In other words, 
breaching the social contract is immoral. 
 
iii. THOMAS HOBBES 
“The Founding Fathers were heavily influenced by 
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in establishing America’s 
                                                 
95 Id. at 75.  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
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first principles, most notably the recognition of unalienable 
rights, the social compact, and limited government.”98 Hobbes 
was a natural law theorist.99  
 
The paradigmatic natural law view holds that 
(1) the natural law is given by God; (2) it is 
naturally authoritative over all human beings; 
and (3) it is naturally knowable by all human 
beings. Further, it holds that (4) the good is 
prior to the right, that (5) right action is action 
that responds nondefectively to the good, that 
(6) there are a variety of ways in which action 
can be defective with respect to the good, and 
that (7) some of these ways can be captured and 
formulated as general rules.100 
 
In his work, Leviathan, Hobbes creates a metaphor for the civil 
state in the form of an artificial man with arms, legs, and a 
head.101 Each part of the artificial man, which Hobbes called 
the “leviathan,” performs the functions of the state. 102 Every 
part of the “leviathan” is made up of each person in that state, 
and each person has desires and reason. The good of man 
corresponds with the good of the state.  
 
[T]he Hobbesian view what is good is what is 
desired, Hobbes thinks that humans are 
similarly constructed so that for each human 
(when he or she is properly biologically 
functioning) his or her central aim is the 
avoidance of violent death.103 Thus Hobbes is 
                                                 
98 Michael Warren, America’s Survival Guide, 
http://www.americassurvivalguide.com/thomas_hobbes.php 
99 Murphy, supra note 73, at § 2.1.  
100 Murphy, supra note 73 at § 1.4.  
101 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN PARTS I & II, (A.P. Martinich ed. 
2005).  
102 Id. at 9.  
103 Similar to Hobbes’ “violent death” terminology, Nancy Bothne, 
Midwest Director for Amnesty International, says that each person 
has the “right to be free of fear.” Berns et al., supra note 90, at 471 
(“To be free from fear is a concept that is a pretty incredible concept. 
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able to build his entire natural law theory 
around a single good, the good of self-
preservation, which is so important to human 
life that exceptionlessly binding precepts can be 
formulated with reference to its achievement.104 
 
Similar to Rousseau, Hobbes takes the position that self-
preservation is the most important element of human action. It 
is simple logic to connect between murder (the act of taking 
another’s life) and the violation of natural law.  
Robert Kraynak, a professor at Colgate University, 
believes that Hobbes’ theory of natural law “gave citizens a 
standard for determining if the written laws and customs of 
their nation or any other nation were just or unjust, right or 
wrong, human or inhumane.”105 Kraynak submits that 
Hobbes’ theory of natural law has translated into what is now 
called “liberties or rights.”106 Therefore, the notion of self-
preservation at the natural law level has now been converted 
into a right or liberty to individual “life.”107 The Declaration of 
Independence contains this right. “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; 
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”108 
 A violation of a person’s “right to life” is a breach of 
the social contract and violates natural law. The United States 
adopted natural law in the Declaration as a set of morals. 
Consequently, capital punishment is morally justified through 
natural law according to the previously discussed theorists.109  
                                                                                                       
It deals not only with a relationship of the state to individuals, but 
with individuals to individuals.”).  
104 Murphy, supra note 73, at 2.1. 
105 Robert P. Kraynak, Thomas Hobbes: From Classical Natural Law to 
Modern Natural Rights; Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American 
Constitution website, http://www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/hobbes. 
106 Id.  
107 See id.  
108 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
109 Contra Kleven Thomas, Is Capital Punishment Immoral Even If It 
Deters Murder? 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 599 (2006) (concluding “… 
capital punishment is immoral even if it does deter murder.”) 
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The Founders did not make up the right to life. Rather, 
the concept was borrowed from theorists such as Thomas 
Hobbes. In short, the Founders did not create natural rights, 
but adopted them. Quite the contrary, natural rights have 
created and shaped the United States into its current form: one 
that allows the death penalty. 
 
V. THE CONTRACTARIAN VIEW VERSUS SOCIAL CONTRACT 
THEORY– MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT. 
 
There is minimal authority for justification theories 
regarding punishment outside the well-known death penalty 
justifications. 
 
The absence of any well-developed 
contractarian theory of punishment seems all 
the more puzzling in light of two salient facts: 
First, there is a robust contractarian tradition 
that emerged in seventeenth century political 
philosophy, first with the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes, later in the Enlightenment version of 
this same tradition in the writings of Locke and 
Rousseau . . . .”110 
 
Perhaps the absence of the contractarian viewpoint in 
American capital punishment discourse is most unusual 
because of its origin and relation to beginning principles of the 
United States. 
 
A. MORAL JUSTIFICATION 
 
 Punishment under a contractarian theory is generally 
easier to understand than other concepts that operate with 
death penalty arguments, such as retribution theory111 or 
religious theories. The act of punishment needs moral 
                                                 
110  Claire Finkelstein, Punishment as a Contract, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
319, 322 (2011). 
111 See Markel, supra note 9, at 423. 
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support.112 Contractarian theory provides support for 
punishment in a different manner than other theories.113 The 
basic nature of a contract is that the obligation is either 
fulfilled or unfulfilled, and if it is unfulfilled, action may be 
taken to rectify the breach.114 However, a source of morality 
must be added to a basic contract viewpoint for there to be 
moral support for punishment. Of course, in the case of 
American capital punishment, this article establishes that the 
Declaration of Independence offers a moral element to the 
social contract view of punishment. 
The contractarian view espoused by Claire Finkelstein 
in the article Punishment as Contract is different from an 
argument for social contract justification.115 Finkelstein says 
that “it is unlikely that rational contractors would accept the 
death penalty.”116 Essentially, a contractarian view presumes 
voluntary entry into a contract.117 This article is unique from 
Finkelstein’s assertion of punishment based on contract, 
because pure contractarian view lacks moral justification 
compared with social contract theory developed in the 
Declaration of Independence. Finklestein is correct in her 
assertion that “rational agents simply do not regard losing 
their lives for the sake of protecting their property as a trade-
off worth making.”118 This would not make sense either for 
Rousseau or Hobbes because it would preclude the basic 
notions of “self preservation”119 and “avoidance of violent 
death.120” The social contract is assumed by the fact one is 
alive. Therefore, an American citizen does not enter the social 
contract voluntarily; rather it is inherently part of being born 
an American citizen. While Finkelstein’s contractarian view is 
similar to social contract theory, there are important 
differences that differentiate social contract theory under the 
                                                 
112 Finkelstein, supra note 108, at 324 (stating “[t]he practice of 
punishment therefore stands in need of justification if the 
background moral objections to it are to be overridden.”). 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 324-25. 
116 Id. at 335. 
117 See id. at 324. 
118 Id. at 335. 
119 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 13. 
120 HOBBES, supra note 97, at part 1, ch. 13. 
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Declaration from pure contract theory flaws, such as lacking a 
moral foundation or origin and lacking consent to enter the 
contract because consent is assumed in social contract 
theory.121 
 
B. CASE EXAMPLES OF THE “RIGHT TO LIFE,” SOCIAL 
CONTRACT THEORY, AND JUSTIFIED PUNISHMENT. 
 
The effect of natural rights, specifically social contract 
theory, on the “right to life” is that they transform the “right to 
life” from a plain language interpretation to a term of art. 
Basically, the “right to life” is conditional-- not unconditional. 
For example, the defendant in Kansas v. Kleypas,122 who 
appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court, argued that his “right 
to life”123 under the Kansas Constitution would be violated by 
the death penalty. In his argument, the defendant 
distinguished his “right to life” from a right to due process 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.124  The defendant 
further argued that “our [Kansas] state constitution simply 
does not contemplate the taking of a life by the State under 
any circumstances.”125 He contends that the Kansas 
Constitution confers upon him an absolute “right to life.”126 
However, the Court rejected his argument, stating that “[the] 
argument, though somewhat novel, has been soundly rejected 
by other state courts.”127 Most interestingly, the court noted 
that the defendant’s absolute “right to life” argument 
“stretches” the language of the Kansas Constitution outside of 
its intended meaning, and such an argument is not within the 
                                                 
121 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13. 
122 Kansas v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 252-53 (Kan. 2001) (overruled as to 
some conclusions of law but not the “right to life” conclusion stated 
in this text) (overruling recognized by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 
(2006)). 
123 Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 252-53 (citing KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1 
(“All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, 
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”). 
124 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
125 Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 253.  
126 Id.  
127 Id.; see, e.g., Ruiz v. Arkansas, 772 S.W.2d 297 (Ark. 1989); 
Missouri v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 (Mo. 1982); Slaughter v. 
Oklahoma, 950 P.2d 839, 861-62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
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spirit or letter of the language.128 This conclusion leads one to 
infer that other Supreme Courts would conclude similarly 
when presented with the same question. 
One dissenting judge in Rhode Island v. Blood 
mischaracterized natural law and its application to murder. In 
this Rhode Island case, the defendant killed a family 
member.129 The dissenting judge declared that killing a family 
member is a “gross violation of the natural law.”130 This 
characterization in the context of this article is inaccurate for 
two reasons. First, a gross violation of natural law does not 
exist; there is either a violation of natural law or no violation at 
all. Secondly, under natural law and the “right to life,” there is 
no difference between murdering a family member and 
murdering any other person in society – everyone has a right 
to live, even the murderer himself, until, of course, he or she 
commits the murder and breaches the social contract. 
The main purpose of the social contract is protection. 
Everyone benefits from protection of the civil state. There are 
two obvious instances that highlight the moral justification of 
capital punishment through the context of natural rights. First, 
capital punishment for murderers of law enforcement officials 
is morally justified because police are necessary for self-
preservation under the civil state.  The act of murdering a 
police officer under Hobbes’ view is like severing the hand of 
the Leviathan or the “artificial man.”131 Essentially, the police 
provide the protection that a person would have provided on 
his or her own under the state of nature. However, it is a better 
exchange for everyone to defend each other through a civil 
body rather than trying to preserve ourselves alone.  
  Another obvious example that justifies punishment by 
death via the social contract would be killing a person who is 
weaker, such as a child. A child enters the world and bargains 
for safety, protection, or in the event that protection fails, 
retribution, in exchange for his or her relinquishment of free 
will under the state of nature discussed by Hobbes and 
Rousseau.  
                                                 
128 Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 253. 
129 Rhode Island v. Blood, 37 A.2d 452, 454 (R.I. 1944) (Condon, J., 
dissenting). 
130 Id. at 465. 
131 See HOBBES, supra note 99, at 9.  
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 An example of a capital execution is the tragic case 
involving Ernest John Dobbert Jr. and his daughter, Kelly 
Ann.132 Dobbert brutally abused Kelly Ann until she died.133 
Both Dobbert and Kelly Ann had a right to life, but when 
Dobbert decided to deny Kelly Ann her right to life, he also 
forfeited his own right to life under the social contract. 
Therefore, when examining the “right to life” language with 
natural rights concepts, Dobbert relinquished his right, thus 
prompting the civil state to act134 to both avenge the death of 
Kelly Ann and preserve the civil state from further harm. The 
Florida governor at the time of Dobbert’s execution 
commented and described the connection between the state 
and its citizens regarding such executions: 
 
Ernest Dobbert has been executed because of 
his brutal actions toward his own children. I 
hope that this indication of the seriousness of 
child abuse will be an example of the value 
which the people of Florida place upon the lives 
of infants and young people in our state, and a 
measure of the lengths the people of Florida are 
prepared to go to prevent and punish such 
crimes.135 
 
Consider Locke’s position on such crimes: “each transgression 
may be punished to that degree and with so much severity as 
will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him 
cause to repent and terrify others from doing the like.”136 It 
appears that Governor Graham is essentially describing the 
same idea espoused by Locke. 
                                                 
132 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 284 (1977). 
133 Id. at 285. 
134 The natural life, says Blackstone, “cannot legally be disposed of or 
destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor by 
any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.” 




child-abuser/, last accessed Mar. 31 2013, quoting former Governor 
of Florida, Bob Graham. 
136 LOCKE, supra note 88, at 315. 
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VI. THE CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE: CHRISTIAN FAITH AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE MORAL THEORY IN THE CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT REALM. 
  
 This section offers one alternative moral influence to 
the capital punishment debate. An in-depth analysis of the 
Christian faith would encompass several works and require 
extensive research and analysis. However, mentioning such an 
alternative theory bolsters the natural rights argument as a 
legitimate justification for capital punishment and it also 
provides a more comprehensive understanding; further, and 
more importantly, it provides a basis for another common 
source of American morality to compare against natural 
rights.  
Throughout its history, the United States has 
recognized a higher source of power – God; for example, the 
Pledge of Allegiance contains the phrase “One nation under 
God;”137“in God We Trust,” was first printed on U.S. 
coins in 1864; the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the early 
1820’s, opened session with “God save the United States 
and this Honorable Court;” and ever since George 
Washington, during his inaugural oath, first added “so 
help me God,” so too has every President since then.138  
Christianity has likely influenced the United States more than 
any other religious faith.139 President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
espoused a high regard for the Declaration but considered it 
second to the Bible: “Fellow Americans, we venerate more 
widely than any other document, except only the Bible, the 
American Declaration of Independence.”140  
When debating American capital punishment, 
Christianity and its principles are almost always applicable. 
                                                 
137 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2013).  
138 America Acknowledges God, Foundation For Moral Law, 
available at, http://morallaw.org/resources/america-
acknowledges-god/ 
139 See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
140 Bayer, supra note 35, at 336 (2011) (citing Dwight David 
Eisenhower, Report by the President to the American People on His 
European Trip (Sept. 10, 1959), in WILLIAM J. FEDERER, TREASURY OF 
PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATIONS 322 (2004). 
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Christian followers have a connection to capital punishment 
because Jesus was executed. The story about Jesus’ short trial 
and execution offers insight into societal desire to punish by 
death and the political motivation which services that need. 
The Book of Matthew, chapter 27, verses 11-26 describe Jesus’ 
sentencing: 
 
[n]ow it was the governor’s custom each year 
during the Passover celebration to release one 
prisoner to the crowd – anyone they wanted. 
This year there was a notorious prisoner, a man 
named Barabbas. As the crowds gathered 
before Pilates’ house that morning, he asked 
them, “which one do you want me to release to 
you – Barabbas, or Jesus who is called the 
Messiah? The crowd shouted back, “Barabbas!” 
Pilate responded, “Then what should I do with 
Jesus who is called the messiah? They shouted 
back, “Crucify him!”141 
 
It can be said that Jesus’ sentencing and execution is the 
antithesis of America’s ambition for a capital punishment 
process. An innocent man (Jesus) dies. A killer (Barabbas) was 
released into society. No appeal or due process occurred. 
Lastly, execution by crucifixion is cruel and unusual.142  
It would be difficult to argue that Christianity is not a 
moral code. In large part, Christianity as a basis for morals is 
more prevalent in the United States – at least, consciously - 
than natural rights; it is certainly referenced more often. 
However, Christianity is unclear about its position on whether 
it is for or against the death penalty. Should we forgive or 
punish according to Scripture? America’s uncomfortable 
association with the death penalty in modern times is likely 
attributable, at least in part, to Christianity and its principles.  
Christianity fuels two differing sides of the death 
penalty argument. Consider the following passages and their 
apparent contradiction to one another. The first passage is 
from Exodus, Chapter 22 verse 24: “an eye for an eye, tooth for 
                                                 
141 Matthew 27:11-26 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.). 
142 See In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). 
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a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot.”143 Now compare 
the previous pro-death penalty passage with one that endorses 
forgiveness144 instead of retribution: “Get rid of all bitterness, 
rage, anger, harsh words, and slander, as well as all types of 
evil behavior.”145 “Instead, be kind to each other, 
tenderhearted, forgiving one another, just as God through 
Christ has forgiven you.”146  The natural rights position is clear 
on capital punishment; it is not only allowed, but required. 
Christianity is ambiguous on the topic of capital punishment, 
as evidenced by the ambiguity of various Bible verses.  
While Christianity is the basis of numerous moral 
discussions about capital punishment, it is mutually exclusive 
in text. The language of the Bible is subject to interpretation. It 
is difficult for opponents to discern whether or not one 
actually believes the scripture and is enforcing it, or whether 
that person believes in or against the death penalty and is 
using scripture to support his or her position. As such, natural 
rights are not as ambiguous, nor as controversial, as 
Christianity. Furthermore, natural rights are adopted by virtue 
of being American. Christianity, on the other hand, is not 
adopted by virtue of citizenship; rather, it is voluntarily 
adopted. In other words, a person can, of course, be an 
American but not a Christian; however, one cannot be an 
American and not be subject to natural law, because of the 
Declaration of Independence’s incorporation of natural rights 
and its involuntary social contract. 
 An issue arises when participants in the death penalty 
process are Christians who subscribe to the forgiveness text as 
the most important tenet of the Bible.  
 
                                                 
143 Exodus 22:24 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.); see also Numbers 35:31; 
Leviticus 24:16-17. 
144 For an interesting account of execution and the Christian Faith, see 
e.g., Jill Jones, The Christian Executioner: Reconciling "An Eye for an 
Eye" with "Turn the Other Cheek", 27 PEPP. L. REV. 127, 127 (1999) 
(What made the Texas execution (Karla Faye Tucker) so dramatic 
was the fact that the “pickax killer” was a born-again Christian); see 
also Michael Graczyk, Tucker Face to Face with Jesus, ARIZ. REP., Feb. 4, 
1998, at A1.  
145 Ephesians 4: 31-32 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.). 
146 Id. 
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In Florida, one criminal judge dramatically 
highlighted the struggle that some practitioners 
face regarding whether they can participate in 
capital sentencing by writing a series of letters 
to the public in the local newspaper. In one 
such letter he declared, “[b]ecause God has 
given me a new life in Jesus Christ, I choose not 
to condone our use of capital punishment.”147 
 
Punishment under a natural rights theory may not correspond 
with religious moral principles, especially for those charged 
with the task of carrying out the execution. As such, it is 
possible that man’s moral codes can contradict one another. 
The dilemma then becomes which path to follow; in other 




 Summing up the death penalty in few words is almost 
impossible; however, the following passage is an admirable 
attempt. “We pity him [subject of execution], but we also 
appreciate the anger of his countrymen and the dramatic 
necessity of his death. The dramatic necessity would appear to 
rest on its moral necessity.”148 This passage draws on the social 
contract theory to find the death penalty is a necessary evil. 
Social contract theory, when supported by the moral nature of 
the Declaration, offers Americans a developed and unique 
argument to justify decisions and actions surrounding the 
death penalty. 
As established previously, every American has a right 
to life when they enter the social contract pursuant to the 
Declaration’s language. However, breach of this social contract 
through murder violates another’s right to life, as inferred 
from Rousseau, Locke, Mill, and Hobbes, and subjects the 
                                                 
147 Jones, supra note 143, at 134 (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching 
for the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611, 639 n.154 
(1987). 
148 Berns et.al, supra note 92, at 469. 
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murderer to morally justified punishment.149 Punishment is 
necessary and consented to by the wrongdoer to accomplish 
the key goal of self-preservation of all individuals in the state. 
Therefore, the death penalty serves a purpose of “self-
preservation”150 under the social contract by offering the 
bargained-for protection guaranteed by the civil state in 
exchange that Man leaves his state of nature.   
Considering the Founding Fathers’ sources of 
philosophical influences, the “right to life” is not absolute; it is 
subject to forfeiture by the act of murder under the social 
contract. The death penalty serves a necessary function under 
natural law theory that adheres to deep-rooted morals of 
American society encompassed in the Declaration of 
Independence. Therefore, given the origins of America’s 
founding, it is not surprising that America still has the death 
penalty. 
                                                 
149 See Wright, supra note 24, at 535 (concluding the death penalty is, 
under our social circumstances, not morally justifiable, even in 
principle). 
150 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13-6. 
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MONEY IS NOT AN OPTION- COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The death penalty has sparked heated debate for 
centuries. The debate has centered on religious beliefs, 
constitutional issues, moral values, and cost concerns.  The 
national economic crisis has put the costs of executions at the 
forefront of the debate in recent years. Courts and juries have 
begun to consider the cost of execution versus the cost of life 
in prison without parole in the realm of capital sentencing.1 
These new considerations have no place in death penalty 
                                                 
* Ivy Gardner, B.B.A., M.B.A. (Cumberland University), J.D. 2013, 
Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law. 




John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the 
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of 
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment); Tennessee v. 
Cobbins, State’s Response to Motion to Permit Evidence at 
Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs of the Death Penalty, Knox 
County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009), available at 
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/051309carjack.pdf.  
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jurisprudence. One’s life, criminal or not, should never be 
taken – or spared – based on dollars and cents.  
Section II of this note presents a scenario in which a 
defendant has been convicted of murder and is now entering 
the sentencing phase of his trial. Section III evaluates the 
available cost studies of executions around the country. 
Section IV focuses on the actual language used in a recent trial 
regarding the cost of the death penalty versus life 
imprisonment.  
Section V considers the various constitutional 
arguments surrounding the consideration of execution costs in 
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Section VI attempts to 
balance the positive and negative aspects of considering 
execution costs from both the prosecution and the defense 
perspectives. Section VII concludes by evaluating ways to 
allow the cost considerations while protecting both the 
defendant’s and the state’s rights in a capital case. 
 
II.  DOES JOHN DESERVE LIFE IN PRISON BECAUSE IT IS 
CHEAPER?2  
Jane, a six-year-old girl, is outside playing on her 
swing set in the backyard. John, a sixty- five-year-old man, 
comes out of the woods and starts pushing her on the swing. 
Jane is thrilled that John is pushing her because her father was 
killed in a car accident when she was three, leaving her with 
no father figure in her life. After five minutes on the swing, 
John asks Jane if she would like to walk with him to see his 
puppy, Izzy. Jane loves puppies and is excited to meet a new 
one. Jane goes with John and is not seen again for ten years. 
For those ten years, John keeps Jane in a storm cellar 
on his property a little over ten miles from Jane’s childhood 
home. He rapes Jane on the first day and continues to do so at 
least twice a week, sometimes more. He keeps her handcuffed 
to the floor of the cellar for the next several years, and feeds 
her soup and crackers once a day. John tortures Jane, burning 
her with his cigarette or making small slits in her tiny arms 
with his hunting knife.  
                                                 
2 This story is fictional and describes a horrific crime the author 
wants readers to consider throughout the note. 
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Jane screams for help for the first few days until John 
binds her mouth with a dirty oil rag and threatens to kill her 
“Mommy” if she is not quiet. Jane endlessly shakes with fear 
every time she hears a noise at the cellar door. Jane is living 
her own hell, at the age of six, with no end in sight.  
One day, after ten years of being tortured and raped, 
Jane decides that she has to find a way out of the cellar and 
away from John. She waits until she hears John’s old truck 
start up and back out of the driveway. She slowly comes out of 
the cellar, which John stopped locking a few months before, 
and smiles at the sight of daylight for the first time in ten 
years. She begins to walk toward the road not knowing fully 
what her plan is once she sees another person. Jane gets about 
half a mile down the road when she hears John’s old truck 
coming back. She tries to run but her legs are so fragile that 
she has a hard time getting her footing. She falls down right as 
John gets to her. 
John gets out of the truck yelling, grabs Jane by her 
matted hair, and slings her in the bed of his truck like a 
ragdoll. A young woman, Julie, drives by and sees the 
exchange between John and Jane and notices Jane is crying 
hysterically. She does not stop but watches as John pulls into 
his driveway and around the back of his house. Julie calls the 
local police department and describes to them what she has 
just witnessed and tells them the location of John’s home.  
John takes Jane back to the cellar and is so angry he 
begins to strike her with his belt. Jane is crying hysterically 
which makes John even more upset and he begins to strike her 
with his fists and kick her. When she does not stop crying, 
John takes Jane’s head and bashes it up against the cellar wall 
until she is no longer crying and her body goes limp.  
John crawls out of the cellar, with a smile on his face, 
and begins walking back to his house at the same time law 
enforcement is pulling into his driveway. Law enforcement 
sees that he is covered in blood, immediately places him under 
arrest, and begins looking for the young girl described by 
Julie. They find a gruesome bloody scene in the cellar with 
Jane’s limp body lying on the floor. John has finally allowed 
Jane to escape her hell. She is dead. 
John eventually confesses to the kidnapping, torture, 
rape, and murder of Jane. He gives law enforcement chilling 
details of the last ten years and shows no remorse for his 
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actions or for killing the sixteen-year-old Jane. After being 
convicted of first degree murder, along with other crimes, 
John sits in the courtroom for his sentencing.  
The judge gives the jury its instructions and explains to 
them the process of determining whether John should be 
sentenced to death or life in prison. The defense has asked the 
judge to include an instruction detailing the costs of executing 
John and the costs of sentencing John to life in prison. This 
instruction is important to the defense because the statistics 
show that it is cheaper to allow John to live in prison for the 
rest of his life than to execute him, and the defense believes 
that the jury will spare John’s life because it is the cheaper 
option for society during the tough economic times. 
This story is a horrific description of the brutal murder 
of a young sixteen-year-old girl, who was taken from her 
childhood home at the age of six. A young girl, tortured and 
raped repeatedly over ten years, and then brutally beaten 
when she tried to escape. A man, who has no remorse for 
taking the life of such an innocent child, and is going to live or 
die based on, among other things, the jury’s feelings about 
money and the cost-benefit of the death penalty versus life 
imprisonment. Money should not be relevant when 
determining whether John lives or dies.  
 
III.  STATISTICS SHOW EXECUTIONS ARE MORE EXPENSIVE 
THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
This note is not simply about the actual costs of 
execution, the actual costs of life in prison or primary based on 
statistics. This note is about whether these costs should be 
allowed to be a deciding factor in determining when a person 
should live or die. With that being said, it is still important to 
evaluate the costs of each and assess the costs both nationally 
and state by state.3 
                                                 
3 The following states have abolished the death penalty: Alaska, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656(1) (2013); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1251 
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There is no national consensus for the cost of capital 
punishment.4 A number of states have never even evaluated 
their costs associated with capital punishment.5 “Of the states 
where reliable estimates are available, the differing 
methodologies used, assumptions made, and applicable 
statutes make generalizations difficult.”6  The 2009 Report 
from the Death Penalty Information Center puts the numbers 
in perspective: 
 
The high costs to the state per execution reflect 
the following reality: For a single death penalty 
trial, the state may pay $1 million more than for 
a non-death penalty trial. But only one in every 
three capital trials may result in a death 
sentence, so the true cost of that death sentence 
is $3 million. Further down the road, only one 
in ten of the death sentences handed down may 
                                                                                                       
(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(b) (West 2014); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.265, § 2 (West 2013) invalidated by 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a) 
(West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-18-14 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 
2013) invalidated by People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-32-01 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 2303 (West 2013); State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); W. VA. CODE § 61-
2-2 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.0135(1)(B), § 940.01(1) (West 2013).  
See also NPR Staff and Wires, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR 
(March 09, 2011), available at 
http:www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/Illinois-abolishes-death-
penalty. 
4 Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in 
a Time of Economic Crisis – A Report from the Death Penalty Information 
Center (2009) page 17, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Dieter].  
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
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result in an execution. Hence, the cost to the 
state to reach that one execution is $30 million.7 
 
All studies that have been conducted regarding the 
cost of capital punishment have concluded that execution is 
much more expensive than sentencing a person to life in 
prison; a capital trial, due to many factors but most notably the 
length of capital trials, is much more extensive and expensive, 
and there is, generally, far more appellate and other post-
conviction review of death penalty cases than cases seeking 
only life imprisonment.8 According to the Death Penalty 
Information Center, there are several ways one can approach 
how much capital punishment actually costs.9 First, the costs 
of each individual step in a capital case could be calculated, 
including the investigation, trial, and appeals; however, this 
number would only include a minority of the cases that 
actually go through the whole system.10 A second approach is 
to “measure the extra cost to the state of arriving at one death 
sentence or one execution.”11 Lastly, the total extra costs to the 
state for maintaining a capital punishment system could be 
assessed on a yearly basis.12 
Each of the above approaches has its own pros and 
cons. In the first approach, by evaluating each individual step 
of a capital case, researchers would be able to break the 
statistics down further to determine the most costly step in the 
process. This further evaluation would allow legislatures to 
target costly areas within the process and take steps to 
facilitate lowering the costs of capital cases within their state. 
However, as stated above, this evaluation method only 
calculates cases that go through the entire process and not all 
capital cases. The second approach would allow states to 
evaluate capital cases on a case by case basis and determine 
the exact price of one execution. This method, however, limits 
the calculation to one death sentence when a state may have 
                                                 
7 Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).  
8 Id at 6. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
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numerous executions that cost the state a tremendous amount 
of money.  
The third approach allows a state to evaluate costs on a 
yearly basis which would give the state the ability to budget 
more efficiently. The problem with this method is that not 
every state will have an execution every year. Rather, if a state 
goes without an execution for several years and then has a 
person sentenced to death, the extra money needed for that 
sentence may not be available within the budget. The third 
approach is also too broad in calculating all extra costs 
associated with a capital case. Out of the three, the first 
method seems to encompass the entire realm of capital case 
expenses in its calculations and may be the best evaluation 
method. 
Several states have conducted research regarding the 
cost of their executions. California spends $137 million per 
year on the death penalty, system wide, while life in prison 
costs only $11.5 million per year.13 Since 1977, California has 
averaged less than one execution every two years making the 
actual cost per execution over $250 million.14 New York had 
no executions but spent $170 million over a nine-year period 
of time prior to abolishing capital punishment.15 New Jersey 
had no executions but spent $253 million over a twenty-five 
year period of time prior to abolition.16 Between 1978 and 
1999, Maryland spent $186 million on capital cases but only 
had five executions, thus, each execution cost $37 million.17  
Different features of a capital punishment system are 
also telling of the exponential cost associated with having this 
system over a system only offering life in prison as a 
maximum punishment. Maryland sought, but did not impose, 
the death penalty in 106 cases which cost the state $71 
                                                 
13 See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, 
Report and Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty 
in California, at 10 (June 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20
REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf [hereinafter California 
Commission]. 
14 Id.  
15 Dieter, supra note 4, at 14 n.40.  
16 Id. at 14 n.41. 
17 Id. at 15 n.42.  
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million.18 “The average cost for the defense at trial in a federal 
death case is $620,932, about eight times that of a non-capital 
federal murder case.”19 In Kansas, the trial costs for capital 
cases are about sixteen times greater than for non-capital 
cases, while the appeal costs are twenty-one times higher.20 
California spends over $60 million annually to house 670 
inmates on death row.21 
These staggering numbers reflect several things. First, 
there are more people on death row than ever before and each 
individual on death row costs an additional $90,000 above 
what it would cost to house them for a life in prison 
sentence.22 Second, despite the reinstatement of the death 
penalty in 1976, since then, there have been fewer executions 
per year.23 Third, correctional facilities now have higher 
overall operating costs.24 All of these factors taken together 
contribute to a higher cost per execution.25 Since capital 
punishment was reinstated in 1976, “the country has spent 
about $2.5 billion beyond the costs that would have been 
incurred if life in prison was the most severe penalty.”26 
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR DEATH ELIGIBLE 
DEFENDANTS OUTLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed 
numerous constitutional protections for death penalty eligible 
                                                 
18 Id. at 16 n.47.  
19 J. Gould & L. Greenman, OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERVICES OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Update on Cost, Quality, 
and Availability of Defense Representation in Federal Death Penalty Cases 
at 25 (2008), available at 
http:www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/P
ublications/UpdateFederalDeathPenaltyCases.aspx. 
20 Legislative Division of Post Audit State of Kansas, Performance 
Audit Report - Costs Incurred for Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit 
of the Department of Corrections at 13 (2003), available at 
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf.   
21 California Commission, supra note 13, at 70. 
22 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 17. 
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defendants because death is different from any other 
punishment that a criminal defendant may face. Capital 
defendants are afforded protection against arbitrary and 
capricious death sentences. Evidence considered during the 
sentencing phase must be both relevant and reliable. The 
sentencing phase of a capital trial is subject to the harmless 
error doctrine and should all but guarantee a capital 
defendant an errorless sentence of death. These constitutional 
safeguards are critical to capital sentencing and do not leave 
room for consideration of economic evaluations regarding the 
cost of execution versus life imprisonment. 
 
A. DEATH IS DIFFERENT 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
that “death is different.”27 In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the 
first time, emphasized that death is exceptional in terms of 
punishment for crimes.28 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan stated “death is … an unusually severe punishment, 
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”29 In 
another concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that the 
death penalty differed “from all other forms of criminal 
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total 
irrevocability.”30 
The Supreme Court has also noted several times that 
death is “qualitatively different.”31 In Woodson v. North 
Carolina, the Court noted that “[d]eath, in its finality, differs 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 509 n.12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). See also, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional 
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370, 397-401 
nn.200-206 (1995) (collecting cases for the proposition that “death is 
different”). 
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
31 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
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more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term 
differs from one of only a year or two.”32 The Court summed 
up why death is different in its opinion in Gardner v. Florida: 
 
[F]ive Members of the Court have now 
expressly recognized that death is a different 
kind of punishment from any other which may 
be imposed in this country. From the point of 
view of the defendant, it is different in both its 
severity and its finality. From the point of view 
of society, the action of the sovereign in taking 
the life of one of its citizens also differs 
dramatically from any other legitimate state 
action. It is of vital importance to the defendant 
and to the community that any decision to 
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, 
based on reason rather than caprice or 
emotion.33 
 
Death is deliberate. Death is final.  
 
B. A SENTENCE OF DEATH CANNOT BE HANDED DOWN IN 
AN ARBITRARY & CAPRICIOUS MANNER 
Since “death is different,” the Supreme Court has 
developed a “greater level of scrutiny of the capital sentencing 
determination.”34 Courts must strive to make sure executions 
are not handed out in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.35 A 
sentence of death is to be reviewed by appellate courts to 
avoid arbitrary or unfair application of the death penalty.36 
The Supreme Court has developed two general 
conditions to minimize the risk of arbitrary action in capital 
                                                 
32 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
33 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (internal citations 
omitted). 
34 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99. 
35 Id.  
36 See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (and cases cited 
therein). 
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sentencing.37 First, courts must set boundaries on the 
sentencer’s judgment to “genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably 
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”38 
Second, sentencers must be allowed “to consider any relevant 
mitigating factor” that might prevent the sentencer from 
imposing the death penalty.39 
 
i. THE CLASS OF PERSONS DEATH ELIGIBLE MUST BE 
NARROWED 
States must adopt statutes and courts must implement 
procedures that distinguish between those defendants who 
deserve to be executed and those who do not.40 The statutes 
and procedures should also guide juries in deciding on which 
factors support a sentence of death and those factors which do 
not.41  
At the sentencing phase, narrowing occurs when the 
sentencer is required to determine whether aggravating 
circumstances justify imposing the death penalty.42 A 
defendant cannot receive a death sentence unless the trier of 
fact convicts the defendant of murder and finds at least one 
aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty phase.43 
An aggravating circumstance must be narrowly tailored 
                                                 
37 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). 
38 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 
(1980) (plurality opinion). 
39 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246.  
40 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
188 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring))). 
41 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (a state statute for 
capital sentencing must: “(1) rationally narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, 
individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible 
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances 
of his crime.”) 
42 Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (statutory aggravating circumstances 
“circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”). 
43 Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006). 
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enough that it does “not apply to every defendant convicted of 
a murder. . . .”44 
A statute can be effective in limiting the sentencer’s 
discretion if the statute provides: (1) “clear and objective 
standards”; (2) “specific and detailed guidance”; and (3) “an 
opportunity for rational review of the process for imposing a 
sentence of death.”45 The Court in Woodson noted procedures 
that do not give credence to the character of an individual 
defendant or the particular offense “treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass 
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”46 
 
ii. JURIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING 
EVIDENCE 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has time and time 
again stated that juries must be allowed to consider mitigating 
evidence that may excuse the imposition of death on a 
defendant.47 The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give a 
defendant the right to present mitigating evidence in capital 
cases.48 In Lockett, the Court held a sentencer is obliged to 
think about mitigating evidence the defendant offers 
concerning “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”49  
All relevant mitigating evidence must be allowed to be 
presented to juries in capital cases and the defendant must be 
afforded wide latitude to present the mitigating evidence.50 
                                                 
44 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). 
45 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (quoting, respectively, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
198; Coley v. Georgia, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974); Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976); and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). 
46 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
47 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246. See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 
66, 81-82 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197. 
48 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
49 Id.; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74. 
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). See also Abdul-Kabir, 
550 U.S. at 264 (statutory requirement that jury consider only 
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Sentencers in capital cases “must give independent weight” to 
each mitigating circumstance.51 However, when evaluating 
mitigating factors, the sentencer does not have free 
discretion.52 In Brown, the Court upheld the trial court’s 
instruction warning the jury to not be swayed by “mere 
sympathy” when making the determination to give a death 
sentence.53 The Brown Court concluded that a reasonable juror 
would interpret the instruction to mean that he or she should 
ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence and that states may 
prohibit juries from basing their sentencing decisions on 
factors not presented at the trial.54 
It is imperative that capital sentencing juries avoid an 
arbitrary and capricious application of the death sentence. If 
the above statistics were to swing the other direction and show 
that executions were less expensive than imprisoning a person 
for life, juries allowed to consider these cost evaluations may 
begin to arbitrarily put defendants to death because it is 
cheaper for society to do so. By allowing these costs to be 
considered, regardless of the side to which the pendulum 
swings, courts open themselves up to a direct violation of the 
Supreme Court’s rule against arbitrarily applying the death 
penalty. 
Allowing juries to consider the cost of execution versus 
the cost of life in prison without parole does not meet the 
Supreme Court requirement of narrowing the class of death 
eligible persons. To consider the statistics as they are now, 
juries would not sentence any defendants to death because it is 
cheaper for society to keep them in prison for the rest of their 
                                                                                                       
particular kinds of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional); 
Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (sentencer may not 
be precluded from “giving meaningful effect to mitigating 
evidence”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion) (sentencer 
cannot be precluded from considering character or circumstance of 
defendant’s record). 
51 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987). 
52 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (The jury in Brown had been instructed not to be swayed by 
“mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public 
opinion or public feeling.”). 
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lives. It is understandable why a defendant would want to 
offer the statistics as mitigating evidence. However, the 
purpose of aggravating and mitigating evidence is to allow the 
jury to evaluate the individual defendant and the crime itself. 
Even though the statistics would be an extremely powerful 
mitigating argument to keep the defendant alive, the statistics 
do not go toward the individual defendant or the murder itself 
and should not be considered by a jury when determining 
whether to impose a sentence of death.  
 
C. SENTENCING EVIDENCE MUST BE RELEVANT AND 
RELIABLE 
The Eighth Amendment demands any part of a capital 
case be analyzed under a higher level of scrutiny if that part of 
the case affects the sentencing determination.55 A heightened 
standard of reliability is required when determining whether 
death is the most appropriate punishment.56 Constitutional 
standards “require inquiry into the reliability, relevance, 
value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve 
fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the 
defendant and the victim’s family.”57 Unless the evidence is 
both relevant and reliable, it should not be considered during 
the sentencing phase of a capital case. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence demand that only 
material that relates closely to the facts of a case be considered 
by the trier of fact.58 Rule 402 clearly states that relevant 
evidence is admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.59 
Relevant evidence means “evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”60 Trial judges are also 
given the discretion to find relevant evidence inadmissible if 
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
                                                 
55 New York v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493-94 (N.Y. 1997). 
56 Id. at 494. 
57 Tennessee v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001). 
58 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, & 403. 
59 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
60 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 TO LIVE OR TO DIE                      91 
 
 
misleading to the jury.61 The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that mitigating evidence is admissible in capital cases 
and only has to meet a low threshold test for relevance to be 
admitted.62  
Execution cost-benefit evidence does not meet the 
relevance test under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or 
precedent. This evidence is irrelevant because it does not have 
a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. Jurors can make the same sentence 
determination with this evidence as they would without the 
evidence. Also, this evidence does not relate to the “existence 
of any fact that is of consequence” but only relates to how 
much a state may pay for its capital punishment system to be 
implemented. 
Even if the cost-benefit evidence is found to be 
relevant, courts should still find it inadmissible under Rule 
403. By allowing parties to discuss the cost of executions 
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, juries may 
confuse the issues involved in this phase. The issue in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial is to determine whether the 
defendant receives the death penalty or a lesser punishment. 
The issue is not one of how much an execution may cost and it 
is critical that jurors not be allowed to confuse these two issues 
at such a crucial part of a capital case. 
The cost of an execution versus the costs of life 
imprisonment has no relevance to a capital sentencing phase. 
Only relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence that 
reflects on the individual defendant or the crime itself should 
be considered in the penalty phase of a capital case. A 
Connecticut Superior Court Judge recently dealt with the 
relevance of these costs evaluations and stated: 
 
Economic arguments tailored to specific 
individuals are not only irrelevant but perverse. 
From an economic view, it will thus be more 
expensive to incarcerate the younger defendant 
                                                 
61 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-
88 (2004) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s test for “constitutional 
relevance”). 
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for the remainder of his life and – in strict 
economic terms – more cost-effective to execute 
him. . . . This argument plainly makes no moral 
sense.63 
 
Overall, statistics tend to be an unreliable source of 
information. “Statistics is as much an art as it is a science.”64 
One author, Darrell Huff, has coined statistical manipulation 
as “statisticulation,” or in other words the use of statistical 
information to misinform society.65 Statistics are vulnerable to 
various manipulations and distortions.66 “The secret language 
of statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded culture, is 
employed to sensationalize, inflate, confuse, and 
oversimplify.”67 “A well-wrapped statistic is better than 
Hitler’s “big lie”[;] it misleads, yet it cannot be pinned on 
you.”68 
To illustrate how easy it is to manipulate the same 
statistics to fit one’s agenda, Huff proposes the following 
example: 
 
You can, for instance, express exactly the same 
fact by calling it a one percent return on sales, a 
fifteen percent return on investment, a ten-
million-dollar profit, an increase in profits of 
forty percent, or a decrease of sixty percent 
from last year. The method is to choose the one 
that sounds best for the purpose at hand and 
                                                 
63 Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/Judge-
Execution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting 
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the 
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of 
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment)(internal 
quotations omitted). 
64 Darrell Huff, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 120 (W.W. Norton & 
Company 1954) available at http://www.horace.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/How-to-Lie-With-Statistics-1954-
Huff.pdf. 
65 Id. at 100. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 8. 
68 Id. at 9. 
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trust that few who read it will recognize how 
imperfectly it reflects the situation.69 
 
Going on this proposition, the statistics regarding the 
cost of the death penalty and the cost of life in prison without 
parole are fatally flawed. The statistics that are available are 
based on a judicial system where the death penalty is the 
ultimate penalty. If life in prison without parole was the 
ultimate penalty, the statistics would show that penalty to be 
much more expensive than the lesser penalty of life in prison 
with the option for parole. These statistics are developed to 
promote anti-death penalty arguments and can be skewed in a 
variety of ways to lend credence to any proposition one may 
want to propose. To allow a jury to consider statistics that can 
fluctuate, as needed, while deciding whether or not a 
defendant lives or dies is absurd.  
The individual execution costs will vary depending on 
the age of the defendant, the execution procedure used by the 
state in which the execution is carried out, etc.  This dynamic 
shows that the statistical numbers can always be skewed and 
used in ways that promote whatever policy argument or 
reasoning one may want to promote. To determine whether 
one lives or dies based on flawed, irrelevant, unreliable 
statistics or statistics that can easily be altered should not be 
allowed in capital cases.  
 
D. AN ERROR IN CAPITAL SENTENCING MAY BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMLESS BUT IT IS STILL AN ERROR 
The harmless error doctrine was first developed by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1967.70 In Chapman, the Court 
decided that even though an error is constitutional, that does 
not render that error resistant to the harmless error analysis.71 
The Court also found that some constitutional errors were so 
fundamental as to defy harmless error analysis and to thus be 
automatically reversed.72 The Chapman Court established the 
rule for determining whether an error was in fact a harmless 
                                                 
69 Id. at 82. 
70 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
71 Id. at 22. 
72 Id. at 23. 
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error: “before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73 
In 1988, the Court held that the Chapman test was 
equally applicable in the penalty phase of a capital case.74 The 
Court, in Satterwhite, held: “it is important to avoid error in 
capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of 
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion 
given to the sentencer.”75 The only time the Court has found 
automatic reversible error in a capital case is where a juror has 
been found to be so pro-capital punishment that he is 
effectively unable to not impose a death sentence.76 
The purpose of the harmless error test “reflect[s] a 
balancing of the defendant’s interests in an error-free 
proceeding against the societal interest in finality and judicial 
economy.”77 James Scoville has summed it up nicely: “any 
error in capital sentencing implicates some constitutional 
concerns…the constitutionally compelled sentencing 
discretion in capital punishment proceedings may be 
undermined by error regardless of whether an independent 
constitutional right is violated.”78  
Allowing a jury to consider the cost of execution versus 
the cost of life imprisonment should be deemed an error. One 
can call it “harmless error” but it is still an error and it is an 
error in a case that determines whether a person lives or dies. 
We should strive for a perfect system and an error in death 
sentencing is a permanent mistake and is greater than any 
other mistake allowed in criminal jurisprudence.  
                                                 
73 Id. at 24. 
74 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988). 
75 Id. at 258. 
76 The term “Morgan Precept” comes from the case of Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). 
77James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital 
Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 744 (1987) (quoting United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 502 (1983) (criticizing lower court for its failure 
“to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one 
hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the 
interests of the victim on the other”)). 
78 Id. at 757.  
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V.  SHOULD JURIES BE ALLOWED TO EVALUATE EXECUTION 
COSTS IN CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING? 
There are valid arguments on both sides regarding 
these cost evaluations. A juror, as a taxpayer, has a vested 
interest in the cost of all trials, especially costly capital murder 
trials. The statistics available calculate the average cost of 
executions and do not allow jurors to evaluate what the 
individual trial they are sitting for will cost. There is no 
national standard or national agency that calculates the cost of 
executions on average around the nation so the statistics 
provided are fundamentally flawed since they are not a 
national average but only an average for a few states.  
 
A. JURIES HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COSTS 
As taxpayers, every juror in every trial has a vested 
interest in the cost of that prosecution. The costs of a trial 
include the prosecutor’s salary, court-appointed defense 
counsel, the judge’s salary, law enforcement salaries, and 
other various trial costs. These costs are high in a normal 
criminal trial but, due to many factors such as the length of a 
capital trial and the cost of mandatory expert witnesses, are 
exponentially increased in a capital murder trial as shown in 
the statistics above. As the expense of trials increase, local 
taxes likely will be increased to cover the extra costs. 
When calculated, the actual cost per execution per year 
to individual taxpayers is actually quite minimal.79 The United 
States has spent around $2.5 billion on capital cases since 
1976.80 Taxpayers spent, on average, thirty-one cents per year 
on capital cases from 1976 to 2010.81 Individual taxpayers pay 
                                                 
79 To determine the following calculations, the author used the 
statistics included in Section II and divided them by the individual 
state and national census figures, respectively. Note only population 
of eighteen and over was used in these calculations since author 
intends to calculate taxpayer expense. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Population 
Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov. 
80 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15. 
81 $2.5 billion over 34 years (1976-2010) = $7,352,411 per 
year/population of 234,564,071 = $.31 cents per year. 
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around $4.90 a year for capital cases in California.82 Taxpayers 
in New York and New Jersey paid less than $1.50 per year for 
their capital punishment system prior to their states’ abolition 
of the death penalty.83 Maryland taxpayers paid around $2.00 
per year for their capital punishment system.84 These figures 
show that the actual cost to individual jurors, as taxpayers, is 
nominal and goes to show that jurors do not have the vested 
interests that one might think when looking at the larger 
overall state costs.  
While the jurors may have a vested interest as 
taxpayers, the “death penalty itself is not on trial” when it 
comes to cost evaluations.85 The better venue to evaluate the 
cost of execution compared to the cost of life in prison without 
parole is within the legislature, whether it is on a federal or an 
individual state level. Leland Price, Tennessee Assistant 
District Attorney General, recently stated, “public debate 
among our policy makers concerning the economic costs of the 
death penalty is one thing, presenting such evidence to a 
capital jury trying to make an individualized sentencing 
decision is another.”86  
By allowing jurors, as taxpayers, to evaluate the cost of 
execution versus life in prison without parole, courts allow the 
jurors’ personal finances to come into the sentencing equation. 
A capital murder trial is not the place for personal finances to 
have such a huge impact on whether or not the defendant 
lives or dies. In times of economic hardship, the decision to 
render the death penalty would shift in light of individual 
jurors’ financial situations instead of being evaluated in terms 
of the individual convicted of murder and the circumstances 
surrounding the crime itself. 
                                                 
82 California Commission, supra note 13 ($137 million per 
year/population of 27,958,916 = $4.90 per year). 
83 Dieter, supra note 4 at, 15-16 (New Jersey: $252 million over 20 
years = $10,080,000 per year/population of 6,726,680 = $1.50 per 
year; New York: $170 million over 9 years = $18,888,888 per 
year/population of 15,053,173 = $1.25 per year). 
84 Id. at 17 ($186 million over 20 years = $9,300,000 per 
year/population of 4,420,588 = $2.10 per year). 
85 Tennessee v. Cobbins,  2009 WL 2115350, State’s Response to 
Motion to Permit Evidence at Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs 
of the Death Penalty, Knox County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009).  
86 Id. 
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B. NO CASE BY CASE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE 
There are no individual death penalty trial cost 
statistics available. Each case is different in facts, investigation 
methods, trial strategy, appeals, and post-conviction 
procedures. Therefore, the cost of each capital murder case 
differs from the next and can differ tremendously. 
In Lockett, the Supreme Court determined that the jury 
in a capital murder trial is to make a decision appropriate for 
the individual defendant in light of the crimes he has 
committed.87 The Court reasoned “[g]iven that the imposition 
of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all 
other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an 
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”88 
To allow non-individualized cost evaluations to play a 
part in a jury’s decision to determine whether the defendant 
lives or if the defendant is executed is contrary to Supreme 
Court capital murder jurisprudence. The Court has made clear 
that capital case sentencing determinations are to be made on 
an individual defendant and individual crime basis. Since 
individual case statistics are unavailable in the death penalty 
arena, courts should not allow juries to consider the difference 
in execution and life in prison without parole in terms of cost. 
Juries should only be allowed to consider the characteristics of 
the individual defendant and the circumstances of the 
individual crime committed.  
 
C. NO NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION OF COSTS 
No national evaluation standard exists for evaluating 
the cost of executions and life in prison without parole in each 
state. With no national evaluation standard in place, all fifty 
states could implement a different method of evaluation. If 
different evaluation methods are used, the number of 
variables considered during the statistical analysis can make 
                                                 
87 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See also Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 29 (holding that 
evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the crime or 
relating to the defendant’s character and background is admissible in 
order to meet the constitutional requirement that sentencing be 
conducted in an individualized manner.). 
88 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. 
98                                                 2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
the eventual statistics inconsistent among the various states. 
The different parts that would have to be pieced together to 
gather a comprehensive economic picture on the costs of 
execution will vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
depending on the evaluation method.  
As mentioned above, not all death penalty states have 
statistics available regarding the cost of execution or the cost 
of life in prison without parole. If death penalty states want to 
begin to allow juries to consider the costs of executions during 
the sentencing phase of capital cases, they should develop a 
national committee to determine how these costs are 
calculated and the variables that must be considered when 
making these calculations. These steps would make the 
statistics more reliable and allow juries to make true 
determinations regarding the actual costs involved instead of 
relying on fluffed numbers as they stand now. 
 
VI. HOW DO WE AVOID THE TROUBLES OF FLAWED 
STATISTICS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER ONE IS 
SENTENCED TO LIFE OR TO DEATH? 
Courts have three options in determining how cost-
benefit evidence is admitted into the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial: (1) courts may allow only the capital defendant to 
present the evidence; (2) once a defendant offers the statistical 
evidence, the courts may choose to allow the prosecution to 
respond to the argument; or (3) courts may choose to 
completely exclude any cost-benefit evidence or arguments. 
While each of these options have their benefits, ultimately 
courts should follow the latter and not allow execution cost-
benefit evidence or arguments at the sentencing phase of 
capital cases. 
 
A. ONLY THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT CAN PRESENT 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF EXECUTION COST 
Courts may decide to only allow the defense to admit 
the information regarding cost of execution versus life 
imprisonment. This information can be a valuable asset to a 
capital defendant and potentially spare the defendant’s life. 
 TO LIVE OR TO DIE                      99 
 
 
Defense attorneys owe a duty to each client to protect 
their constitutional rights and freedoms. This duty does not 
become less important when a client is charged with capital 
murder. If anything, the duty becomes more important to 
spare the life of the client. Defense counsel must attempt to 
sway the jury to spare the life of his or her client and make 
jurors aware of any information that may possibly sway their 
sentencing decision in favor of life in prison.  To this point, it 
is imperative for defense counsel to take all avenues available 
to avoid a sentence of death and offering this statistical 
information for jury consideration is an avenue that must at 
least be attempted. 
A capital defendant has a valid argument that these 
statistics are a form of mitigating evidence that should be 
considered by the jury during the sentencing phase. As the 
statistics stand now, the defendant can make a powerful 
argument to the jury to sentence him to a term of life in prison 
because that sentence would save the jurors, as taxpayers, a 
tremendous amount of money. If a court finds this argument 
to be persuasive and determines the information to be 
mitigating, defendants around the country could be spared 
from execution. 
If one’s life is being determined by twelve people, 
those people should be allowed to consider anything and 
everything while making their determination to take the life of 
another. Human nature and compassion seems to say that 
courts should not deny a defendant the right to plea for his life 
in any manner necessary. If this plea includes using statistical 
data that may curtail a jury from sentencing a defendant to 
death, then so be it.  
 
B. ONCE THE DEFENDANT OPENS THE DOOR, THE 
PROSECUTION CAN RUN THROUGH IT 
Courts may decide to allow the defendant to admit the 
information regarding the cost of execution first and then 
allow the prosecution to counter the information with their 
own arguments. It would only seem fair to allow the 
prosecution to counter any arguments made by the defendant, 
especially statistical arguments.  
Since the statistics are in favor of the capital defendant, 
the only avenue the prosecution has available is to tug at the 
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emotions of the jury. They may remind the jury of how 
heinous the defendant’s actions were. The prosecution may 
also introduce the costs to the victim and the victim’s family. 
They may agree the cost of executing the defendant is high; 
however, that cost can in no way outweigh the cost of losing a 
relative. 
Why should the defendant be given the chance to live 
based on the cost of executions when the defendant took the 
life of an innocent person? How low do the costs have to drop 
before you will deliver justice for the innocent life taken by the 
defendant? The judicial system is supposed to seek justice; are 
you going to allow money to alter what the system is designed 
to do? These are all questions the prosecution may ask the jury 
when trying to counter a capital defendant’s arguments 
regarding the cost of execution.  
A prosecutor may focus on the fact that the cost of a 
punishment should never matter, especially when a person’s 
life has been taken by another. Cost of punishment may be a 
valid consideration in misdemeanor or lower felony cases 
when the options are limited to incarceration or probation or 
community service. However, the cost of execution versus the 
cost of life imprisonment has no place in capital sentencing.  
A prosecutor may explain to the jury that the majority 
of these costs are sunk costs that, in reality, never affect the 
individual jurors as taxpayers. The trial costs, including 
prosecutorial salaries, law enforcement salaries, judge salaries, 
are costs that are going to be paid whether those individuals 
are working on a capital case or on a misdemeanor case. These 
individuals do not receive overtime pay for the extra time put 
into a capital trial. Therefore, the jurors should not put a 
tremendous amount of faith into a defendant’s arguments 
based on execution costs. 
 
C. EXECUTION COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS 
SHOULD BE INADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL CASES 
Courts should not allow the information regarding the 
cost of execution and life in prison without parole into the 
realm of death penalty jurisprudence. The courts have juggled 
the many constitutional safeguards surrounding the death 
penalty along with the moral realms of the death penalty for 
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years. To allow economic evaluations to come into play is 
opening death penalty jurisprudence up to further attack. 
Death is different. The decision of whether or not to 
take a person’s life is the ultimate decision a capital juror has 
to make. This decision will forever weigh on a juror’s mind.  
Allowing parties to present execution cost arguments 
to a capital jury is arbitrary and capricious in and of itself. 
Today, if used, the statistics could potentially allow all capital 
defendants to escape execution. The statistics may drastically 
change tomorrow and potentially allow all capital defendants 
to receive a death sentence because it is cheaper for society to 
execute. Depending on the statistics of the day, you live or you 
die. This is the exact thing the Supreme Court has tried to 
avoid in developing the protections afforded by defendants 
from arbitrary and capricious actions by the courts. 
By allowing cost-benefit evidence and arguments into 
the sentencing phase of a capital case, courts will make the 
decision a personal decision for the jurors to make instead of a 
decision based on the circumstances surrounding the crime 
and the individual defendant. The purpose of the sentencing 
phase is to allow the jury to determine one’s punishment 
based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Execution 
statistics do not fit under either of those categories and should 
not be admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The 
punishment decision is not a personal decision; it is a decision 
to be made based on the evidence submitted at trial regarding 
the crime itself and the character of the defendant – nothing 
more, nothing less.  
One could go on for days about the relevance and 
reliability of statistics. Suffice it to say, the statistics offered 
above are neither relevant nor reliable and have absolutely no 
business being admitted into a capital case. The cost statistics 
are completely irrelevant to the crime of murder or any 
circumstances that might surround the crime. The statistics are 
also irrelevant to the character or background of a capital 
defendant. These statistics can be twisted to promote one 
public policy and twisted again to meet another. A famous 
quote sums up the reliability of statistics nicely: “There are 
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”89 The cost 
                                                 
89 Former British Prime Minister Benjamin “Disraeli would often 
apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies: lies, 
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of execution statistics are irrelevant and unreliable and should 
not find their way into death penalty jurisprudence.  
Since capital trial errors are evaluated under the 
harmless error doctrine, it would likely be impossible for 
appellate courts to properly evaluate the effects of allowing 
this statistical information and determine if a harmful error 
had actually occurred. With the cost-benefit evidence being 
questionable, at best, trial courts should avoid putting 
appellate courts in the predicament of trying to guess what 
jurors are thinking as they make sentencing determinations.  
As previously stated, the admittance of execution cost 
evidence should be deemed an error. Harmless or harmful, an 
error is still an error. The judicial system should strive to be a 
perfect system even if that goal seems unattainable at times. 
An error of this magnitude can easily be avoided by courts 
holding that cost-benefit evidence and arguments regarding 
executions are inadmissible.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The death penalty has been under attack for many 
years and the resulting debate has focused on various topics 
that put people’s values into play. To allow an economic 
element into the sentencing phase of capital cases will only 
open the death penalty up for further criticism. Money should 
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STATES LEFT WITH THE DAUNTING TASK OF APPLYING 
THE ATKINS HOLDING FOR THE EXEMPTION OF MENTALLY 
RETARDED DEFENDANTS FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
Kendall Nicole Inglish* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled the execution of a mentally retarded 
defendant who has committed a capital crime is 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.1  The Court left to the individual states the 
obligation to determine how to apply the holding of Atkins.2  
Because of this, the states differ on the definition of mental 
retardation, which party bears the burden of proof, the 
standard of proof to be applied, and when the determination 
of retardation should be made.  Leaving the states to their own 
                                                 
* Kendall Inglish, J.D. 2014, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan 
School of Law; B.S., University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Charles MacLean and the Lincoln 
Memorial University Law Review for assistance in the publication of 
this article. 
1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
2 Id. 
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devices has denied some defendants full protection under the 
Eighth Amendment.  It is not necessary to enact a standard 
mental retardation definition, because there are case-by-case 
details that should be taken into consideration in proving the 
existence of mental retardation of that individual defendant; 
however, states should enact laws that uphold the Court’s 
holding in Atkins by establishing that (1) the defendant bears 
the burden of proof; (2) the standard of proof be 
preponderance of the evidence, and (3) the determination of 
mental retardation must be made prior to trial.  
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY AND HOW IT 
APPLIES TO THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
 The United States Supreme Court has continuously 
expressed that “death is different” when it comes to deciding 
death penalty appeals.3  Since 1976, 1,350 people have been 
executed in the United States.4  From 1976 to 2002, of those 
executed, at least forty-four were defendants with mental 
retardation.5  In fact, it was not until 2002 that the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged that mental retardation 
limits a defendant’s culpability to a degree that renders the 
death penalty cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6   
 In its 2002 landmark, Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally 
retarded defendant.7  Unfortunately, in its decision, the 
Supreme Court failed to advise the states which burden of 
proof standard should be used in determining a defendant’s 
                                                 
3 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
4 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Number of Executions by State And Region Since 
1976, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited April 5, 2013), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976. 
5 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., List of Defendants With Mental Retardation 
Executed In The United States, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardation-
executed-united-states (last visited April 5, 2013). 
6Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: 
Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From 
Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 82 (2003).  
7 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.   
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alleged mental retardation.8  The Supreme Court’s failure to 
define the standard of proof to apply and which party bears 
the burden of proof, has denied mentally retarded capital 
defendants equal protection and due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Chillingly,   the failure by United 
States Supreme Court to establish a standard of proof means 
the difference between the defendant’s life and death.9    
 Therefore, states should enact laws treating allegations 
of mental retardation as an affirmative defense, so like in other 
affirmative defense cases, the defendant bears the burden of 
proof.  The states should further pass legislation standardizing 
the proof required to be introduced by a capital defendant. 
The standard of proof the states should adopt would be the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  The preponderance 
of the evidence standard would afford all capital defendants 
alleging mental retardation protection under the United States 
Constitution.  
 The United States Supreme Court also failed to set 
forth in the Atkins decision when the determination as to a 
defendant’s alleged mental retardation should be made, 
causing inefficiency both in time and expense. Further, it 
creates bias in the judicial system in some states.   The states, 
therefore, should uphold the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Atkins and require that the determination as to a 
defendant’s mental retardation be made prior to trial. Such a 
procedure would be more likely to lead to a fair trial for 
mentally retarded defendants and create an efficient judicial 
process.    
 While the United States Supreme Court has righted the 
wrong illustrated in the 1976 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, it 
did not provide practical recommendations to the states when 
applying Atkins, and therefore the states should endorse the 
Atkins holding to its fullest and intended effect so that 
mentally retarded defendants convicted of a capital crime are 
not denied their afforded protection under the United States 
Constitution.   
                                                 
8 James Gerard Eftink, et al, Mental Retardation As A Bar To The Death 
Penalty: Who Bears The Burden of Proof?, 75 MO. L. REV. 537, 568 
(2010). 
9 Id.  
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III. THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PRIOR TO THE 
DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA WAS BASED ON A 
“NATIONAL CONSENSUS” 
 The Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; 
however, whether or not it was intended by its founders, the 
amendment has been dynamic because its scope has been 
manipulated based on society’s progression.10  When the 
Supreme Court reviewed the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, one of 
the factors the Court seriously considered in determining 
whether the execution of a mentally retarded man was 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual was society’s evolving 
standard of decency.11    
 John Paul Penry was charged with the 1979 brutal 
rape, beating, and fatal stabbing with a pair of scissors of a 
woman in Texas.12  Penry, who had been on parole for another 
rape conviction at the time he committed the murder, was 
found competent to stand trial even though he was found to 
be “mildly to moderately retarded” and had “the mental age 
of a six-and-a-half year old.”13  At his trial, doctors testified 
that Penry suffered from organic brain damage likely caused 
at birth and had an IQ at the time of trial of fifty-four.14  Penry, 
who was twenty-two years old at the time he committed the 
crime, had not only the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old 
child, but also the social maturity of a nine or ten-year-old 
child.15  Still, the jury found Penry competent to stand trial, 
convicted him, and sentenced him to death.16   
                                                 
10 Donald E. d'Entremont, Constitutional Law-Defendant's Mental 
Retardation Does Not Preclude Imposition of the Death Penalty As Long As 
the Sentencer Considers All Relevant Mitigating Evidence-Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990) 
[hereinafter d'Entremont]. 
11 Id. at 224. 
12 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 308. 
16 Id. 
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 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry’s 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal, determining that the 
death penalty was not prohibited due to Penry’s allegation of 
being mentally retarded. 17  Penry took his case to the District 
Court, which denied relief.18  Thus, Penry appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment.19  
 Penry’s case finally reached the United States Supreme 
Court in 1989, to determine, inter alia, whether it was cruel and 
unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person.20  
Here, Penry argued his mental retardation acted as a 
mitigating factor, and therefore he should have been 
sentenced to a penalty less than death.21  In a five-to-four 
decision, the Supreme Court found mental retardation is a 
factor that may lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital 
offense, but it could not be concluded in Penry’s case that the 
Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of a mentally 
retarded person of Penry’s ability.22   
 In support of its decision, the Supreme Court stated 
while mental retardation could be considered and given effect 
as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there was not enough 
evidence in Penry’s specific case to establish a national 
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded.23  The 
Court examined federal and state laws prohibiting such 
executions, public opinion surveys, and the position of the 
American Association on Mental Retardation, and found no 
consensus at the time against executing mentally retarded 
defendants.24  Therefore, the Court reasoned the states could 
continue to execute mentally retarded defendants until state 
legislatures reached a consensus prohibiting such executions.25   
                                                 
17 Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
18 Penry, 492 U.S. at 312. 
19 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 926 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
321 (2002).  
20 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. 
21 Id. at 315. 
22 Id. at 340. 
23 Id. 
24 d'Entremont, supra note 10, at 226. 
25 Id.; Linda L. Hinton, Criminal Law-Imposing the Death Penalty on 
Capital Defendants Who Are Mentally Retarded Is Not Prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment To The Constitution If Instructions To The Jury Allow 
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While the state legislatures never did reach a consensus 
prohibiting such executions, the Supreme Court came to that 
decision thirteen years after Penry when it was asked to decide 
the case of Atkins v. Virginia.   
 
IV. THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER PENRY, THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN ATKINS BY BANNING 
THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 
 Thirteen years after the decision not to exclude the 
mentally retarded from being sentenced to death was reached 
in Penry, the Supreme Court decided that the death penalty 
could no longer be used against the mentally retarded.  In a 
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reasoned in Atkins v. 
Virginia, that executing a mentally retarded person violates the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. 26 
 Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted in Circuit Court in 
Virginia of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and 
was facing the death penalty.27  In the penalty phase, the 
defense relied on testimony from a forensic psychologist who 
had evaluated Atkins and concluded that he was “mildly 
mentally retarded” based on interviews with people who 
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and by 
conducting an intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins 
had a full scale IQ of fifty-nine.28  The jury sentenced Atkins to 
death anyway, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a 
second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a 
misleading verdict form.29  At the resentencing, the forensic 
psychologist testified again.30  However, the prosecution 
presented an expert rebuttal witness who expressed the 
opinion that Atkins was not mentally retarded, but rather was 
of “average intelligence, at least,” and diagnosable as having 
                                                                                                       
For The Consideration Of Mental Retardation As Mitigating Factor, 39 
DRAKE L. REV. 921, 928-29 (1990). 
26 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 308-09. 
29 Id. at 309. 
30 Id. 
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antisocial personality disorder.31  The jury again sentenced 
Atkins to death.32  The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed 
Atkins’ death sentence stating it was “not willing to commute 
Atkins’ sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because 
of his IQ score.”33  Because of the gravity of the concerns of the 
dissenters to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision, and due 
to the dramatic shift of the state legislative landscape that 
occurred since the Penry decision, the Supreme Court decided 
to grant Atkins certiorari.34  Justice Stevens delivered the 
opinion of the Court stating: 
 
Those mentally retarded persons who meet 
the law's requirements for criminal 
responsibility should be tried and punished 
when they commit crimes. Because of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, 
and control of their impulses, however, they 
do not act with the level of moral culpability 
that characterizes the most serious adult 
criminal conduct. Moreover, their 
impairments can jeopardize the reliability and 
fairness of capital proceedings against 
mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for 
these reasons, in the 13 years since we 
decided Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the 
American public, legislators, scholars, and 
judges have deliberated over the question 
whether the death penalty should ever be 
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The 
consensus reflected in those deliberations 
informs our answer to the question presented 
by this case: whether such executions are 
“cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution.35 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 310 (citing Atkins v. Com., 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000). 
34 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. 
35 Id. at 306-07. 
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V. INTERPRETATIONS POST-ATKINS BY THE STATES HAVE 
RESULTED IN AN UNDERMINING OF THE ATKINS 
HOLDING  
 After the decision was handed down in Atkins, the 
individual states were left to decide how to apply the holding 
to their own death penalty sentences.36  Each state has been left 
to define mental retardation, to decide the necessary proof in 
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, and to 
determine whether or not a defendant could be sentenced to 
the death penalty, because the United States Supreme Court 
did not create a bright-line rule for any of those factors.37  As a 
result, no uniform definition of mental retardation has been 
established.38  Some states, such as Idaho, have applied a 
definition of mental retardation that is viewed by some as so 
limiting that it offends a defendant’s rights under the United 
States Constitution.39  In Idaho, mental retardation is based on 
a fixed IQ number, although experts agree that an IQ number 
alone does not determine mental retardation.40  An Idaho 
defendant with an IQ of 71 or above could be set to be 
executed if convicted, even if that defendant could otherwise 
qualify as being mentally retarded.41  Other states, such as 
California, do not specify a certain IQ for determining mental 
retardation.42  Rather, California defines mental retardation as 
“significantly subaverage [sic] general intellectual functioning 
                                                 
36 Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of 
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 241-42 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hagstrom]. 
37 Id. at 242. 
38 Id. 
39 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, 
ACLU.ORG (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mental-
retardation-and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty].   
40
 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
41 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
42 Sara Catania, Death Row’s IQ Divide, L.A. TIMES OPINION (May 8, 
2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
catania8may08,0,1060490.story. 
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existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and 
manifested before the age of 18.”43 
 Inconsistencies also result, depending on when the 
determination of mental retardation is made.44  In Louisiana 
and Virginia, prosecutors have argued the determination 
should always be made post-conviction by the same jury that 
found the defendant guilty.45  In Louisiana, the determination 
of mental retardation can be made pre-trial by a judge but 
only if the prosecutor agrees the determination be made then, 
otherwise it is left to sentencing by the jury.46  In Virginia, the 
determination is made by the jury or the judge in non-jury 
trials during the defendant’s sentencing.47  However, 
efficiency in the administration of justice dictates that a pre-
trial determination on a defendant’s mental retardation would 
save time and money associated with the prosecution of a 
death penalty trial.48    
 Additionally, there have been irregularities among the 
states in establishing the standard of proof necessary to 
determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to 
death.49  Currently sitting on death row in Georgia is Warren 
Hill, an inmate with an IQ of 70, who was granted a stay of 
execution on February 19, 2013, within thirty minutes of his 
scheduled time to receive a lethal injection.50  In 1991, Hill was 
                                                 
43 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West, West, WestlawNext current with 
urgency legislation through Ch. 526, except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg.Sess.). 
44 Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39; see also John 
H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 689, 
693 (2009). 
45 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1)-(2) (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2013 Reg Session); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 
(West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. Session); Mental 
Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
46 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 905.5.1(C)(1) (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2013 Reg. Session); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., States That 
Have Changed Their Statutes To Comply With the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited Mar. 3, 
2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-
comply-supreme-courts-decision-atkins-v-virginia. 
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West, WestlawNext current through 
2013 Reg. Session). 
48 Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 39. 
49 Hagstrom, supra note 36, at 266. 
50 Ed Pilkington, Georgia Inmate Warren Hill Granted Stay of Execution 30 
Minutes Before Lethal Injection, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, 
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sentenced to death after he killed his cellmate in prison.51  Hill 
was incarcerated at the time for killing his eighteen-year-old 
girlfriend.52  In Georgia, a defendant who alleges intellectual 
disability for avoiding the death penalty must prove the 
disability beyond a reasonable doubt.53  Hill was sentenced to 
the death penalty after he was unable to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was mentally retarded.54  The beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard is one in which experts say is 
almost impossible to achieve when using that standard to 
assess mental retardations.55  Even those doctors who 
diagnosed Hill with an IQ of 70, which constitutes mild mental 
retardation, found it impossible to meet this standard.56  All 
three of the doctors who examined Hill have reversed their 
opinion that Hill had not met the legal definition of “mentally 
retarded” and that their original evaluation of the Hill was 
“extremely and unusually rushed.”57  Georgia continues to 
hold capital defendants to the strictest standard of proof to 
show intellectual disability should preclude the death 
penalty.58  Georgia is an outlier, as twenty-eight of the thirty-
                                                                                                       
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/20/warren-hill-stay-of-execution 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Georgia Disabilities 
Expert Calls for Halt to Execution of Inmate With Mental Retardation, 
DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG,  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/georgia-
disabilities-expert-calls-halt-execution-inmate-mental-retardation (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2013); Eric Jacobson, The Supreme Court Must Stop the 
Execution of Warren Hill, HUFF POST CRIME, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-jacobson/warren-hill-
execution_b_2665094.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  
51 Huffington Post, Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row 
Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, HUFF POST CRIME, (Feb. 19, 2013, 
11:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/19/warren-hill-
execution-stayed_n_2720700.html  [hereinafter Warren Hill Execution 
Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision]. 
52 Id. 
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (West 2015); Warren Hill Execution Stayed: 
Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, supra note 51. 
54 Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in 
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three states with the death penalty use a lower standard for 
proving mental retardation.59 
 One of those states which require a lower standard of 
proof for avoiding the death penalty based on mental 
retardation is Arizona.  On January 3, 2013, “after more than 
13 years and two trials,” the Arizona Supreme Court ruled 
that Shawn Grell could not be executed because he was 
mentally retarded.60  Grell’s sentence was reduced to life in 
prison without possibility of parole for the 1999 murder of his 
two-year-old daughter by lighting her on fire after dousing 
her with gasoline.61  At trial, Grell’s attorneys failed to prove 
by Arizona’s clear and convincing evidence standard that he 
was mentally retarded.62  But on appeal, the Arizona Supreme 
Court ruled that Grell was mentally retarded using a lower 
standard of preponderance of the evidence.63  The Arizona 
Attorney General’s Office plans to appeal the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s ruling based on the fact that Grell was not 
found mentally retarded under the higher legal standard of 
clear and convincing evidence required by state law, but 
instead by a standard of preponderance of the evidence.64  The 
Arizona Attorney General intends to seek legislation that 
would clarify the standard for future cases involving 
defendants who claim to be mentally retarded since Grell was 
found mentally retarded by preponderance of the evidence 
even though the statute in Arizona requires a defendant to 
                                                 
59 The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION 
PAGES (Nov. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-intolerable-burden-of-
proof.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).  
60 Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 357 (Ariz. 2013); Jim Walsh, Arizona 
Court Reduces Shawn Grell’s Death Sentence to Life, AZCENTRAL.COM 
(Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/20130109arizona-
court-reduces-shawn-grell-death-sentence-life-brk.html (hereinafter Walsh). 
61 Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60. 
62 Grell, 291 P.3d at 351; Walsh, supra note 60; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-753(g) (West, WestlawNext legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the 
First Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature).  
63 Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60 (“Teachers and school 
officials were reluctant to label Grell as retarded for fear of angering his 
mother, referring to behavioral disorders instead when assigning him to 
special-education classes.”). 
64 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra 
note 60.  
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prove mental retardation by a clear and convincing evidence 
standard.65 
 Those defendants on death row prior to the decision in 
Atkins have also met obstacles in appealing their sentences.  
The Fifth Circuit denied Bruce Webster, an inmate on federal 
death row for the 1994 kidnapping, rape, and murder of an 
Arkansas teen, an appeal to prove he was mentally retarded, 
because he had exhausted his appeals to the point where new 
evidence to prove his intellectual disability was not allowed 
unless that new evidence could show that Webster was 
innocent.66  The allegedly weak weight of Webster’s new 
evidence, including three doctors who diagnosed him as 
mentally retarded, and the fact he had applied for Social 
Security Disability benefits due to his mental retardation the 
year prior to the murder he committed, was not the reason for 
the denial by the Fifth Circuit and affirmation by the United 
States Supreme Court.67  Rather, a 1996 federal criminal law 
severely limiting the number of appeals an inmate can make 
stopped Webster from possibly establishing his mental 
retardation post-Atkins.68 
 Even inconsistencies in applying the bare bones ruling 
of Atkins (no death penalty sentence for the mentally retarded) 
have been felt since its decision was entered.  In August 2012, 
Marvin Wilson, a defendant with an IQ of 61, was executed in 
Texas.69  Generally, an IQ of around 70 or as high as 75 
                                                 
65 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra 
note 60.  
66 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2005); Scott 
Goldstein, High Court Denies Appeal of Mentally Retarded Man Who 
Helped Rape, Kill Arlington Teen, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dec. 7, 




67 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2005); Goldstein, 
supra note 66.   
68 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104–
132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Goldstein, supra note 66. 
69 David R. Dow, Supreme Court Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, 
But Texas Does It Anyway, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawed-
executing-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dow]; Kate Randall, Texas Executes Mentally 
Disabled Death Row Prisoner, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (Aug. 8, 2012), 
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indicates limited intellectual functioning.70  Texas allowed for 
the execution of Wilson, convicted of murdering a police 
informant in 1992, using precedent from the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals decision established in Ex parte Briseno.71  In 
Ex parte Briseno, a mentally retarded defendant was executed 
because his retardation was deemed to be mild.72  From this 
2004 case, Texas uses a “Briseno factors” test to determine 
mental retardation.73  These “Briseno factors” are arguably 
subjective and stereotypical and without any scientific data to 
back them up.74  These factors include but are not limited to 
asking people who knew the defendant whether they thought 
he was “mentally retarded” to whether the crime committed 
required forethought.75   
 On February 29, 2012, Arizona executed Robert 
Moorman, who was diagnosed as being mentally retarded and 
having attended special education classes while in public 
school.76  Moorman was sentenced to death for the 1984 
murder of his adoptive mother who he killed while out on a 
three-day furlough while serving a nine-year prison term for 
                                                                                                       
http://www.wsws.org/Fen/articles/2012/08/wils-a08.html (last visited Aug. 
19, 2013) [hereinafter Randall]. 
70 Am. Ass’n of Intellectual and Dev’l Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual 
Disability, AIDD.ORG, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?navID=21. 
71 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Dustin Volz, 
Court Also Rejects Appeal for Man Scheduled to Die Next Week, Tucson 
Sentinen.com (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:31 AM), 
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/022912_az_executions/man-
put-death-after-last-minute-appeals-fail/, David R. Dow, Supreme Court 
Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, But Texas Does It Anyway, 
U.S.NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawed-
executing-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html. 
72 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 18; Dow, supra note 68. 
73 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68. 
74 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68. 
75 John H. Blume et. al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical 
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 689, 712 (2009). 
76 Michael Kiefer, Execution to Conclude Shocking Arizona Murder Case, 
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:19 PM), 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120224arizona-murder-case-
execution-moormann.html [hereinafter Kiefer].  
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the 1984 kidnapping and molesting of a nine-year-old girl.77  A 
defendant in Arizona, by clear and convincing evidence, must 
prove the criteria of being mentally retarded to avoid the 
death penalty under Atkins.78  One doctor witness, who often 
testifies against inmates, said Moorman was “absolutely” 
mentally disabled, which would make it illegal for Arizona to 
execute him because of Atkins.79  Other doctors said that 
Moorman’s intellect was just above someone who is legally 
considered mentally disabled.80   
 Ten years after the Atkins decision, Alabama reduced 
the sentence of one of their longest serving death row inmates 
because of the defendant’s intellectual disability.  Bobby 
Tarver, convicted in 1982 of murdering a taxi cab driver, had 
his death sentence overturned by a federal judge because of 
Tarver’s mental retardation.81  In 2003, Melanie Anderson’s 
sentence to the death penalty for the 1994 beating and torture 
death of her boyfriend’s three-year-old niece was reversed to 
life in prison after she was deemed mentally retarded.82 
 
VI. STATES SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT BEAR THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING MENTAL RETARDATION 
AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
  
 Currently, only fourteen of the thirty-three states with 
the death penalty have enacted statutes shifting the burden of 
                                                 
77 Arizona v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987); Kiefer, supra 
note 76 (Moorman’s representatives said he killed his adoptive mother after 
years of suffering sexual abuse from her). 
78 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G); Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 352 
(Ariz. 2013).  
79 Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76. 
80 Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76. 
81 Tarver v. Thomas, No. 07-00294-CG-B, 2012 WL 4461710, at *20 (S.D. 
Ala. Sept. 24, 2012); Brendan Kirby, Judge Changes Sentence of Mobile 
County’s Longest-Serving Death Row Inmate to Life, BLOG.AL.COM (Dec. 
6, 2012, 3:53 PM), 
http://blog.al.com/live/2012/12/judge_changes_sentence_of_mobi.html. 
82 North Carolina v. Anderson, 94 CRS 5669, 95 CVR 887 (N.C. Gen. Ct. 
Justice Superior Ct. Div. July, 29, 2003); Jerry Lankford, A Look at Capital 
Punishment and Wilkes County Moratorium on Executions Possible, THE 
RECORD (June 11, 2003), 
http://www.therecordofwilkes.com/newsa.asp?edition_number=187&pg=F. 
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proving mental retardation to the defendant.83  Since the 
decision in Atkins, three states have not set a standard of proof 
at all, but still require that the defendant prove his or her 
mental retardation.84  Historically, the prosecution bears the 
burden of proof in criminal cases; however, as to certain 
defenses, various jurisdictions assign one or more of the 
burdens to the defense.85  When it comes to proving an 
affirmative defense, federal courts have upheld statutory law 
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof.86  A 
defendant uses an affirmative defense to admit that he has 
acted in the way in which he has been accused, but that his 
conduct was justifiable, excusable, or could be mitigated for a 
particular reason, and therefore should reduce or negate the 
crime which he has been charged with.87  Mental retardation 
should, therefore, be considered an affirmative defense and 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant because it is offered 
by the defendant to excuse or mitigate his actions in an effort 
to avoid being sentenced to death.  In further support that the 
burden should be borne by the defendant, it should be noted 
that no state statute currently exists that places the burden on 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant is not mentally 
retarded.88  Once the states enact legislation placing the 
burden of proof with the defendant, the question becomes 







                                                 
83 Yamilka M. Rolon,  Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE (June 2008), 
http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/2/250.full (hereinafter Rolon). 
84 Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E. 2d 90, 102 (Ind. 2005); Rolon, supra note 82. 
85 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 5:18 (7th ed. 2012). 
86 Matthew S. Gray, Proof Issues, 84 GEO. L.J. 1248, 1252 (1996). 
87 Scott R. Poe, Inconsistent Methods for the Adjudication of Alleged 
Mentally Retarded Individuals: A Comparison of Ohio's and Georgia's 
Post-Atkins Frameworks for Determining Mental Retardation, 54 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 405, 421 (2006) [hereinafter Poe]. 
88  Missouri v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. 2008). 
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VII. STATE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT PROVE 
MENTAL RETARDATION USING A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD TO AVOID UNDERMINING THE 
HOLDING OF ATKINS 
 Because the United States Supreme Court did not set a 
standard of proof to be applied by the states in Atkins, state 
legislatures are permitted to enact any or no laws mandating 
what standard their state will apply as long as it is 
“appropriate.”89   
 
The function of a standard of proof, as that 
concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause 
and in the realm of fact finding, is to “instruct 
the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks he should have in 
the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of adjudication.”90   
 
Since the Atkins decision, three states with the death penalty 
have not set a standard of proof.91  Six states with the death 
penalty have enacted statutes requiring a preponderance of 
the evidence standard, with eighteen death penalty states 
keeping their pre-Atkins preponderance of the evidence 
standard.92  Four states with the death penalty require a clear 
                                                 
89 Ed Pilkington, Georgia Lawyers Rush To Save ‘Mentally Retarded’ 





90 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
91 Pruitt, 834 N.E. 2d at 102; Rolon, supra note 83. 
92 Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute 




Smith v. Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, 32-33 (Ala. May 25, 2007) (citing 
Morrow v. Alabama, 928 So. 2d 315, 323 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); see also 
Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1341 n.21 (N.D. Ala. 2006)); 
A.C.A. § 5-4-618(a)(2),(c) (2008); CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1376(b)(3) (2008); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (2008); see also Colorado v. Vasquez, 
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and convincing evidence standard.93  Only one state with the 
death penalty, Georgia, requires that a defendant prove 
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94   
 First, we must look at the standards of proof that fail to 
uphold the intention of Atkins to move toward the correct 
standard of proof that should rest upon the defendant.  
Placing a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt 
upon a defendant is unconstitutional because it makes it 
almost impossible for those capital defendants with mental 
retardation from proving their condition.95  For example, a 
capital defendant who alleges mental retardation in Georgia 
has to introduce more evidence than a capital defendant 
alleging mental retardation in any other state and that proof 
must show with “virtual certainty” that the defendant is 
mentally retarded.96  Consequently, doubt can easily be 
                                                                                                       
84 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2008); 725 ILCS 5/114-15(b) (2009);  Bowling 
v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 
905.5.1(C)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(2)(ii); see 
Chase v. Missouri, 873 So.2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004); MO. REV. ST. § 
565.030.4(1) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(4) (2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 174.098.5(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (f) 
(2008) (standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence if determined by 
a jury, clear and convincing evidence if determined by a court); Ohio v. 
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002); Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d 
556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Blonner v. Oklahoma, 2006 OK CR 1, 
6-8 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 
(S.C. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2009); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-203(c) (2008); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104(11)(a); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2008).  
93 Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute 




ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(G) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4) 
(2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2005(c), (f) (2008). 
94 Rolon, supra note 83; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2008) 
95 Andrew Cohen, Executing The Mentally Retarded: The Night The Lights 
Went Out In Georgia, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/executing-the-
mentally-retarded-the-night-the-lights-went-out-in-georgia/273088/. 
96 Poe, supra note 87, at 420. 
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introduced by expert testimony and an effective opposing 
expert can raise doubt enough to sentence a defendant to 
death who would otherwise be considered mentally 
retarded.97  The United States Supreme Court has never 
“suggested much less held, that a burden of proof standard on 
its own can so wholly burden an Eighth Amendment right as 
to eviscerate or deny that right.”98  Because of their disabilities 
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, 
the mentally retarded do not act with the level of moral 
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.99  Requiring such a high standard of proof such as 
Georgia’s standard denies a capital defendant protection and 
due process and undermines the Atkins holding.   
 Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence indicating 
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 
certain.”100  At least one state has found that a clear and 
convincing evidence standard placed on a defendant trying to 
prove mental retardation is unconstitutional under Atkins.101  
In Pruitt v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that 
assigning the clear and convincing evidence standard to a 
defendant to prove his allegation of mental retardation in 
avoiding a sentence of death was a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment because “the defendant’s right not to be executed 
if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter 
of federal constitutional law.”102  The Indiana Supreme Court 
analogized the Pruitt case with Cooper v. Oklahoma, which 
found that requiring a defendant to prove his competence to 
stand trial by a clear and convincing evidence standard was a 
violation of his right to due process.103 
 In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously decided that a defendant did not have to prove 
his competency to stand trial by a clear and convincing 
                                                 
97 The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION 
PAGES (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-
intolerable-burden-of-proof.html?_r=0. 
98 Id. 
99 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. 
100 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009).  
101 Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 103. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996)).  
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standard because it was too high of a burden.104  The Court 
reasoned that assigning a burden of clear and convincing 
evidence to the defendant places a “significant risk of an 
erroneous determination that the defendant is competent.”105   
Further, the Court found that a clear and convincing evidence 
standard allocates a large share of the risk to the defendant.106  
The Court reasoned the clear and convincing evidence 
standard was such a harsh standard that it violates a 
defendant’s right to due process of law and that the standard 
assigned should be a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.107  While the Cooper case was to determine 
competency to stand trial, it should still be looked to for 
guidance in deciding the standard to assign a capital 
defendant alleging mental retardation because the issues are 
analogous.  
 The “more stringent the burden of proof a party must 
bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous 
decision.”108  To avoid an erroneous decision being made in a 
decision as important as life or death of a defendant, states 
should require that at a maximum the standard of proof 
assigned to a capital defendant alleging an affirmative defense 
of mental retardation is the standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.  A standard of preponderance of the evidence means 
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free 
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to 
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather 
than the other.”109  Currently, the majority of states that have 
enacted legislation requiring the capital defendant prove their 
mental retardation by a certain burden of proof have chosen 
that burden to be by a preponderance of the evidence.110  
 States should treat a determination of mental 
retardation similar to the United States Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
104 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 369. 
105 Id. at 363. 
106 Id. at 366. 
107 Id. 
108 Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 
(1990). 
109 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
110 Mary Hollingsworth, State v. Grell: Placing the Burden on Defendants 
to Prove Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 775, 778 
(2007). 
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treatment of competency for trial and require that the standard 
of proof that a capital defendant must prove be by a 
preponderance of evidence.111  The argument for this 
treatment is: the risk to a capital defendant who must meet a 
burden higher than preponderance of the evidence is dire, 
whereas the risk to the state is modest.112 
 When the burden of proof is at the lower standard of 
preponderance of the evidence, success by capital defendants 
claiming mental retardation is not frequent, which illustrates 
that a preponderance of the evidence standard is not just a 
“free pass” for a capital defendant alleging mental retardation 
trying to avoid the death penalty.113  For example, in Virginia, 
which requires a capital defendant prove mental retardation 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the success rate is zero 
percent for the six capital defendants who have alleged mental 
retardation to avoid the death penalty.114  Similarly, Alabama, 
which has a preponderance of the evidence standard, has only 
a twelve percent success rate for the twenty-six capital 
defendants who have alleged mental retardation to avoid the 
death penalty.115   
 Therefore, subjecting a capital defendant to prove an 
allegation of mental retardation at any standard higher than 
preponderance of the evidence would shift the allocation of 
risk, and would be dire for the defendant’s defense.  All states 
with the death penalty should refine their legislation by 
joining the majority of states and mandate that the standard of 
proof be preponderance of the evidence to avoid deflating the 
Atkins holding.  
 
                                                 
111 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355. 
112 Id. at 364-65. 
113 Kenneth Williams, Most Deserving Of Death? An Analysis Of The 
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VIII. STATES SHOULD ENACT STATUTORY LAW REQUIRING 
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A DEFENDANT’S 
ALLEGED MENTAL RETARDATION BE DECIDED PRIOR 
TO THE TRIAL COMMENCING 
 The determination of whether a capital defendant is 
mentally retarded by the standard of preponderance of the 
evidence should be made prior to trial. This would eliminate 
any bias that may occur by the factfinder if the determination 
was made after the guilt phase and to encourage efficiency of 
resources, time, and expense.  Mental retardation is a 
“threshold issue that determines whether a defendant is 
eligible for capital punishment at all.”116  Currently, in many 
states, the same jury that finds a defendant guilty during the 
guilt phase of the trial decides whether to impose the death 
penalty by considering any aggravating or mitigating 
factors.117  Consideration of a capital defendant’s mental 
retardation during the penalty phase, in addition to being 
made by the same jury that found a defendant guilty during 
the guilt phase, can cause a higher risk of wrongful execution, 
because “[m]entally retarded defendant[s] may be less able to 
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically 
poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an 
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.”118 While the determination of a mental retardation 
includes fact-finding, mental retardation itself “is not the 
functional equivalent of an element of a crime;” therefore, 
determination by a jury is not constitutionally required under 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
may be left to the judge to decide prior to trial.119   
 Proceeding as a noncapital case conserves significant 
resources by reducing litigation expenses and expediting the 
                                                 
116 Howell v. Tennessee, 151 S.W.3d 450, 465 (Tenn. 2004). 
117 Id. 
118 Jessica Hudson, et al., Lightning but No Thunder: The Need for Clarity 
in Military Courts Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation in 
Capital Cases and for Procedures in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 55 
NAVAL L. REV. 359, 374 (2008) (citing Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269 (quoting 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21)) [hereinafter Hudson]. 
119 Grell, 135 P.3d at 706.   
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overall proceedings.120  Trying a capital defendant is more 
time consuming, expensive, and leads to a greater use of state 
legal resources because the government must avoid errors, 
which could prove fatal, in trying a death penalty case.121  
Allowing a trial judge to issue a pre-trial determination as to a 
capital defendant’s mental retardation is “economical in terms 
of the time and cost that might be saved by avoiding a capital 
trial.”122  In light of that fact, “every effort must be made to 
avoid a death-penalty trial, as early in the proceedings as 
possible, where capital punishment is precluded as a matter of 
law.”123  Additionally, should a determination of mental 
retardation be made by the judge prior to trial, an otherwise 
capital defendant could decide to plea, thus expediting the 
judicial process.124 
 Therefore, to provide full constitutional protection to a 
capital defendant and to encourage efficiency of the criminal 
system in applying Atkins, the states should enact legislation 
                                                 
120 See New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004) 
(recognizing that a capital murder trial consumes significantly more 
resources than a non-capital trial and that it would be beneficial to all 
parties to resolve the question of whether the defendant is eligible for the 
death penalty as early as possible); 
Hudson, supra note 118, at 391. 
121 Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal 
Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550, 574 (2005). 
122 Pennsylvania v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 80 (Pa. 2011) cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 122 (2012). 
123 Id.; Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (categorically 
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders). By placing the 
mental retardation determination in the hands of the judge for a pretrial 
decision, “significant resources [could be] saved in terms of trial 
preparation, motion practice, voir dire, trial time, mitigation research, etc.,” 
if the defendant is found to have mental retardation.  United States v. 
Nelson, 419 F.Supp.2d 891, 893 (E.D. La. 2006); see also Morrow v. 
Alabama, 928 So.2d 315, 324 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that pretrial 
Atkins determination by the court spares the parties from “the onerous 
burden of a futile bifurcated capital sentencing procedure”) (quoting 
Louisiana v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 (La. 2002), superseded by 
statute as stated in Louisiana v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 103 (La. 2006)); 
Hudson, supra note 118, at 390 (noting the economic benefits of having a 
judge resolve Atkins claims pretrial).  
124 Hudson, supra note 118, at 372. 
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that leaves determination of a capital defendant’s alleged 
mental retardation to the judge prior to the guilt phase.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 The United States Supreme Court condemned the 
execution of mentally retarded capital defendants in Atkins 
because it studied the national consensus, which illustrated 
that the goals of the criminal justice system cannot be met by a 
person, who because of his mental limitations, cannot 
understand the consequences or wrongfulness of his actions.   
Because the Supreme Court left it to the states to apply the 
Atkins holding, the states should enact certain laws to protect 
the Court’s intention of not violating a capital defendant’s 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution.  States should enact legislation that (1) 
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant because an 
allegation of mental retardation is an affirmative defense that 
should be borne by the defense, (2) sets a standard of 
preponderance of the evidence as the maximum standard of 
proof a capital defendant must meet to prove mental 
retardation because any higher standard of proof would 
unfairly allocate an erroneous risk to the defense that could 
mean death for someone who would otherwise be exempted 
from the death penalty, and (3) requires the determination of 
mental retardation be made prior to the penalty phase to 
encourage efficiency in time and expenses and to discourage 
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TENNESSEE’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HISTORY AND 
TODAY’S MERITED REPRIEVE FOR ITS DEATH PENALTY 
 
Randall T. Noe 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 This paper provides an overview of Tennessee’s capital 
punishment history. It ends with the existence of the state’s death 
penalty in a condition of reprieve due to its value for constitutional 
justice when properly put to use against the worst-of-the-worst and as 
a tool for plea bargainers. History shows that the state’s death penalty 
resided at times of ebb on a “death row” of its own upon the pages of 
the Tennessee Code Annotated. Despite a lengthy evolution process 
spurred on by Tennessee’s legislatures, governors, and courts over 
time, it is possible that the penalty is on “death row” because it is 
controversial, dark, and ugly. The death penalty may never again 
flow and may reach the day of ultimate ebb when its death warrant is 
signed. However, the death penalty has weathered many efforts 
toward reform, will likely never be considered “innocent,” and may 
possibly be redeemed to provide for better future application. 
Although the death penalty has never quite lived up to its potential as 
a deterrent, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and 
an effective tool that merits reprieve from its own “death row.” 
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Investigation National Academy Session 237, University of Virginia; 
Detective Captain, Morristown, Tenn. Police Department. 
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II. BRIEF HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS 
 
Although the precise origins of capital punishment remain 
unclear within the dark recesses of pre-history, “capital punishment 
has been used to penalize various forms of conduct”1 since the dawn 
of civilization. “Simply put, capital punishment penalizes those 
convicted of certain crimes by killing them.”2 
“The United States inherited the bulk of its criminal law, 
including the tradition of capital punishment, primarily from England 
but also from other European countries.”3 As the states were forming, 
the newly created state sometimes adopted the law of the state from 
which it parted. Tennessee gained statehood in 1796, and its body of 
law derived from North Carolina of which it was originally a part.4 A 
look at the history of the death penalty in Tennessee indicates the 
intent of the state to utilize the death penalty as a means of 
punishment and as a deterrent to specific criminal acts.5 “Until 1829, 
the only penalty available for conviction of murder was death.”6 ”An 
act passed in 1829 divided murder into first and second degree [and] 
provided a mandatory death sentence for those convicted of first 
degree murder.7 The death penalty was not allowed for second degree 
murder, and a sentencing range of ten to twenty-one years was set 
instead.8 Tennessee legislators enacted an important change in the 
state’s homicide law in 1838 and the state became the first in the 
nation to give juries the discretion to sentence defendants to death or 
life for first degree murder.9 If the trial jury found mitigating 
circumstances in the case, and stated so in its verdict, it became the 
                                                 
1 RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with 
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. 
REV. 613, 614 (1983). 
4 Margaret Vandiver & Michael Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of 
Death”: Pre-Furman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 
31 U. MEM. L. REV. 861, 867 (2001). 
5 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Note, The Death Penalty in Tennessee—Recent 
Developments, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (1977-1978). 
6 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 870. 
7 Id. at 870-71. 
8 Id. at 871. 
9 Id. 
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statutory duty of the court to sentence the defendant to life.10 This 
change lasted just twenty years. “By 1858, the punishment for first 
degree murder was again mandatory death.”11 
“Like other slave states, Tennessee had separate statutes for 
crimes committed by whites and those committed by slaves, and, 
often by free blacks.”12 The separate laws for black and whites show 
how the state’s criminal justice system reflected the political and 
economic systems of the time.13 In post-Civil War 1865, the Tennessee 
legislature rewrote many of the old laws and omitted “reference[s] to 
race . . . .”14 
Punishment by death is not ultimately effective as a penalty 
unless carried out or executed. The public nature of applying the 
penalty and methods of death have changed over time. “All 
executions in America were public until the 1830’s.”15 A decade 
earlier, concerns began to be expressed about the propriety of such 
public spectacles.16 “The crowds that gathered to witness public 
executions were large and often unruly, disrespectful, drunken and 
dangerous [attendees of] festivals of disorder [that] subverted morals, 
increased crimes, excited sympathy with the criminal, and wasted 
time.”17 The methods varied by state, but Tennessee chose public 
hanging as its first method of execution.18 In response to an 1879 
hanging in Morristown, Tennessee a local newspaper writer wrote: 
 
[W]e would be glad indeed if we knew this was the last 
public execution that would ever occur in Tennessee. 
The whole scene here was demoralizing and in no 
respect did it in our opinion bring any good result. We 
favor hanging for deliberate murder, but we hope the 
law making power will speedily pass a law to require 
it done privately.19 
 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 872. 
12 Id. at 867. 
13 Id. at 918. 
14 Id. at 873-74. 
15 Id. at 875. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 877. 
19 Hamblen’s Only Hanging Took Place Sept. 26, 1879, DAILY GAZETTE & MAIL, 
Nov. 13, 1955, at 14 (reprint from Oct. 1, 1879, on file with author). 
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 Pennsylvania, the first northeastern state to abolish public 
executions, did so in 1834.20 “[T]he South and southern border states 
maintain[ed] the old tradition of public executions longer than the 
rest of the country.”21 As early as 1849, a resolution was introduced to 
require the Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee to look into 
moving executions inside of prison walls, but it was rejected by that 
committee.22 “[In] 1883, [Tennessee] executions were moved from 
public spaces to the relative privacy of prison yards, [and] those who 
could witness the execution were specified.”23 The 1883 legislation 
that caused this change also contained an unfunded mandate that 
required each county to construct a private area for executions.24 After 
a proposal by Governor Patterson in 1909, the Tennessee legislature 
moved executions from the county of conviction to the state prison.25 
 “Many states changed their methods of execution from 
hanging to electrocution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in an attempt to provide a quicker and more reliable method 
of imposing death.”26 In 1911, Governor Hooper expressed to the 
legislature his desire to see Tennessee’s method of execution changed 
from hanging to electrocution as a progression of decency and 
humanity.27 In 1913, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a bill 
changing the method of execution to the electric chair, and 
appropriated $5,000 for the cost of the death chamber, apparatus, 
machinery, and appliances necessary to conduct electrocutions.28 In 
1916, the first electrocution in Tennessee took place.29 Electrocution 
continued as the sole method of execution through 1960 when 
Tennessee entered a forty-year-long, self-imposed, unofficial 
moratorium.30 
In 1999, Tennessee changed its method of execution from 
electrocution to lethal injection, but maintained electrocution as a 
                                                 
20 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 875. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 876. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 876-77. 
26 Id. at 877. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 877-78. 
29 Id. at 878, 894. 
30 Id. 
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choice for those sentenced before the end of 1998.31 In 2000, Tennessee 
carried out its first execution by lethal injection.32 Since 2000, 
Tennessee executed four death row inmates by lethal injection and 
one who volunteered for electrocution.33 
In 2011, Tennessee’s supply of sodium thiopental was seized 
by the Drug Enforcement Agency because of improper import 
procedures of the foreign-made drug.34 Sodium thiopental is used to 
induce general anesthesia as part of the state’s multi-drug lethal 
injection protocol.35 
In 2012, death row inmates in Tennessee and two other states 
sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and others “for 
improperly allowing shipments of a misbranded and new drug 
[sodium thiopental] to enter the United States for use in state lethal 
injection protocols.”36 The district judge in the case agreed with the 
inmates’ contention.37  In addition, the judge found the FDA had 
acted contrary to law by not refusing such imports.38 The judge made 
note that the FDA’s mission is to ensure that all drugs are safe and 
effective, regardless of why the drug is being administered, and that 
the law does not create an exception for drugs purchased by a state to 
use in its lethal injection protocol.39 Moreover, the judge felt the FDA 
“failed to provide a reasoned explanation for departing from [its] own 
regulations . . . to ensure illegal, foreign shipments of [sodium] 
thiopental were not admitted in to [sic] the United States.”40 Finally, 
the judge found the FDA’s “seemingly callous indifference to the 
health consequences of those imminently facing the executioner’s 
needle . . . utterly disappointing.”41 Two years after Tennessee’s 
                                                 
31 Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., 57 (Fall 2012), available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Fall_2012.pdf.  
32 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database at Robert Coe, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/robert-coe, (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); see 
State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983). 
33 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
34 Bridgit Bowden, Arkansas, Tennessee have Lethal Injection Drug Taken by the 
DEA, WPLN NEWS, July 25, 2011, http://wpln.org/?p=29072. 
35 Beaty v. Food & Drug Admin., 853 F. Supp.2d 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
36 Id. at 32. 
37 Id. at 37. 
38 Id.  
39 Beaty, 853 F. Supp.2d at 43 n.9. 
40 Id. at 43. 
41 Id. 
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supply of sodium thiopental was seized, the state experienced a lack 
of pancuronium bromide, a strong muscle relaxant also used in the 
multi-drug lethal injection protocol.42 Before revising the state’s choice 
of drugs, the Tennessee Department of Corrections is “monitoring 




Death penalty abolition efforts are a significant element of the 
history of Tennessee’s death penalty. In 1807, Governor Sevier stated 
“[h]umanity and policy call aloud for a revisal of . . . our laws . . . to 
abolish the inhuman and prompt mode of punishing with death.”44 
Similarly, in 1837, Governor Cannon proposed that the legislature 
should “entirely [abolish] punishment by death in our state, and . . . 
[substitute] in its stead confinement . . . during life.”45  In 1845, 
Governor Brown also stated his position in favor of the abolition of 
capital punishment to the legislature.46 He expressed that a just and 
rational society should regard the ancient barbarities of the death 
penalty with the deepest level of abhorrence and that relaxation of 
such laws would not lead to increases in crime.47 Despite the 
sentiments of these state executives, no immediate legislation was 
advanced. 
“In 1915, Tennessee did something no other southern state has 
done before or since: it abolished the death penalty for murder by 
legislative vote.”48 The bill excluded murder committed by a prisoner 
serving a life term, and was vetoed by Governor Rye.49 A motion to 
sustain the Governor’s veto passed the House despite its previous 
vote in favor of the bill; however, the Governor had delayed his veto 
past the five-day period provided by the Tennessee Constitution, and 
the bill became law.50 Tennessee’s experiment with partial abolition of 
the death penalty was short-lived.51 A week into his term in 1919, 
                                                 
42 Associated Press, Tennessee Searches for Lethal Injection Drugs, CITIZEN 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2013 at A3 (on file with author). 
43 Id. 
44 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 888. 
45 Id. at 889. 
46 Id. at 890. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 878.  
49 Id. at 880-81. 
50 Id. at 881. 
51 Id. at 881-83. 
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Governor Roberts sent word to the legislature about his perceptions 
for the potential of lawless vigilantism and lynch mob vengeance 
taking the place of the state sanctioned death penalty for murderers.52 
Governor Roberts stated that “[t]he assassin now knows that he will 
not forfeit his life by commission of the most atrocious crime upon his 
innocent victim.”53 He urged passage of a bill already introduced to 
reinstate the death penalty for first degree murder and the legislature 
responded quickly with majority votes from both bodies to pass the 
bill.54 
After an approximate forty-year lull in death penalty abolition 
activity, in 1959, Governor Clement requested in an address to the 
legislature that it give abolition of capital punishment serious 
consideration.55 After a failed legislative attempt to abolish the death 
penalty in 1961, a 1965 abolition bill with Governor Clement’s 
endorsement overwhelmingly passed the Senate only to be defeated 
by a single vote in the House.56  
In 1972, as a result of the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decision in Furman v. Georgia57 finding the imposition of the death 
penalty as practiced nationwide violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, the punishment went 
on hiatus across the board.58 In 1973, the Tennessee Legislature 
enacted new first degree murder and death penalty statutes in an 
attempt to remedy the former laws which Furman had rendered 
unconstitutional.59 The new Tennessee death penalty statute60 added 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances patterned after the Model 
Penal Code.61 “After Furman, states sought to resuscitate their capital 
statutes by revising them to address the concerns raised in Furman; 
                                                 
52 Id. at 881-82. 
53 Id. at 882. 
54 Id. at 882-83. 
55 Id. at 892-93. 
56 Id. at 893-94; S.B. 344/H.B. 293 84th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1965). 
57 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
58 Am. Bar Ass’n, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty 
Systems: The Tennessee Death Penalty Assessment Report; An Analysis of 





61 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 9-10; Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)-(4) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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many of the states turned to [Model Penal Code] § 210.6 as a template 
for their revised statutes, hoping in part that the prestige of the 
Institute would help to validate these new efforts.”62 The American 
Law Institute’s current position statement is, “the Institute withdraws 
Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code in light of the current 
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.”63 
In 1974, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the 1973 statutes 
unconstitutional and the legislature responded with amendments.64 In 
1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared the 1974 death penalty 
statute unconstitutional and the legislature again responded with 
amendments.65 The Tennessee murder and death penalty statutes 
faced no further declarations of unconstitutionality, and, with other 
changes discussed below, remain current.66 
In 2007, the Tennessee Legislature created the Tennessee 
Committee to Study the Administration of the Death Penalty.67 Its 
work continued for fourteen months, and it yielded several proposals 
to the legislature.68 The committee recommended “the creation of an 
independent commission to oversee capital defense services in 
Tennessee to ensure that attorneys representing those charged with 
capital murder are competent, trained, monitored, and compensated 
adequately.”69 The bill to enact this measure died in committee.70 
Another recommendation would 
                                                 
62 The Am. Law Inst., Report of the Council to the Membership of The American 
Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, Annex B, 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf; see also Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
63 The Am. Law Inst., Publications Catalog; Model Penal Code, available at 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm? fuseaction= publications.ppage&nodeid=92, 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2013), (choosing to not endorse abolition of capital 
punishment per se). 
64 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 11; State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 
1974). 
65 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 12; Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 
1977). 
66 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202, 204 (2012). 
67 Am. Civil Liberties Union, The Tennessee Death Penalty Study Committee 
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[r]equire . . . the district attorney general to make 
available to the defendant for inspection and copying 
all relevant documents, tangible objects and 
statements, together with complete files of all 
investigative agencies, [and] [r]equire…the district 
attorney general to give notice to the defendant of any 
expert witnesses that the state reasonably expects to 
call as a witness at trial, [and] specifies that the district 
attorney general is not required to disclose written 
materials drafted by the prosecuting attorneys or their 
legal staff for their own use at trial.71 
 
The bill to enact this measure also died in committee.72 
 A third recommendation would “require . . . all statements 
made by a person during a custodial interrogation relating to a 
homicide . . . be electronically recorded and preserved.”73 The bill to 
enact this measure received much more attention, but was also sent to 
die in committee.74 The only recommendation of the committee 
enacted by the legislature “require[d] the administrative office of the 
court to propose a realistic time within which post-conviction relief 
petitions in capital cases are finally disposed of if it is determined the 
one-year statutory time limit is not realistic.”75 The new law became 
sub-parts (e)(1)-(3) of Tennessee’s Final Disposition of [Post-
Conviction] Petitions statute and went into effect July 8, 2009.76  Two 
other states with similar study committees “found their death penalty 
                                                                                                                   
70 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB167
9 &ga=106. 
71 Daniel Potter, Death Penalty Study Committee Issues Recommendations, 
WLPN NEWS, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://wpln.org/?p=4849. 
72 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB140
2 &ga=106. 
73 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB026
1 &ga=106(follow “Summary for SB 0261/HB 0596” hyperlink). 
74 Id. 
75 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB0260
&ga=106 (follow Summary for SB 0260/HB 0597” hyperlink).  
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-111(e)(1)-(3) (2012). 
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systems so broken and rife with error that repeal of the death penalty 
was recommended.”77 A recommendation to abolish the death 
penalty was noticeably absent from the Tennessee committee’s 
efforts.78 
 Regardless of the committee’s lack of an abolition 
recommendation, legislation was proposed in 2010 that would 
“remove . . . the death penalty as a possible punishment for first 
degree murder.”79 This bill died in committee.80 Abolition was 
revisited in 2011 with proposed legislation that would “remove…the 
jury’s ability to sentence a defendant convicted of first degree murder 
to death.”81 This bill also met its demise in committee.82 
 In reviewing these ancient or recent efforts, the possibility of 
abolition of Tennessee’s death penalty has remained a constant topic 
of concern. The drumbeat heartily stirring abolition efforts to a 
fevered frenzy may again resound in Tennessee, but for now THE 
status quo is maintained.    
 
IV. OTHER TWEAKS IN DEATH PENALTY-RELATED LAW 
  
 Other tweaks in death penalty-related law from Tennessee’s 
capital punishment history are important to note. In 1841, then 
Governor James K. Polk suggested to the legislature “that a law was 
needed to enable him to commute death sentences to life as well as to 
grant pardons.”83 In 1842, the legislature responded to his request 
with legislation allowing the governor to reduce a death sentence to 
life when he thought a full pardon was not warranted.84 A law 
enacted in 1858 granted the Tennessee Supreme Court the power to 
recommend the commutation of death sentences to the governor 
                                                 
77 Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 67. 
78 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Tennessee; History of the Death Penalty; Milestones in 
Abolition Efforts, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/tennessee-1#resources. 








83 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 879. 
84 Id. 
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when in its opinion extenuating circumstances were found in 
particular cases.85 
 Some amendments to Tennessee’s statutory scheme merit 
attention: 
 
In 1988, the Tennessee Legislature amended the first 
degree murder statute by…classif[ying] as first degree 
murder the killing of a child less than thirteen years 
old if the child’s death result[ed] from one…or more 
incidents of a protracted pattern or multiple incidents 
of child abuse committed by the defendant against such 
child or if such death result[ed] from the cumulative 
effects of such pattern or incidents.86 
 
This amendment was referred to as the Scotty Trexler law.87 Scotty 
was a twenty-one month-old child murdered in Hawkins County in 
1987 by protracted and severe child abuse inflicted upon him by his 
mother’s live-in boyfriend who babysat him.88 Although initially 
charged with first degree murder, Scotty’s abuser’s charges had to be 
reduced because the statute required premeditation which could not 
be proved.89 The presiding jurist, Judge James Beckner, impacted by 
Scotty’s plight and the unavailability of harsher justice, stepped 
outside of the usual neutral cloak of the robe and advocated for the 
law’s change with testimony before the committee that drafted the 
1988 amendment.90 Scotty’s murderer is due to be released in March 
of 2015.91 In 1995, an amendment “deleted all reference to the 
requisite age of a child abuse victim in order for the defendant to be 
convicted of first degree murder.”92 
 Among other notable points, the Tennessee Legislature, in 
1989, allowed a viable fetus to be considered a murder victim.93 In 
1990, the Legislature enacted “a new statute prohibiting defendants 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 15-16, (emphasis in original)(quoting 1988 
Tenn. Pub. Acts 802, §1). 






92 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 16. 
93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a) (1989). 
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with mental retardation from being subject to the death penalty.”94 A 
1993 amendment added life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole as a sentencing option for first degree murder.95 In 2002, after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on homeland targets, “the . . . Legislature 
added ‘act[s] of terrorism’ to the list of offenses constituting first 
degree murder.”96 In 2011, the Legislature amended the provision 
related to a fetus as a victim to “include a human embryo or fetus at 
any stage of gestation in utero.”97  
 
V. RACE AS AN ISSUE 
  
 Equal justice under law is such a lofty goal that the phrase is 
engraved on the west pediment of the United States Supreme Court 
Building in Washington, D.C.98 The United States Constitution 
provides “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”99 “[E]qual protection 
applies to the federal government through judicial interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.”100 Equal, as an 
adjective, does not hold its ground in an imperfect world. In an ideal 
state, equal numbers would be demonstrated in the racial 
demographics of death row inmates. However, a look at statistics 
readily shows racial disparity in demographic comparisons. 
Nationwide, as of fall 2012, the death row population was 43.17% 
white, 41.93% black, and 14.91% other.101 Overall estimated nationwide 
prison population at the end of 2011 was 35.66 % white, 40.16% black, 
and 24.17% other.102 Overall nationwide citizen population in 2010 
                                                 
94 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 17; See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 
(1990). 
95 Id. at 16. 
96 Id. at 17 (quoting 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 849, §2(a)). 
97 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 408, § 2. 
98 Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The West 
Pediment Information Sheet, (Updated: Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/westpediment.pdf. 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
100 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 718 (3d ed. 2009). 
101 Fins, supra note 31, at 1.  
102 E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, 7 (Dec. 2012), available 
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
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was 72.4% white, 12.6% black, and 15% other.103 Tennessee’s death 
row population as of fall 2012 was 52% white, 43% black, and 5% 
other.104 Tennessee’s overall prison population as of mid-2012 was 
52.08% white, 45.49% black, and 2.4% other.105 Tennessee’s overall 
citizen population in 2010 was 77.56% white, 16.66% black, and 5.78% 
other.106 Even more disparate is the number of executions in 
Tennessee for the period of July 1916, through December 2, 2009, 
which show forty-five white individuals executed, or 34.35%, while 
eighty-six black individuals were executed, or 65.65%.107 
 While statistical disparity is evinced above based on racial 
classification, disparity does not mean inequity based on general 
murder suspect demographics. Statistics from 2001 through 2011 for 
national murder offenders based on crime occurrence data show 
racial demographics of 32.5% white, 37% black, 1.7% other, and 28.9% 
unknown.108 Tennessee’s encompassing murder arrest statistics from 
2002 through 2011 show racial demographics of 39.1% white, 59.7% 
black, and 1.2% other.109 Regarding statistics, some would say where 
there is smoke, there are mirrors. Others would say, based on the 
statistics regarding persons who actually commit murders in the 
United States and Tennessee, that where there is smoke, there is fire; 
and where there is fire, it should be fought. A defender of the death 
penalty wrote: 
 
[S]tatistics of overrepresentation fail to prove racial 
bias. The relevant population for comparison is not the 
general population, but rather the population of 
murderers. If the death penalty is administered 
                                                 
103 Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, Overview of 
Race and Hispanic Origin, 4 (March, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.  
104 Fins, supra note 31, at 33. 
105 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2012 Statistical Abstract, 24 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://www.tn.gov/correction/pdf/StatisticalAbstract2012.pdf. 
106 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Interactive Population Search-Tennessee, 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/ popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47. 
107 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Tennessee Executions, available at 
http://www.tn.gov/correction/media/tnexecutions.html. 
108 See infra Table 1, Race of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime 
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to race being unknown at 
the time of the crime). 
109 See infra Table 2, Race of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest 
Data, 2002-2011. 
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without regard to race, the percentage of African 
American death row inmates found at the end of the 
process should not exceed the percentage of African 
American defendants charged with murder at the 
beginning. The available statistics indicate that is 
precisely what happens.110 
 
 In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of 
five-to-four, decided a case on point regarding the “question [of] 
whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial 
considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves 
that [a defendant’s] capital sentence is unconstitutional under the 
Eight or Fourteenth Amendment.”111 The Court stated a narrow and 
necessary burden of proof: 
 
[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection 
violation has the burden of proving “the existence of 
purposeful discrimination.” A corollary to this 
principle is that a criminal defendant must prove that 
the purposeful discrimination “had a discriminatory 
effect” on him. Thus, to prevail under the Equal 
Protection Clause, [the defendant] must prove that the 
decisionmakers [sic] in his case acted with 
discriminatory purpose.112 
 
The Court was asked to rely on historical evidence, and Justice Lewis 
Powell noted that “[a]lthough the history of racial discrimination in 
this country is undeniable, we cannot accept official actions taken 
long ago as evidence of current intent.”113  The Court found that a 
statistical study was clearly insufficient to support an inference that 
any of the decision-makers in the case acted with discriminatory 
purpose, and that the State as a whole did not act with a 
discriminatory purpose in selecting or reaffirming “a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’, its 
                                                 
110 Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH 
PENALTY 183, 201 (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004). 
111 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987). 
112 Id. at 292 (emphasis in original) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 
550 (1967); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 
113 Id. at 298 n.20. 
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adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”114  For the defendant’s 
claim to prevail, he “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature 
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an 
anticipated racially discriminatory effect,” and there was no evidence 
that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute to 
“further a racially discriminatory purpose.”115 The Court concluded 
this part of the case by holding the defendant failed to demonstrate 
the State maintained capital punishment because of its statistically 
suggested disproportionate impact, and, as there were legitimate 
reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and maintain capital 
punishment, it would not infer a discriminatory purpose on the part 
of the State of Georgia; the Court thus rejected the equal protection 
claims.116 The Court also held, “[t]he Constitution does not require 
that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with 
a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice 
system that includes capital punishment.”117 
 Along similar lines, a gender disparity claim by a male 
defendant would likely be seen as frivolous, yet grossly 
disproportionate statistics are available. The gender percentages for 
those on death row in the United States as of October 1, 2012, were 
98% male and 2% female.118 Those numbers for Tennessee were 
98.88% male and 1.12% female.119 The estimated gender percentages 
for those incarcerated for all crimes in the United States as of 
December 31, 2011, were 93.26% male and 6.74% female.120 The 
gender percentages for those suspected of murder from 2001-2011 
were 65.1% male, 7.2% female, and 27.7% unknown.121 The gender 
percentages for those arrested for murder in Tennessee from 2002 
through 2011 were 88.9% male and 11.1% female.122 The overall 
citizen population gender demographics as of 2010 for the United 
                                                 
114 Id. at 297-98. 
115 Id. at 298 (emphasis in original). 
116 Id. at 298-99. 
117 Id. at 319. 
118 Fins, supra note 31, at 1. 
119 Id. at 57. 
120 Carson & Sabol, supra note 102, at 7. 
121 See infra Table 3, Sex of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime 
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to gender being unknown at 
the time of the crime). 
122 See infra Table 4, Sex of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest Data, 
2002-2011. 
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States were 49.2% male and 50.8% female.123 The overall citizen 
population gender demographics as of 2010 for Tennessee were 
48.75% male and 51.25% female.124 
No one would consider doing away with the death penalty 
because males are disproportionately represented on death row. This 
is because males disproportionately commit more murders in general 
as the statistics above show. Likewise, abolition, mitigation, or 
leniency should not be based on race if its members are 
disproportionately responsible for originating the crimes for which 
they are arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. Similarly, no one 
fathoms trying to narrow statutory language, sentencing guidelines, 
and aggravating factors to be more inclusive of females. Such 
language is gender neutral. Yet, the number of women in prison in 
general is growing at an alarming rate.125 “The female prison 
population grew by 832% from 1977 to 2007, [while] the male prison 
population grew 416% during the same time period.”126 Nevertheless, 
as the statistics above demonstrate, females remain grossly 
underrepresented on death row and in prisons in comparison to 
males. This, like with race, is not inequity or discrimination, as fire is 
being fought where it burns. 
 
VI. TENNESSEE CAPITAL CASES REACH THE NATION’S CAPITAL 
 
A few death penalty issue cases that merited the attention of 
the Supreme Court of the United States originated in Tennessee. In 
Payne v. Tennessee, the Court reconsidered whether the Eighth 
Amendment barred the admission of victim impact evidence during 
the penalty or sentencing phase of a capital trial.127 Previous Court 
opinions had held “the harm . . . a capital defendant causes a victim’s 
                                                 
123 Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Myer, Age and Sex Composition: 2010, 2 
(May, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47. 
124 Id. at 7. 
125 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice, 
http://www.wpaonline.org/institute/index.htm (last visited March 27, 
2013). 
126 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice, Quick Facts: 
Women & Criminal Justice-2009, 1 (2009), available at 
http://wpaonline.org/pdf/Quick%20Facts%20Women%20and%20CJ%2020
09.pdf. 
127 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991). 
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family do[es] not in general reflect on the defendant’s 
‘blameworthiness,’ and that only evidence relating to 
‘blameworthiness’ is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.”128 
The Court held, “[w]e are now of the view that a State may properly 
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s 
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the 
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the 
defendant.”129 The Court rationalized that it wanted to return 
individualism back to victim families, give them a “face,” allow the 
State the full moral force of its evidence, and allow the jury necessary 
information used to determine proper punishment.130 The Court 
opined, “there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in 
mind harm [caused by the defendant to a victim’s family] at the same 
time as it considers mitigating evidence introduced by the 
defendant.”131 The Court further held: 
 
Under the aegis of the Eighth Amendment, we have 
given the broadest latitude to the defendant to 
introduce relevant mitigating evidence reflecting on his 
individual personality, and the defendant’s attorney 
may argue that evidence to the jury . . . . [W]e now 
reject the view [of prior precedent] that a State may not 
permit the prosecutor to similarly argue to the jury the 
human cost of the crime of which the defendant stands 
convicted . . . . “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is 
due to the accuser also . . . .” We thus hold that if the 
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact 
evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, 
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.132 
 
 Another Tennessee case later reached the Supreme Court of 
the United States and was decided in 2006. Paul Gregory House 
(House) was convicted of a 1985 murder and sentenced to death, but 
new revelations raised doubts about his guilt.133 The Court found 
                                                 
128 Id. at 819. 
129 Id. at 825. 
130 Id. 
131 Payne, 501 U.S. at 826. 
132 Id. at 826-27 (emphasis in original) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 122 (1934)). 
133 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 521 (2006). 
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House presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual innocence 
so as to allow “access to a federal court to pursue habeas corpus relief 
based on constitutional claims that are procedurally barred under 
state law.”134 As a result of evidence developed by House’s lawyers 
subsequent to his trial, the Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings with the federal district court ordering Tennessee to retry 
or release him.135 After a stint on bail awaiting retrial, the State, in 
2009, dropped all charges.136 
 A third case of interest of Tennessee origin was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 2009. The issue raised by Gary Cone 
(Cone) was whether his right to due process was violated when the 
State of Tennessee suppressed evidence supporting his claim of drug 
addiction that included witness statements and police reports which 
potentially corroborated his defense at trial and should have bolstered 
mitigation of the death penalty he then received.137 “Cone asserted an 
insanity defense, contending that he had killed [an elderly couple in 
their home] while suffering from acute amphetamine psychosis, a 
disorder caused by drug addiction.”138  The Court found that Cone 
had not procedurally defaulted his Brady claim, that it had been fully 
considered by the state courts, and that it was ripe for federal 
adjudication.139 While the Court agreed that the withheld documents 
in violation of Brady were not material to Cone’s alleged insane 
mental state, it found the trial court failed to adequately consider 
whether that same evidence was material to mitigation efforts during 
sentencing.140 The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and remanded the case to the District Court to determine in the first 
instance whether there was a reasonable probability that the withheld 
evidence would have altered at least one juror’s assessment of the 
appropriate penalty for Cone’s crimes.141 Currently, Mr. Cone remains 
a resident of Tennessee’s Death Row.142 
 
                                                 
134 Id. at 521-22; See also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41. 
135 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41. 
136 Id. at 42. 
137 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 452-69. 
140 Id. at 452. 
141 Id. 
142 Fins, supra note 31, at 57. 
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VII. THE REALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TODAY 
  
 Within Tennessee’s capital punishment history, not unlike the 
rest of the United States, one can observe the influences on death 
penalty jurisprudence through what Chief Justice Warren described 
as the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”143 The ebb and flow of change regarding capital 
punishment in Tennessee was highlighted in previous sections of this 
paper. Reiterated from above, Tennessee did not execute anyone from 
1960 through 2000.144 From 2000 through 2012, Tennessee executed six 
people.145 Eighty-nine people remain under the care of the Tennessee 
Department of Correction on Death Row.146 I agree with what Justice 
Stewart opined over forty years ago that “the [death] penalty is so 
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to 
be of substantial service to criminal justice.”147 However, “capital 
punishment, under contemporary standards, is not to be viewed as 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime of murder.”148 
Accordingly, I disagree with Justice Stewart’s statement “that [death] 
sentences are ‘unusual’ in the sense that the penalty of death is 
infrequently imposed for murder . . . .”149 
 Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, a wise jurist in his sunset 
eighties, while elaborating on his then-held opinions about capital 
punishment, made statements that closely parallel my own beliefs on 
the subject. Justice Powell voted in favor of the death penalty during 
his term on the Court.150 After his retirement in 1987, Justice Powell 
expressed concern about the problem of excessively repetitious 
litigation in capital cases, and felt that if death sentences could not be 
enforced even where innocence of the defendant and fairness of his or 
her trial was not seriously in doubt, then perhaps legislative bodies 
should reconsider whether it was in the public’s interest to retain a 
                                                 
143 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
144 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 887, 894. 
145 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Feb. 24, 
2013). 
146 Fins, supra note 31, at 57. 
147 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972). 
148 Morgan, supra note 5, at 108-09. 
149 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309. 
150 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 216. 
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punishment enforced so haphazardly.151 He stated, “Capital 
punishment, though constitutional, is not being enforced, [and] . . . it 
reflects discredit on the law to have a major component . . . that is 
simply not enforced.”152 Justice Powell later unequivocally related he 
had come to think capital punishment should be abolished, not 
because it was intrinsically wrong, but because it could not be fairly 
and expeditiously enforced.153 His sense of dignity and his conception 
of the majesty of the law were offended by the endless waiting, 
perpetual litigation, last-minute stays, and midnight executions.154 
Justice Powell felt the spectacle of non-enforcement bred cynicism 
about the law’s announced purposes and contempt for courts that 
could not or would not carry those purposes to fruition.155 He felt it 
better to bar the whole ugly mess rather than continue an indecent, 
embarrassing, and wasteful charade.156 The totality of Justice Powell’s 
views describe the perceived reality about capital punishment now, 
two decades later. 
 Furthermore, our country’s think tank for model law utopia, 
The American Law Institute, recognized the dystopia of “the current 
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensur[e] a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,”157 
and withdrew the death penalty section of the Model Penal Code 
without unequivocally endorsing opposition to such penalties.158 
 
VIII. PLEA BARGAINING 
  
 While Justice Powell’s sentiments, in total, are spot on for the 
current state of capital punishment jurisprudence, I disagree with the 
ideas that the death penalty is of no use at all or that it is completely 
unworkable. The threat of a death sentence is a great plea bargaining 
tool. When a defendant’s life is “saved” by a plea bargained sentence 
                                                 
151 Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1046 
(1989) reprinted in COYNE & ENZEROTH, supra note 1, at 216. 
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of life without the chance of parole or “death by imprisonment,” both 
sides can argue a win. My experience with the death penalty as a 
bargaining tool was influenced in particular by two cases that 
impacted the Tennessee judicial district where I have spent my career 
in law enforcement. 
 The first case involved the carjacking and execution style 
murder of three of the four members of the Lillelid family in Greene 
County in 1997.159 The parents along with their six-year-old daughter 
and two-year-old son were carjacked by a group of six young 
Kentuckians at an Interstate 81 rest area, transported to a nearby rural 
road, and each of the family members were then shot.160 The bodies of 
the children were ritualistically placed in an inverted-cross fashion 
atop the bodies of their parents before the Lillelids were run over with 
their own van.161 The family was left for dead as the murderers fled; 
however, the two-year-old boy survived his injuries. Unfortunately, 
he was blinded in the eye where he had been shot and suffered 
impaired motor skills.162 The Lillelid murders became a salient 
incident that sparked a growing outcry for execution of convicted 
killers.163 Third Judicial District Attorney General, Berkeley Bell 
(General Bell), filed notice that the State would seek the death penalty 
for the four of the six defendants who were adults.164 The defendants 
later agreed to enter guilty pleas after the State agreed not to seek the 
death penalty but life in prison without the chance of parole 
instead.165 A newspaper reporter related General Bell’s rationale: 
 
While many have said justice in the case could be 
obtained only through executing the killers, prosecutor 
                                                 
159 Robert Moore, Court Rejects Lillelid Killer’s Appeal, CITIZEN TRIBUNE, March 
15, 2013, at A1. 
160Id. 
161 Id. at A1, A6. 
162 10 Years Ago Today…An Unforgettable Tragedy, GREENEVILLE SUN, April 6, 
2007, available at http://www.greenevillesun.com/Local_News/article/10-
Years-Ago-Today--An-Unforgettable-Tragedy-id-276122. 
163 Outcry For Death Penalty, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, April 20, 1997, available 
at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at left by date). 
164 Grand Jury Indicts-Death Penalty Sought, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, Sept. 3, 
1997, available at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at 
left by date). 
165 Lillelid Murder Suspects Plead Guilty, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, Feb. 20, 
1998, available at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at 
left by date). 
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Bell said after the six entered guilty pleas . . . that 
Tennessee's death penalty is “in name only.” With 
almost 40 years elapsed since an execution, Bell said a 
death sentence in Tennessee is an effective sentence of 
“life in prison without parole.” Bell said he had 
concerns a jury would be torn at sentencing because an 
alleged shooter—Bryant—would be ineligible for 
execution because of juvenile status, yet the four adults 
would face execution regardless of their shooting a 
victim or not. “Credibility problems” for two key 
prosecution witnesses—one with an existing criminal 
history, the other with a just-discovered felony 
record—also helped swing a decision to offer the six 
removal of the death penalty from sentencing 
consideration in exchange for their complete 
admissions of guilt.166 
 
Scattered appeals continue into 2013 as the defendants protest their 
plea deals.167 
 The second case involved the line-of-duty murder of Hawkins 
County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson in 2000.168 Deputy Gibson had 
been part of the team effort to serve an arrest warrant for attempted 
burglary on a suspect who barricaded himself in his home.169 Deputy 
Gibson stepped from cover to attempt to shoot a teargas canister into 
the suspect’s home and was shot in the head by the suspect.170 
General Bell also sought the death penalty in this case.171 A similar 
ensuing plea bargain was struck, the defendant entered a guilty plea, 
and he received a sentence of life without parole.172 General Bell 
stated: 
 
                                                 
166 Gina Stafford, Innocence Lost—Chance Encounter Led to Unthinkable Tragedy, 
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 1998, available at 
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All in all with the factors involved in the case, 
particularly for closure for the family [so] they can 
leave all of this behind and not have to relive it again, 
[w]e felt that the second alternative, that is death in the 
penitentiary by natural causes, was the appropriate 
course to take. It is very important for these types of 
cases to be over . . . . [A]fter our discussions with the 
family, we felt that putting it all behind us was very 
important and that is the basic reason that we decided 
to end it this way. [W]e reached an agreement . . . and 
proceeded as expeditiously as possible to close the 
matter out.173 
 
 These two cases evince the typical effectiveness of having the 
death penalty as a tool to sculpt a plea bargain to the mutual benefit 
of each party to the adversarial process. For my part, retention of 
capital punishment is preferred for the worst-of-the-worst to choose 
between the plea bargain or the gamble of a trial. Whether a 
defendant rolls the dice for trial and loses or takes the deal, the 
punishment fits the crime: death by execution or death by 
imprisonment. 
 
IX. WHAT IF IT WERE YOUR FRIEND? 
  
 Most people have not personally known a murder victim or 
the members of the victim’s immediate or impacted family, and it is 
my prayer that such remains a constant in as many lives as possible. 
Hawkins County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson was a colleague I 
considered a friend. We were acquainted as agents in the “war on 
drugs” who worked together on a few joint cases and who co-
attended some advanced training. “Bubba,” as Deputy Gibson was 
affectionately known, was a gifted conversationalist who made 
friends easily and who treated adversary criminals with respect. He 
was someone I looked up to as a mentor. I will always remember 
something that Bubba told me. During a war story swapping session, 
he was bemoaning the many hours spent building probable cause for 
a barely successful drug search warrant case. During the search, he 
had located only a few marijuana roaches from an ashtray. Not to be 
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dissuaded for too long, he commented, “At least, by God, they knew 
we were there!”174 
I distinctly remember the gut-wrenching feeling I experienced 
in reaction to Bubba’s murder. I was called out to travel to Hawkins 
County to offer critical incident stress peer support the night of his 
death, and the knot in my stomach was not from motion sickness due 
to traveling the winding rural roads to the top of the fog-covered 
mountain near where he died. The nausea did not leave for days after 
attending his funeral and honors burial. Yet I was many gradients 
away from the immense impact this line-of-duty murder inflicted 
onto his wife, his two daughters, his fellow team member in whose 
arms Bubba died, his other co-workers, his immediate family, friends, 
and community.  
 Aside from basal humanity, the defendant who executed 
Deputy Gibson exhibited no known redeeming qualities. A valuable 
life was sacrificed, and a likely remorseless, unrepentant life carries 
on at the taxpayers’ expense. Such a murderer even gains royalty-like 
“cred” in prison ranks as a cop killer. A 2007 survey showed 68% of 
Tennessee voters endorse the death penalty for murder.175 As a 
distant residual victim of this crime due to the loss of a friend, and 
even from that distance or more, something would be missing if the 
death penalty was always off the table as a potential term in the 





 In conclusion, it is my hope that we carry on utilizing a 
variation of Deputy Gibson’s sage words: with God’s help, let others 
know in a positive way that we are here. As for Tennessee’s death 
penalty, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and an 
effective tool that merits reprieve.  
                                                 
174 Conversation with Gerald Monroe Gibson, Deputy, Hawkins Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, in Morristown, Tenn. (Nov. 12, 1999). 
175 Mem. from Roy Occhiogrosso, James Delorey, & Gretchen Wagner, Global 
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TABLE 1: RACE OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON 
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011 
 
YEAR TOTAL WHITE % BLACK % OTHER % UNKN % 
2011176 14548 4729 32.5 5486 37.7 256 1.8 4077 28 
2010177 15094 4849 32.1 5770 38.2 251 1.7 4224 28 
2009178 15760 5286 33.5 5890 37.4 245 1.6 4339 27.5 
2008179 16277 5334 32.8 5943 36.5 273 1.7 4727 29 
2007180 17040 5278 31 6463 37.9 245 1.4 5054 29.7 
2006181 17399 5339 30.7 6843 39.3 295 1.7 4922 28.3 
                                                 
176 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2011, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2011 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-
table-3.  
177 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2010, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2010 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl03.xls. 
178 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2009, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2009 (2010), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html. 
179 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2008, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2008 (2009), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html. 
180 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2007, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2007 (2008), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html. 
181 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2006, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2006 (2007), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html. 
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2005182 17029 5452 32 6379 37.6 299 2 4899 28.8 
2004183 15935 5339 33.5 5608 35.2 271 1.7 4717 29.6 
2003184 16043 5132 32 5729 35.7 308 1.9 4874 30.4 
2002185 15813 5356 33.9 5579 35.3 274 1.7 4604 29.1 
2001186 15488 5174 33.4 5521 35.6 273 1.8 4520 29.2 
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& RACE, 2004 (2005), available at 
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& RACE, 2003 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
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185 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2002, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 2.6, MURDER OFFENDERS BY 
AGE, SEX, & RACE, 2002 (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2002/table2-6_offendersage02.xls. 
186 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE 
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us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2001/table2-6_offendersage01.xls. 
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TABLE 2: RACE OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST 
DATA, 2002-2011  
YEAR TOTAL WHITE % BLACK % OTHER % 
2011
187
 295 128 43.4 164 55.6 3 1 
2010
188
 272 114 41.9 154 56.6 4 1.5 
2009
189
 368 141 38.3 222 60.3 5 1.4 
2008
190
 327 119 36.4 201 61.5 7 2.1 
2007
191
 313 110 35.1 202 64.5 1 0.3 
2006
192
 342 113 33 224 65.5 5 1.5 
2005
193
 358 140 39.1 210 58.7 8 2.2 
2004
194
 329 132 40.1 192 58.4 5 1.5 
                                                 
187 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2011, 24, 
(2012), available at 
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188 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2010, 26, 
(2011), available at 
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(2010), available at 
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(2009), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2008%20Crime%20
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(2008), available at 
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N%202007.pdf. 
192 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2006, 26, 
(2007), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2006%20All%20Ag
encies%20Combined.pdf. 
193 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2005, 27, 
(2006), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202005%20Complete.pdf. 
194 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2004, 25, 
(2005), available at 
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nnessee%202004.pdf. 




 316 137 43.4 177 56 2 0.6 
2002
196
 353 146 41.4 207 58.6 0 0 
TOTAL 3273 1280 39.1 1953 59.7 40 1.2 
 
  
                                                 
195 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2003, 25, 
(2004), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2003_CIT_Complet
e.pdf. 
196 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2002, 22, 
(2003), available at 
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N%202002.pdf. 
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TABLE 3: SEX OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON 
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011 
 
YEAR TOTAL MALE % FEMALE % UNKN. % 
2011
197
 14548 9458 65.2 1138 7.8 3925 27 
2010
198
 15094 9972 66.1 1075 7.1 4047 26.8 
2009
199
 15760 10391 65.9 1197 7.6 4172 26.5 
2008
200
 16277 10568 64.9 1176 7.2 4533 27.8 
2007
201
 17040 10975 64.4 1206 7.1 4859 28.5 
2006
202
 17399 11508 66.1 1151 6.6 4740 27.2 
2005
203
 17029 11117 65.3 1246 7.3 4666 27.4 
2004
204
 15935 10262 64.4 1130 7.1 4543 28.5 
2003
205
 16043 10218 63.7 1123 7 4702 29.3 
2002
206
 15813 10285 65 1108 7 4420 28 
2001
207
 15488 10126 65.4 1086 7 4276 27.6 
TOTAL 176426 114880 65.1 12636 7.2 48883 27.7 
 
  
                                                 
197 See supra note 176.  
198 See supra note 177. 
199 See supra note 178.  
200 See supra note 179. 
201 See supra note 180. 
202 See supra note 181. 
203 See supra note 182. 
204 See supra note 183. 
205 See supra note 184. 
206 See supra note 185. 
207 See supra note 186. 
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TABLE 4: SEX OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST 
DATA, 2002-2011 
YEAR TOTAL MALE % FEMALE % 
2011
208
 295 263 89.2 32 10.8 
2010
209
 272 241 88.6 31 11.4 
2009
210
 368 325 88.3 43 11.7 
2008
211
 327 299 91.4 28 8.6 
2007
212
 313 282 90.1 31 9.9 
2006
213
 342 302 88.3 40 11.7 
2005
214
 358 314 87.7 44 12.3 
2004
215
 329 290 88.1 39 11.9 
2003
216
 316 276 87.3 40 12.7 
2002
217
 353 317 89.8 36 10.2 
TOTAL 3273 2909 88.9 364 11.1 
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